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NE of the least convincing things about the European Union’s energy and climate policy is the brazen catchiness of its slogan1: 20-20 -20. This refers to a 20% reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions and 20% share for renewable energy sources by 2020. The idea that rigorous analysis of the right policies happened to echo the target date seems, at best, trivially2 amdescending3. At least this week’s suggestion by the European Commission that the EU should consider unilaterally moving to a 30% cut in C02 has the merit of showing that something other than public relations and numerology is at work.
歐盟能源和氣候政策中一個最缺乏說服力的條款就是那個響亮的口號： 20-20-20o它的含義是到202_實現二氧化碳減排20%,并且可再生能源的比例達 到20%。對適當的政策的全面分析，以回應達成目標的時間似乎充其量只是無關痛 癢的謙辭。至少歐盟委員會本周提出的單方面把二氧化碳減排目標提高到30%的 彭義就沒有顧及公共關系和現狀。
Yet for many that is the limit of its appeal. The French and German governments have already come out against the plan. The main business lobby group in Brussels is opposed as well. Their argument is that bigger cuts would burden business at a difficult time, both by increasing the cost of carbon for such large emitters4 as the steel and cement industries, and by raising the price of electricity for everyone else. The commission’s own analysis gives numbers for these. It puts the cost of achieving a 30% reduction (compared with 1990 emissions levels) in 2020 at 81 billion ($99 billion) a year, against only 48 billion to deliver the 20% target.
但對多人來說，那正是歐盟委員會提案的命門。法國和德國政府已經對這個 計劃表示了反對。布魯塞爾的主要游說集團也表示了反對。他們的觀點就是過高的 減排會在困難時期增加公司的負擔,不僅會增加鋼鐵、水泥等排放大戶的開銷，還 會造成電價上漲，給別人增加負擔。歐盟委員會自己提供了這方面的分析數據。到2020年實現減排30%的目標(相對于1990年的排放水平)，每年的支出是810^歐元 (99(低美元),而減排20%的開支僅為每年480億歐元。
That 48 billion is a lot less than the 70 billion cost estimated for the 20% target in 2008, mainly because the recession has already reduced emissions. Green enthusiasts have seized on this to argue that 30% could be had today for little more than 20% was had then. They also point to analysis by the European Climate Foundation, among others, which says that efficiency savings as a result of the 30% policy might save as much or more than its cost.
4800億歐元的開支遠低于2008年估計的700^歐元，其主要原因是經濟衰退巳 經減少了排放量。綠色環保人士抓住了這一點，認為只需要比以往多付出一點努 力，就能使減排目標從20%上升到30%。他們還拿出了歐洲氣象的分析數據，聲稱減 排30%帶來的效率提升節省的開支甚至高于達成這一目標的支出。
These arguments are hardly compelling. If the existing policy becomes cheaper because of the recession, why not just pocket the difference and be thankful for small mercies? Even if the calculated gains from the proposal were real (and they may not be), championing diffuse5 benefitsover identifiable costs is always hard politics. A similar argument goes for claims that, by spurring more vibrant green technology, the 30% cut would create lots of jobs, exports and the like.
這些觀點很難有說服力。如果說當前的政策因為經濟衰退而變得更為便宜,那 么為什么不見好就收呢？即使上面的計算是真實的(其實有可能不是），分散的利益 和明確的支出也很難作為決策的依據。一個相類似的觀點就是如果使用更多的綠 色科技，30%的減排將會增加大量的工作機會、出口等等。
The weightiest argument for looking at a 30% cut is that it is already EU policy in certain circumstances. At the Copenhagen climate negotiations last December, the EU tried to demonstrate leadership by repeating a 2007 pledge that it would increase its planned cuts to 30% if it judged the commitments by others to be suitably inspiring. They never were, so it never did. Were dramatic new pledges of cuts to be made by other countries in future, the 30% cut for the EU would quickly become an obligation. But after Copenhagen that seems highly unlikely.
要求減排30%的一個最重量級的理由就是它在某些情況下已經是歐盟的既成 政策。在去年12月的哥本哈根氣候大會上，歐盟試圖通過重復2007年的承諾展示自 己的領導地位，其承諾就是如果其他國家的目標非常宏大，那么歐盟就會把減排 目標提高到30%。這種情形沒有發生,因此歐盟也沒有這么做。如果在將來其他國 家的目標變得非常積極，那么30%減排很快就會成為歐盟的責任。但是自從哥本哈 根氣候大會之后’這躲變得不可能了。
The commission would thus face an uphill task to win approval for a unilateral 30% target. Still, the underlying reasons for it have some cogency. The leadership role that Europe once played in climate politics is gone, and those who would regain it need to have something to offer. More fundamentally, Europe now has a large and costly carbon market that is meant to drive the economy towards low_ emission technologies. But the price it sets on emissions is too low. A 30% target would mean raising the cost of carbon in that market, although, since many industrial users get free allowances, the burden of paying this would still be spread unequally. There may be other ways to raise carbon costs that have more appeal: a rising EU-wide carbon tax, for example, that would be imposed in some form on imports too. But would this be any easier to deliver?
歐盟委員會爭取30%的減排目標絕不會一帆風順。歐盟委員會建議的背后還 有一些深層次的原因。歐洲在氣候政策里曾經的領導地位已經消失，想重新獲得這 種地位，就需要拿出一些措施。從更基本的原因上來說，歐洲現在二氧化碳排放的 市場很大，代價也很高，這意味著經濟發展的趨勢是低排放技術。但是現在排放的 代價太低了。30%的減排目標意味著提高排放的價格，但是，由于許多企業都有免 費的福利，因此各個企業的負擔會變得不均衡。也許有其他的方式來提高二氧化碳 排放的價格，比如說在歐盟范圍內提高二氧化碳稅，這也會以某種方式影響進口。 但是這容易嗎？
