評論
打印
Across the full spectrum of international institutions—the G8 and G20, the IMF, OECD, ILO, WTO, and others—we are working to level playing fields and encourage robust and fair economic activity. Just as the WTO eliminated harmful tariffs in the 1990s, today we need institutions capable of providing solutions to new challenges, from some activities of state-owned enterprises to the kinds of barriers emerging behind borders.
我們還通過各種國際機構組織——如8國集團、20國集團、國際貨幣基金組織、經合組織、國際勞工組織、世貿組織等——來努力實現平等的競爭環境，鼓勵健全而公平的經濟活動。正如上世紀90年代世貿組織廢除了有害的關稅，今天我們需要有一些機構來提供辦法，解決從國有企業的某些活動到境內出現壁壘等新問題。
We also support innovative partnerships that develop norms and rules to address these new concerns. We should build on the model of the Santiago Principles on sovereign wealth funds, which were negotiated jointly by host governments, recipient governments, the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the sovereign funds themselves. This code of conduct governing sovereign investment practices has reassured stakeholders — investor nations, recipient nations, and the private sector. And it may prove a useful model for other shared challenges, like ensuring that state-owned companies and enterprises compete on the same terms as private companies.
我們支持有創意的合作關系，針對這些新問題制定標準和規則。我們應借鑒有關主權財富基金的《圣地亞哥原則》模式，這些原則是由東道國政府、接受國政府、世界銀行、國際貨幣基金組織、經合組織以及主權基金等共同談判而成。管理主權投資活動的行為準則消除了利益相關方——如投資國、接受國、以及私營公司——的疑慮。這對于解決其他共同的問題或許是一個有用的模式，如確保國有公司和企業與民間公司按照同樣的規則進行競爭。
As a second step, we are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS, will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea’s economy grow by 6 percent. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers to reaching new customers.
第二個步驟是，我們將謀求一種新型的貿易協定，使它們在開拓新市場同時，提升公平競爭的標準。例如，《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》，即KORUS，將在5年時間內取消美國95%的消費品和工業出口產品關稅。僅消除關稅就能為美國出口產品帶來100億美元以上的增長，并促使韓國經濟增長6%。所以，無論是美國機械制造商，還是韓國化學品出口商，這一協定均為獲得新客戶減少了障礙。
But this trade deal isn’t simply about who pays what tariff at our borders. It is a deeper commitment to creating conditions that let both our nations prosper as our companies compete fairly. KORUS includes significant improvements on intellectual property, fair labor practices, environmental protection and regulatory due process.
然而，這項貿易協定并非只涉及誰在我們的邊界支付多少關稅的問題。它是更深一層的承諾，即創造條件，讓兩國在彼此公司的公平競爭中走向繁榮。《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》涵蓋了在知識產權、公正對待勞工、環保及正當監管程序上的明顯改進。
And let me add that the benefits of KORUS extend beyond the economic bottom line. Because this agreement represents a powerful strategic bet. It signals that America and South Korea are partners for the long term—economically, diplomatically, people to people. So, for all these reasons, President Obama is pursuing congressional approval of KORUS, together with necessary Trade Adjustment Assistance, as soon as possible. He is also pursuing passage of the Colombia and Panamanian Free Trade Agreements as well.
讓我補充一點——該協定的好處不限于經濟底線。它意味著有力的戰略性抉擇。它標志著，美國與韓國在經濟、外交和民間交流領域是長期合作伙伴。因此，奧巴馬總統正在謀求國會盡快批準《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》，以及必要的“貿易調整援助”計劃。他也在謀求批準與哥倫比亞和與巴拿馬的自由貿易協定。
Now, we have learned that, in our system, getting trade deals right is challenging, painstaking work. But it's essential. We consider KORUS a model agreement. Asian nations have signed over 100 bilateral trade deals in less than a decade, but many of those agreements fall short on key protections for businesses, workers, and consumers. There are a lot of bells and whistles, but many of the hard questions are glossed over or avoided.
我們認識到，在我們的體制內，達成適中的貿易協定要通過艱難和痛苦的努力。但它十分重要。我們認為《韓國與美國自由貿易協定》是一個典范協定。在過去不到10年時間內，亞洲國家簽署了100多項雙邊貿易協議，但許多這類協議未能為商家、工人和消費者提供關鍵性的保護。它們在形式上應有盡有，但忽視或規避了許多艱難的問題。
