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After the Great Recession, in contrast, most central banks (the Bank of Japan being a notable exception) were content to prevent prices falling, and have not actively worked to make up lost output.
相比之下，大衰退后，大多數(shù)央行（日本銀行是一個(gè)特殊的例外）都滿足于防止物價(jià)下跌，而且沒有主動(dòng)地去恢復(fù)失去了的產(chǎn)出。
As a result, the recovery has been much weaker than in previous cycles, including the Depression, and monetary policy has taken longer to return to normal, leaving economies poorly prepared for the next recession.
其結(jié)果就是，復(fù)蘇要比在以前的周期中，包括大蕭條，弱了很多；同時(shí)，貨幣政策也用了更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間來恢復(fù)正常，從而就使得各個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體對(duì)下一次危機(jī)準(zhǔn)備不足。
Similarly, the Great Recession demonstrated the value of automatic fiscal stabilisers, but governments failed to seize the opportunity to link tax and benefits more closely to the business cycle.
同樣，大衰退展示了自動(dòng)財(cái)政穩(wěn)定機(jī)制的價(jià)值。但是，各國(guó)政府卻沒能抓住機(jī)會(huì)，將稅收和福利更加密切地與商業(yè)周期聯(lián)系在一起。
Indeed, rules that have recently been adopted, such as Europe's fiscal compact, constrain rather than harness fiscal policy.
實(shí)際上，最近被采納的一些規(guī)則，如歐洲的財(cái)政契約，與其說是駕馭財(cái)政政策，倒不如說是遏制財(cái)政政策。
The Depression enabled radical change by discrediting untrammelled capitalism and the elites who supported it.
通過讓不受約束的資本主義和支持它的精英名譽(yù)掃地，大衰退是的激進(jìn)改革成為可能。
That had dangerous side-effects: it also empowered fanatical and dangerous political outsiders.
這帶來的危險(xiǎn)的負(fù)面效應(yīng)：它也讓狂熱和危險(xiǎn)的政治局外人獲得了權(quán)力。
Though financial and political elites were not spared a populist backlash after the Great Recession, they have largely kept their seat at the table, blocking the enactment of bolder reforms.
盡管政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)營(yíng)們?cè)诖笏ネ酥鬀]有逃脫民粹主義的反攻倒算。但是他們大都抱住了自己的位置，阻礙了更大膽改革的施行。
The success of the response to the downturn helped avoid some of the disasters of the 1930s.
應(yīng)對(duì)這場(chǎng)衰退的成功曾為避免上世紀(jì)30年代的那種災(zāi)難立下了汗馬功勞。
But it also left the fundamentals of the system that produced the crisis unchanged.
但是，它也讓造成了這場(chǎng)危機(jī)的這一體系的根本原封未動(dòng)。
Ten years on, the hopes of radical reform are all but dashed.
十年過去了，激進(jìn)改革的希望已經(jīng)灰飛煙滅。
The sad upshot is that the global economy may have the opportunity to relearn the lessons of the past rather sooner than hoped.
這種不幸的結(jié)果在于，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)有可能比預(yù)想的還要快地有機(jī)會(huì)去重溫過去的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。
