我所要考慮的這一群成功投資者，共有一位共同的智力族長——本杰明·格雷厄姆。但是，這些離開此智力家族的孩童，都是依據(jù)非常不同的方法猜測他們自己的“銅板”。他們各自前往不同的地方，買賣不同的股票和企業(yè)，但他們的綜合績效絕對無法用隨機因素加以解釋。他們做相同的猜測，并不是因為領(lǐng)導者下達某一項指令，因此也無法用這種方式解釋他們的表現(xiàn)。族知只提供了猜測銅板的智力理論，每位學生都必須自行決定如何運用這項理論。

　　The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this： they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially， they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday， or whether it is January or July， etc. Incidentally， when businessmen buy businesses， which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks —— I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday， I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors， needless to say， do not discuss beta， the capital asset pricing model， or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact， most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables： price and value.

　　來自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資者所具備的共同智力結(jié)構(gòu)是：他們探索企業(yè)的價值與該企業(yè)市場價格之間的差異。事實上，他們利用其間的差異，卻不在意效率市場理論家所關(guān)心的問題：股票究竟在星期一或星期—：買進，或是在一月份或七月份買進……。當企業(yè)家買進某家公司時——這正是格雷厄姆一多德都市的投資者透過上市股票所從事的行為——我懷疑有多少人會在意交易必須發(fā)生于某個月份或某個星期的第一天。如果企業(yè)的買進交易發(fā)生在星期一或星期五沒有任何差別，則我無法了解學術(shù)界人士為何要花費大量的時間和精力，探討代表該企業(yè)部分股權(quán)的交易發(fā)生時的差異。毋庸多說，格雷厄姆一多德都市的投資者并不探討bate、資本資產(chǎn)定價模型、證券投資報酬本的變異數(shù)。這些都不足他們所關(guān)心的議題。事實上，他們大多數(shù)難以界定上述學術(shù)名詞。他們只在乎兩項實數(shù)：價格與價值。

　　I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior， the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before？ Of course， the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now， in the age of computers， there are almost endless data available about them. It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility； it's simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired， it seems sinful not to use them， even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said， to a man with a hammer， everything looks like a nail.

　　面對圖形分析師所研究的價量行為，我始終感覺驚訝。你是否會僅僅因為某家公司的市場價格在本周或前一周劇揚。便決定購買該企業(yè)呢？在日前電腦化的時代，人們之所以會大量研究價格與成交量的行為，理由是這兩項變數(shù)擁有了無數(shù)的資料。研究未必是因為其具任何功用；而只是因為資料既然存在，學術(shù)界人士便必須努力學習操作這些資料所需要的數(shù)學技巧。—旦擁有這些技巧，不去運用它們便會帶來罪惡感，即使這些技巧的運用沒有任何功用，或只會帶來負面功用。也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所說的，對一位持鐵錘的人來說，每—樣事看起來都像是釘子。

　　I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally， despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price， volume， seasonality， capitalization size， etc.， upon stock performance， no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

　　我認為，這一群具有共同智力起源的投資者非常值得我們研究。雖然學術(shù)界不斷地對價格、成交量、季節(jié)性、資本規(guī)模以及其他變數(shù)，研究它們對股票績效的影響，但這群以價值為導向贏家的方法卻毫不受人關(guān)心。

　　I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four —— I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham's class， but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously！ After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up， and it's possible to trace the record of three.

　　關(guān)于這一項績效的研究，我首先要追溯到從1954年到 1956年間，工作于Greham—Newman公司的四位伙伴。我們總共四個人——我并不是從數(shù)以千計的對象中挑選這四個人。在我選修本杰明·格雷厄姆的課程之后，我要求進人Graham—Newman公司擔任無給職的工作，但格雷厄姆卻以價值高估而拒絕了我的要求。他對價值看得非常嚴重！經(jīng)我不斷地懇求，他最后答應雇我。當時公司有三位合伙股東，以及我們四位“學徒”。公司結(jié)束經(jīng)營之后，我們四個人陸續(xù)在1955年到1957年間離開公司，目前只能夠追蹤其中三個人的投資記錄。

　　The first example （see Table 1*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件） is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college， but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what “Adam Smith” —— after I told him about Walter —— wrote about him in Supermoney （1972）：

　　第一個案例（*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件）是華特·史洛斯。華特從來沒有念過大學，但他在紐約金融協(xié)會參加了本杰明·葛雷厄姆的夜間課程。華特在1955年離開Greham—Newman公司。以下是“亞當·史密斯”——在我和他談論有關(guān)華特的事跡之后——在《超級金錢》（Supermoney，1972年） 一書中對他所做的描述：

　　He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports， and that's about it.

　　他從來不運用或接觸有用的資訊。在華爾街幾乎沒有人認識他，所以沒有人提供他有關(guān)投資的觀念。他只參考手冊上的數(shù)字，并要求企業(yè)寄年報給他，情況便是如此。

　　In introducing me to （Schloss） Warren had also， to my mind， described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other people's money， and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.” He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real —— and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety” principle.

　　當華特介紹我們認識時，他曾經(jīng)描述“他從來沒有忘記自己是在管理別人的資金，這進一步強化了他對于風險的厭惡。”他有高尚的品格。并以務實的態(tài)度自持。對他來說。金錢是真實的，股票也真實的——并從此而接受了“安全邊際”的原則。