評(píng)論
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Then, what did you do next?
那么，接下來你們?cè)趺醋龅模?/p>
We made more.
我們干勁倍增。
We worked harder.
并且更加努力。
We said: ‘This is great. Let’s do more.’
我們?cè)?jīng)說過：“這事兒挺不錯(cuò)， 讓我們做得更棒些。”
I mean, the Mac market share is going up every single quarter.
我的意思是，Mac的市場(chǎng)份額每個(gè)季度都有增長。
We’re growing four times faster than the industry.
我們的增長速度比整個(gè)行業(yè)快4倍。
People are starting to pay a little more attention.
人們開始關(guān)注我們。
We’ve helped it along.
而且我們正保持著這個(gè)勢(shì)頭。
We put Intel processors in and we can run PC apps alongside Mac apps.
我們把因特爾處理器放了進(jìn)來，于是我們不僅可以運(yùn)行Mac軟件，
We helped it along.
還可以運(yùn)行PC上的應(yīng)用程序。
But I think a lot of it is people have finally started to realize that they don’t have to put up with Windows
我認(rèn)為這件事情最重要的一點(diǎn)在于，人們終于意識(shí)到，他們沒必要再忍受Windows了,
—that there is an alternative.
其實(shí)還有另一個(gè)選擇。
I think nobody really thought about it that way before.
我認(rèn)為在此之前，從來沒人這樣想過。
Why did you get the idea to launch the Apple store?
為什么會(huì)想開設(shè)蘋果專賣店？
It was very simple.
很簡單。
The Mac faithful will drive to a destination, right?
蘋果的信徒們將會(huì)駕車駛向一個(gè)目的地，對(duì)吧？
They’ll drive somewhere special just to do that.
他們會(huì)開車去一個(gè)特別的地方做喜歡做的事。
But people who own Windows—we want to convert them to Mac.
但是對(duì)于Window用戶來說——我們想要他們轉(zhuǎn)而使用Mac。
They will not drive somewhere special.
他們不會(huì)開車去特別的地方。
They don’t think they want a Mac.
他們覺得自己不需要Mac電腦。
They will not take the risk of a 20-minute drive in case they don’t like it.
他們甚至不愿意花上20分鐘開車來瞅瞅，他們擔(dān)心自己壓根兒就不喜歡蘋果。
But if we put our store in a mall or on a street that they’re walking by,
但是如果我們把店面開在大商場(chǎng)里或者大街上，人們會(huì)經(jīng)常走過路過，
and we reduce that risk from a 20-minute drive to 20 footsteps,
而我們就可以將20分鐘的車程縮短為20步的距離。
then they’re more likely to go in because there’s really no risk.
他們進(jìn)來參觀的可能性就大大增加了，這樣就不用付出什么成本。
So we decided to put our stores in high-traffic locations.
所以我們決定將蘋果專賣店開到車流密集的區(qū)域。
And it works.
它確實(shí)奏效了。
Will you catch tech’s next wave?
你們會(huì)趕上下一波技術(shù)熱潮嗎？
Things happen fairly slowly, you know.
事情的發(fā)展速度其實(shí)十分緩慢，這你也是知道的。
They do.
確實(shí)如此。
These waves of technology, you can see them way before they happen,
這些一波接一波的技術(shù)熱潮，都是可預(yù)見的。
and you just have to choose wisely which ones you're going to surf.
你要做的，只是精明地選擇站在哪兒。
If you choose unwisely, then you can waste a lot of energy,
如果你站錯(cuò)隊(duì)，那么你就會(huì)浪費(fèi)許多精力。
but if you choose wisely it actually unfolds fairly slowly.
但是如果你走對(duì)方向，它呈現(xiàn)的速度也是相當(dāng)之緩慢。
It takes years.
可能要花上幾年。
One of our biggest insights years ago
多年前，我們最具前瞻性的觀點(diǎn)之一，
was that we didn’t want to get into any business where we didn’t own or control the primary technology
就是不要涉足任何我們不具備或不能掌控核心技術(shù)的領(lǐng)域，
because you’ll get your head handed to you.
否則你會(huì)被殺得片甲不留。
We realized that almost all一 maybe allof future consumer electronics,
我們意識(shí)到，對(duì)于全部的——或許是全部，未來的消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品而言，
the primary technology was going to be software.
軟件都將是核心技術(shù)。
And we were pretty good at software.
而我們?cè)谲浖I(lǐng)域?qū)嵲谑堑眯膽?yīng)手。
We could do the operating system software.
我們會(huì)做操作系統(tǒng)。
We could write applications on the Mac or even PC, like iTunes.
可以在Mac甚至PC上編寫像iTunes—樣的各種程序。
We could write the software in the device,
可以編寫設(shè)備軟件，
like you might put in an iPod or an iPhone or something.
就像你可以放在iPod或者iPhone或者其他設(shè)備中的程序。
And we could write the back-end software that runs on a cloud, like iTunes.
同樣我們也可以編寫像iTunes—樣的后臺(tái)軟件。
So we could write all these different kinds of software and make it work seamlessly.
因此，我們可以編寫多種軟件，讓它們交織在一起嚴(yán)絲合縫地協(xié)同工作。
And you ask yourself, What other companies can do that?
試問還有哪些其他公司可以做到這點(diǎn)？
It’s a pretty short list.
寥寥無幾。
The reason that we were very excited about the phone, beyond that fact that we all hated our phones,
在發(fā)現(xiàn)了人們厭倦自己手機(jī)的事實(shí)之后，我們對(duì)自己的手機(jī)產(chǎn)品變得極端興奮，
was that we didn’t see anyone else who could make that kind of contribution.
原因在于，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)除了我們沒人能為此作出貢獻(xiàn)。
None of the handset manufacturers really are strong in software.
沒有任何一個(gè)掌上設(shè)備制造商在軟件領(lǐng)域有實(shí)力。
