表6 的投資業績屬于查理的一位好朋友——另一位非商學系出身的人——他畢業于南加州大學的數學系。畢業之后，他進入IBM，曾經擔任推銷員的工作。在我網羅查理之后，查理又網羅他。他的名字是瑞克·吉林。從1965年到]983年，史坦普指數的復利成長率為316％，而瑞克的績效為22200％，這或許是因為他缺乏商學教育背景，他可以視為具有統計上的顯著性。

　　One sidelight here： it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn't take at all. It's like an inoculation. If it doesn't grab a person right away， I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records， and it doesn't make any difference. They just don't seem able to grasp the concept， simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin， who had no formal education in business， understands immediately the value approach to investing and he's applying it five minutes later. I've never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It's instant recognition， or it is nothing.

　　在此撇開主題：以40美分的價格買進一美元的紙鈔，人若不能夠立即接受這項概念，就永遠不會接受它。它就像注射藥劑。如果它無法立即抓住這個人，則我認為即使你長期地說服他，并且展示各種記錄，你也無法讓他接受。這是很單純的概念，但他們就是無法領悟。類似瑞克這樣的人，他完全沒有正式商學教育的背景，卻可以立即領會價值投資法，并且在五分鐘之后便加以利用。我從來不曾見過任何人，會在10年之后才逐漸地皈依這種方法。它似乎和智商或學術訓練無關。它是頓悟，否則就是拒絕。

　　Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter. Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs. We happened to be in the same building in Omaha. In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did， so he left advertising. Again， it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.

　　表7是史坦。波爾米塔（Stan Perlmeter）的投資業績。他畢業于密西根大學藝術系，是Bozell＆Jacobs廣告公司的合伙股東之—。我們的辦公室恰好于奧瑪哈市的同一幢大樓。1965年，他認為我所經營的事業比他的行業要好，于是他離開廣告業。再—次地，史坦于五分鐘之內就接受了價值投資法。

　　Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made independently . But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it's because he's getting more for his money than he's paying. That's the only thing he's thinking about. He's not looking at quarterly earnings projections， he's not looking at next year's earnings， he's not thinking about what day of the week it is， he doesn't care what investment research from any place says， he's not interested in price momentum， volume， or anything. He's simply asking： what is the business worth？

　　史坦所持有的股票與華特的不同。他所持有的股票也和比爾不同。他們都是獨立的記錄。但是，史坦買進每—支股票時，都是因為他所獲得的價值高于他所支付的價格。這是他惟一的考慮。他既不參考每一季的盈余預估值，也不參考明年的盈余項估值，他不在乎當時是星期幾，也不關心任何的投資研究報告，他無視價格動能、成交量與其他類似的變數。他只提出一個問題：該企業值多少錢？

　　Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I've been involved in. They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement； they are the only two I have influenced. In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers. Very， very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint. Table 8 is the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund. It was with a large bank some years ago， and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.

　　表8與表9的投資業績記錄分別屬于我參與的兩家退休基金，它們并非是從我所參與的十幾種退休基金中選擇出來的，他是唯一兩家我能夠影響其投資決策的退休基金。在這兩家基金中，我引導他們轉變為價值導向的投資管理人，只胡非常少數的基金是基于價值進行投資管理的。表8是華盛頓郵報公司退休基金（the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund）的投資業績記錄。幾年之前，他們委托一家大型銀行管理基金，后來，我建議他們聘請以價值為導向的基金經理，這樣能夠使投資業績更好。*本段采用劉建位的翻譯

　　As you can see， overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change. The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds， which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers. So I've included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds. They wouldn't have said they did. Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game， they were in the top percentile of fund management. The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.

　　正如你在投資記錄中所看到的那樣，從他們更換基金經理之后，其整體投資業績在所有基金中一直名列前茅。華盛頓郵報公司要求基金經理人至少保持25 %的資金投資于債券，而債券未必是基金經理人的投資選擇。因此，我在表中也將其債券投資業績包括在內，而這些數據表明他們其實并沒有什么特別的債券專業技巧，他們也從未這樣吹噓進自己，雖然有25%的資金投資于他們并不擅長的債券領域，從而拖累了他們的投資業績，但其基金管理業績水平仍然名列前一百名之內。華盛頓郵報公司退休基金的投資盡管并沒有經過一個很長的市場低迷時期的考驗，但仍然足以證明三位基金經理的許多投資決策并非后見之明。*本段為編輯增加，采用劉建位的翻譯

　　Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund. I don't manage a dime of it myself but I did， in 1974， influence their decision to select value-oriented managers. Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies. They now rank number one in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this “conversion” to the value approach. Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year. Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P. The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million. FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers. Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominators of selecting securities based on value.

　　表9的投資業績屬于FMC公司退休基金，我本人沒有管理過這家基金的一分錢，但我的確在1974年影響了他們的決策，說服他們選擇以價值為導向的基金經理。在此之前，他們采取與其他大型企業相同的方式來選擇基金經理。在他們轉向價值投資策略之后，其投資業績目前在貝克退休基金調查報告（the Becker survey of pension funds）中超越其他同等規模基金而名列第一。1983年時，該基金共有8位任職1年以上的基金經理，其中7位累積投資業績超過標準普爾指數。在此期間，FMC基金的實際業績表現與基金平均業績表現的凈回報差額是2.43億美元，FMC將此歸功于他們與眾不同的基金經理選擇傾向，這些基金經理未必會是我個人中意的選擇，但他們都具有一個共同的特點，即基于價值來選擇股票。*本段采用劉建位的翻譯

　　So these are nine records of “coin-flippers” from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven't selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It's not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners —— people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect， character， and temperament. It's very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average； note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style， these investors are， mentally， always buying the business， not buying the stock . A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses. Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude， whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business， is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks； others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

　　以上這9項投資業績記錄都來自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市”　的“銅板投擲者”，是我根據他們的投資決策架構，在多年前便選定了他們。我了解他們所接受過的訓練，而且知道他們的智慧、個性和脾氣。我們務必了解，這群人只承擔了一般水準以下的風險；留意他們在股市疲弱期間的記錄。他們的投資風格雖然大不相同，但心態上始終恪守：買進的標的是企業，而非企業的股票。他們當中有些人偶爾會買下整個企業，但是他們經常只是購買企業的—小部分。不論買進整體或一部分的企業，他們所秉持的態度完全相同。在投資組合，有些人持有幾十種的股票；有些人則集中少數幾支股票。但是，每個人都受惠于企業市場價格與其內含價值之間的差值。