華特的投資組合極為分散，目前擁有的股票遠(yuǎn)越過 100支。他了解如何選股，將價(jià)格遠(yuǎn)低于其價(jià)值者出售給私人投資者。這便是他所做的一切。他不擔(dān)心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不關(guān)心今年是不是大選年。他的想法非常單純，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能夠以40美分買進(jìn)，我遲早會(huì)獲利。他便是如此不斷地行動(dòng)：他所持有的股票種類遠(yuǎn)比我的多 ——而且比我更不關(guān)心企業(yè)的本質(zhì)；我對華特似乎沒有太大的影響力。這是他的長處之—，沒有人能夠?qū)λa(chǎn)生足夠的影響力。

　　The second case is Tom Knapp， who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war； when he came back from the war， he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis， and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School， where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd's course again， and took Ben Graham's course. Incidentally， 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach！

　　第二個(gè)案例是湯姆· 科納普，他曾經(jīng)和我一起在Greham—Newman公司工作。湯姆于大戰(zhàn)之前曾在普林斯頓大學(xué)主修化學(xué)，大戰(zhàn)結(jié)束之后，他經(jīng)常在海灘游蕩。某一天，他得知大衛(wèi)·多德將在可倫比亞大學(xué)開夜間投資課程。湯姆以旁聽方式選修該課程，之后他對投資學(xué)科產(chǎn)生了濃厚的興趣，于是正式注冊進(jìn)入哥倫比亞大學(xué)商學(xué)院，并且獲得了MBA學(xué)位。35年之后，我撥電話給湯姆，確定某些有關(guān)此一主題的事，我發(fā)現(xiàn)他仍然在海灘游蕩。惟—的差別是。他目前擁有一片海灘！

　　In 1968， Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson， also a Graham disciple， along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion， formed Tweedy， Browne Partners， and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy， Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses， but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.

　　在1968年，湯姆與艾德·安德生——也是葛拉漢的信徒——以及其他一、兩位有共同信念的人，組成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投資高度分散。他們偶爾會(huì)從事控制股權(quán)的投資，但其被動(dòng)式的投資績效約略等于控權(quán)式投資的表現(xiàn)。

　　Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then， in a sense， Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it， it has been satisfactory.

　　表3是格雷厄姆－紐曼公司第三位員工的投資業(yè)績記錄。他在1957年成立巴菲特合伙公司。他做出的最明智的決策是在1969年結(jié)束合伙公司。從此之后，伯克夏。哈撒韋公司在某種程度上成為合伙公司的延續(xù)。我無法給各位單一的指數(shù)，用以合理地測試伯克夏公司的投資管理。但是，我認(rèn)為各位不論如何考驗(yàn)它，它的表現(xiàn)一直都令人滿意。

　　Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund， which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham's class， Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School， he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben's course at Columbia， where we met in early 1951. Bill's record from 1951 to 1970， working with relatively small sums， was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners， so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time， just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners， to an amazing degree， not only stayed with him but added money， with the happy result shown here.

　　表四是紅杉基金經(jīng)理人比爾·盧昂的投資業(yè)績記錄，我在 1951年格雷厄姆的講座中認(rèn)識(shí)他。哈佛商學(xué)院畢業(yè)之后，他進(jìn)入華爾街。稍后，他發(fā)覺需要接受真正的商業(yè)教育，于是參加了格雷厄姆在哥倫比亞大學(xué)開辦的講座，我們便相逢于1951年初。從1951年到1970年間。比爾所管理的資金規(guī)模相當(dāng)小，績效卻遠(yuǎn)比大盤來得好。當(dāng)我結(jié)束巴菲特合伙公司的業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)，我要求比爾成立—個(gè)基金公司，來管理我們合伙股東的資金，他于是成立了紅杉基金。他成立基金的時(shí)機(jī)非常不利。他面臨兩個(gè)層次的市場，以及以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向的投資者相當(dāng)難以運(yùn)作的情況。我十分樂于提及一點(diǎn)。我的合伙股東不僅繼續(xù)委托他管理，還投入更多的資金，而且對他的表現(xiàn)十分贊賞。