I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.
我相信市場上存在著許多沒有效率的現象。這些來自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資人成功地掌握了價格與價值之間的缺口。華爾街的“群眾”可以影響股票價格,當最情緒化的人、最貪婪的或最沮喪的人肆意驅動股價時,我們很難辯稱市場價格是理性的產物。事實上,市場經常是不合理的。
I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, “I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don't you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million.” I would decline —— perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice —— now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!
我想提出有關報酬與風險之間的重要關系。在某些情況下,報酬與風險之間存在著正向關系。如果有人告訴我“我有一支六發彈裝的左輪槍,并且填裝一發子彈。你可以任意地撥動轉輪,然后朝自己扣一次扳機。如果你能夠逃過一功,我就賞你100萬美元。”我將會拒絕這項提議——或許我的理由是100萬美元太少了。然后,他可能建議將獎金提高為500萬美元,但必須扣兩次扳機 ——這便是報酬與風險之間的正向關系!
The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it's riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.
在價值投資法當中,情況恰巧相反。如果你以60美分買進一美元的紙鈔,其風險大于以40美分買進一美元的紙鈔,但后者報酬的期望值卻比較高。以價值為導向的投資組合,其報酬的潛力愈高,風險愈低。
One quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post , Newsweek , plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.
我可以舉一個簡單的例子:在1973年,華盛頓郵報公司的總市值為8千萬美元。在這一天,你可以將其資產賣給十位買家之一,而且價格不低于4億美元,甚至還能更高。該公司擁有華盛頓郵報、商業周刊以及數家重要的電視臺。這些資產目前的價值為4億美元,因此愿意支付4億美元的買家并非瘋子。
Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million. And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each. Since you don't have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that's not a difficult job.
現在,如果股價繼續下跌,該企業的市值從8千萬美元跌到4 千萬美元,其bate值也上升。對于用bate值衡量風險的人來說,更低的價格使它受得更有風險。這真是仙境中的愛麗絲。我永遠無法了解,用4千萬美元,而非8千萬美元購買價值4億美元的資產,其風險竟然更高。事實上,如果你買進一堆這樣的證券,而且稍微了解所謂的企業評價,則用8千萬美元的價格買進4億美元的資產,這筆交易基本上沒有風險,尤其是分別以800萬美元的價格買進10種價值4000萬美元的資產,其風險更低。因為你不擁有4億美元,所以你希望能夠確實找到誠實而有能力的人,這并不困難。
You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don't try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.
另外,你必須有知識,而且能夠粗略地估計企業的價值。但是,你不需要精密的評價知識。這便是本杰明·葛拉厄姆所謂的安全邊際。你不必試圖以8000萬美元的價格購買價值8300萬美元的企業。你必須讓自己保有相當的緩沖。架設橋梁時,你堅持載重量為3萬磅,但你只準許1萬磅的卡車穿梭其間。相同的原則也適用于投資領域。
In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis , yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I've practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It's likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.
有些具備商業頭腦的人可能會懷疑我撰寫本文的動機:更多人皈依價值投資法,將會縮小價值與價格之間的差距。我只能夠如此告訴各位,自從本杰明·格雷厄姆與大衛 ·多德出版《證券分析》,這個秘密已經流傳了50年,在我奉行這項投資理論的35年中,我不曾目睹價值投資法蔚然成風。人的天性中似乎存在著偏執的特色,喜歡把簡單的事情弄得更復雜。最近30年來,學術界如果有任何作為的話,乃完全背離了價值投資的教訓。它很可能繼續如此。船只將環繞地球而行。但地平之說仍會暢行無阻。在市場上,價格與價值之間還會存在著寬廣的差值,而奉行格雷厄姆與多德理論的人也會繁榮不絕。