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Mr Singh did not accept this fatalism.
辛格先生并不接受這種宿命論。
Blame for India’s stagnant exports lay not just with global forces outside India’s control, but with “stumbling blocks” that Indian officials had left in exporters’ way.
印度出口的停滯不僅是因為印度無法控制的全球力量，還因為印度官員給出口商設置了“絆腳石”。
“Official policy has been far too slow in recognising the necessity of a sustained export drive,” he wrote in 1963.
“官方政策遲遲未能認識到持續出口驅動的必要性。”辛格在1963年寫道。
As finance minister almost 30 years later, he had a chance to put his ideas into action.
近30年后他成為財政部長，有機會將自己的想法付諸行動。
In 1991 the country was on the brink of a financial crisis.
1991年，印度處于金融危機的邊緣。
To secure an international loan, the central bank had to air-lift gold to London.
為了獲得國際貸款，印度中央銀行不得不空運黃金到倫敦。
It was clear that India needed to cut spending by reducing the budget deficit.
很明顯，印度需要通過減少預算赤字來削減開支。
Mr Singh also believed it could “switch” spending by devaluing the rupee.
辛格先生還認為，印度可以通過使盧比貶值來“轉換”支出。
The cheaper currency attracted foreign demand for India’s exports and discouraged spending on imports.
盧比貶值吸引了外國對印度出口的需求，并抑制了在進口方面的支出。
These two measures might have been enough to solve the immediate crisis.
這兩項措施或許足以解決眼前的危機。
But Mr Singh seized his chance to do more.
但是辛格先生抓住機會做了更多事情。
The rupee devaluation gave him cover to cut import tariffs and remove export subsidies.
趁盧比貶值，他削減了進口關稅并取消了出口補貼。
He also gave firms freedom to grow without a licence.
他還讓企業無需許可證即可自由經營。
The reforms reinforced each other, as Montek Singh Ahluwalia, his ally, has pointed out.
正如他的盟友蒙特克·辛格·阿盧瓦利亞所指出的，這些改革相得益彰。
India, for example, found it easier to attract investment from Japan when it became possible for Japanese expats to import food items from their home country.
例如，印度發現，當日本僑民可以從日本進口食品時，吸引日本的投資就變得更容易。
Mr Singh’s legacy is vast.
辛格先生留下了巨大的遺產。
Lant Pritchett of the London School of Economics and co-authors have tried to add up all of the additional goods and services India produced from 1993 to 2002 that an unreformed economy would not have.
倫敦經濟學院的蘭特·普里切特及其合著者嘗試把印度在1993年至2002年間產生的所有額外商品和服務加起來，如果沒有貿易改革，這些商品和服務是不會產生的。
Converted into today’s dollars and appropriately discounted (as benefits were spread over years) the total could exceed $1.5trn.
換算成現在的美元，并進行適當的折算后（因為收益分攤在很多年），這些商品和服務的總額可能超過1.5萬億美元。
As prime minister from 2004 to 2014, Mr Singh reaped some of what he had sowed.
在2004年至2014年擔任總理期間，之前播下的一些種子給辛格先生帶來了收獲。
The economy grew briskly until a spate of corruption scandals paralysed government decision-making.
經濟增長一直很活躍，直到一連串的腐敗丑聞使政府決策陷入癱瘓。
Foreign capital was often plentiful.
外國資本一直很充足。
Dollars poured in from exports of IT services, an industry the fatalists did not foresee.
IT服務出口帶來了源源不斷的美元，IT是宿命論者沒有預見到的行業。
India’s foreign-currency reserves, $1bn in 1991, exceeded $280bn by the end of his tenure.
印度的外匯儲備在1991年為10億美元，到辛格總理任期結束時超過了2800億美元。
Despite this change, India is still insecure about its position in the global division of labour.
盡管發生了這種變化，印度仍然對其在全球勞動分工中的地位感到不安全。
Its tariffs are higher than most of its Asian peers.
印度的關稅比大多數亞洲國家都要高。
It refused to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an Asian trade deal, because it feared Chinese competition.
它拒絕加入亞洲貿易協定《區域全面經濟伙伴關系協定》，因為擔心來自中國的競爭。
Some economists doubt India can ever emulate East Asia’s industrial success, given its restrictive land and labour laws.
一些經濟學家懷疑，由于印度的土地和勞動法具有限制性，印度是否能夠效仿東亞的工業成功。
Mr Singh has passed away. Export fatalism lives on.
辛格先生已經去世，但出口宿命論存而不亡。
