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There's no hindsight involved here. Bill was the only person I recommended to my partners， and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor's， that would be solid performance. Bill has achieved well over that， working with progressively larger sums of money. That makes things much more difficult. Size is the anchor of performance. There is no question about it. It doesn't mean you can't do better than average when you get larger， but the margin shrinks. And if you ever get so you're managing two trillion dollars， and that happens to be the amount of the total equity valuation in the economy， don't think that you'll do better than average！
其中并不涉及后見之明。比爾是我推薦給合伙股東的惟一人選，我當時就表示，如果他的績效能夠高出史坦普指數四個百分點，這便是非常穩固的表現。比爾的績效遠甚于此，而且所管理的資金規模不斷地擴大。這使得管理愈來愈困難。資金規模是績效的拖累，這是毫無疑問的。這并不意味當資金規模擴大，你的表現便無法超越平均水準，只是超越的幅度會縮小。如果你所管理的資金是2兆美元，則你的表現必然無法超越平均水準，因為你的資金規模便是整個股票市場的總市值。
I should add that in the records we've looked at so far， throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value， but they make their selections very differently. Walter's largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages. Tweedy Browne's selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand， Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very， very low. These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.
我必須補充說明一下，截至目前我們所觀察的記錄，投資組合在整段期間都幾乎沒有重疊。他們都是根據價格與價值間的差異來選股，選擇的標的也截然不同。華特的最重要持股都是扎實的企業，如Hudson Pulp&Paper、Jeddo HighHand Coal、New York Trap Rock Company，即使是偶爾閱讀金融版新聞的人，對這些企業的名稱也耳熟能詳。帝地布朗公司所選擇的標的則更是名不見經傳的企業。另一方面，比爾的選擇標的則是大型企業。這些投資組合極少出現重疊現象。他們的記錄并非由某人主導的猜測銅板，其他人則只聽命附和。
Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate， who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter's. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance， and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration， with the results shown. Incidentally， this record belongs to Charlie Munger， my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership， however， his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.
表5的投資業績來自于我的—位朋友，他畢業于哈佛法學院，并且成立了一家主要的法律事務所。我大約在1960年認識他，并且建議說，法律作為嗜好是件好事，但是他應該做得更好。于是，他成立了一家合伙公司，他的操作方式和華特迥異，他的投資組合集中在極少數的證券，因此績效的變動比較激烈，但他仍然依據相同的價值折價法從事投資。他愿意接受績效的上下震蕩，而他恰好是一位精神極度集中的人。他的名字是查理·蒙格，他是我在柏克夏公司從事操作的長期合伙股東。當他自己經營合伙事業時，他的投資組合和我或任何先前所提到的人完全都不同。
