Although dangerous financial vulnerabilities in America will take time to build up again, the present financial peace is likely to be far shorter than the 75 years that separated the Depression and the Great Recession.
盡管危險的金融脆弱性在美國要花一定的時間去再次累計,但是,當前的金融和平有可能遠遠短于間隔了大蕭條和大衰退的75年。
That would be less troubling had the world made itself more robust to future crises after the last one.
要是世界各國在上次危機后使自己在面對未來危機時更加強健,這種情況就會不那么令人揪心了。
In the years after the Depression, sweeping banking and financial reforms created new regulatory institutions and placed tight constraints on financial behaviour, which made finance a very boring industry for most of the next half-century.
在大蕭條之后的數年間,全面的銀行業和金融改革造就了各種全新的監管制度,并對金融行為施加了嚴格的限制,這一度使得金融在接下來的50年中成為一種非常枯燥的行業。

From the 1980s to the 2000s, those restrictions were largely undone: banks were given freer rein over the activities they could engage in and products they could create.
在上世紀80年代到本世紀頭十年間,這些限制打都被廢除了:銀行被賦予了對其可能從事的行為以及可能創造出來的產品的更自由的掌控。
The financial crisis could not have occurred without this liberalisation.
這場金融危機要是沒有這種自由化是不可能爆發的。
Yet in its wake, the financial sector has been treated relatively gently.
然而,在其爆發之后,金融部分卻受到了相對溫柔的對待。
Oversight and disclosure have been improved and capital-adequacy rules toughened.
監督和披露得到了改善,資本充足性規則得到了強化。
But some of these rules are now being relaxed, at least in America, and the financial industry's weight in the world economy has scarcely changed.
但是,其中的一些規則如今,至少是在美國,正在得到松綁。同時,金融行業在世界經濟中反而分量幾乎沒有變。
As a share of American GDP it has actually increased somewhat since 2007.
作為美國GDP的一項占比,自2007年以來,它實際上是增加了。
The stabilisation policies used in the Great Recession were vastly superior to those of the Depression.
較之大蕭條期間,用于大衰退中的各種穩定政策高明了許多。
But today's governments have done a worse job of learning from experience than did their forebears.
但是,較之他們的前輩,今天的各國政府在從經驗中吸取教訓這個方面就做得差的遠了。
Franklin Roosevelt did not simply seek to restore growth.
富蘭克林·羅斯福沒有簡單地尋求恢復增長。
Rather he promised reflation in order to make up the ground lost during the downturn.
相反,他承諾了通脹,以便收回衰退中的失地。