評論
打印
This time it may be different, because there has been a shift in power from the regional to the central authorities, and the local officials of the banks are no longer under the control of the local provincial authorities — but success cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, China may be dragged by a global slowdown. But if Cbhina flounders, the global economy loses its motor. Therefore the relative success of China is more assured than its absolute success.
這一次，也許有所不同，因?yàn)闄?quán)力從地方轉(zhuǎn)移到了中央，地方銀行的官員不再受省級機(jī)關(guān)管轄。盡管如此，成功也不能被視作理所當(dāng) 然。此外，中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展可能會受困于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。但如果中國出了問題，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)就會失去了動力。因此，中國會獲得相對成功而不是絕對的成功。
We are at a moment in history which, in some ways, is comparable to the end of the Second World War. Then the prevailing system had actually collapsed and a new one had to be built from scratch. At Bretton Woods, the victorious powers proved equal to the task. Inspired mainly by Lord Keynes, they built a system that could accommodate the entire world even if the United States was more equal than others. Now, the prevailing multilateral system — call it international capitalism — did not fully collapse but it has been greatly weakened, its inherent flaws have been revealed, and it is challenged by a viable alternative. The rise of China offers a fundamentally different form of economic organization than the current international financial system. It may be given the label of "state capitalism" as distinct from the international capitalism championed by the Washington Consensus.
從某些方面來說，我們現(xiàn)在所處的歷史時(shí)刻堪比二戰(zhàn)末期。那時(shí)，主宰體系實(shí)際已經(jīng)崩潰，一個(gè)新的體系亟待建立。戰(zhàn)勝國在布雷頓森林會議上證實(shí)了這一任務(wù)的公平性。在凱恩斯勛爵的啟發(fā)下，他們建立了一個(gè)能容納全世界的體系，盡管美國享有“更平等”的權(quán)利。當(dāng)前，居于主導(dǎo)地位的被稱作國際資本主義多邊體系盡管還沒有徹底瓦解，但已被大大削弱。它的內(nèi)在缺陷已暴露，而且面臨著被一個(gè)可行的體系替代的威脅。中國的崛起提供了一個(gè)與目前國際金融體系截然不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)組織形式。它可能會被貼上“國家資本主義”的標(biāo)簽，以區(qū)別于《華盛頓共識》所倡導(dǎo)的“國際資本主義”。
