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All that equates to an avalanche of work for investment bankers.
所有這些對投資銀行家來說都意味著海量的工作。
The industry’s staffing model, meanwhile, is ill-suited to spikes in demand.
與此同時，該行業的招聘模式并不適合員工需求激增的情況。
“If the large banks aren’t able to pay their best people well, they lose them all,” explains one headhunter.
“如果大型銀行不能給最優秀的員工支付高薪，他們就會全部流失，”一位獵頭解釋道。
The only way to do that and remain profitable is to be ruthless about headcount, running teams with “very little fat” in normal times.
要做到這一點，并保持盈利的唯一方法是精簡團隊成員，在正常時期用“極少的成本”管理團隊。
When business balloons, as it did in 2021, those lean teams very quickly end up working at full capacity—at which point the only options are to poach people from elsewhere or to turn down business.
在業務膨脹時，就像2021年那樣，這些精簡的團隊很快就會滿負荷工作，到那時，唯一的辦法就是從其他地方挖人或者拒絕業務。
The result is a fierce, zero-sum skirmish between banks for skilled staff.
其結果是銀行之間為爭奪熟練員工展開了一場激烈的零和沖突。
At the same time, the list of other firms offering bankers eye-watering salaries has lengthened.
與此同時，還有更多其他公司向銀行家們開出了令人垂涎的薪水。
Private-equity funds have long piggybacked off the training offered by the big investment banks, luring talent away with better pay and slightly gentler working hours.
長期以來，私募股權基金一直都依靠大型投資銀行提供的培訓，以更高的薪酬和更人性化的工作時間來吸引人才。
Banks in America are particularly vulnerable, with a supersized private-investment industry offering just as supersized compensation.
美國的銀行尤其脆弱，要面臨龐大的私人投資行業提供的可觀薪水。
(Blackstone, one of the biggest such firms, received 29,000 applications for 100 junior-level jobs in 2021.)
(最大的此類公司之一黑石集團(Blackstone)，在2021年收到了2.9萬份應聘100個初級職位的申請。)
In recent years, these have been joined by a growing cohort of dealmakers going it alone and taking firms public via special-purpose acquisition companies.
近年來，越來越多的交易人團體開始單干，通過特殊目的的收購公司將公司上市。
m&a boutiques, which advise on mergers without the full-service offering of an investment bank, entice still more bankers away from banking.
在沒有投資銀行提供全方位服務的情況下，為并購提供建議的小型并購公司吸引了更多的銀行家離開銀行業。
Third, there has indeed been a shift in workers’ attitudes -- just not one that results from them being unwilling to hack the hours of their predecessors.
第三，員工們的態度確實發生了轉變——只不過并不是因為他們不愿意減少前輩的工作時間。
Florian Pollner of McKinsey, a consultancy, describes how in conversations with human-resources bosses, a theme that comes up time and again is younger workers’ more modular approach to their careers.
麥肯錫咨詢公司的弗洛里安·波勒納描述了在與人力資源主管的對話中，一個反復出現的主題是，年輕員工對待職業的方式更加模塊化。
Instead of looking for jobs for life, they seek out roles they can spend a few years in and then leave with broader options.
他們找的不是能干一輩子的工作，而是能讓自己在其中待上幾年，然后有了更多選擇并離開的職位。
That works in banks’ favour for recruiting junior staff: their graduate schemes are still seen as excellent preparation for a career.
這對銀行招聘初級員工有利：它們的畢業生計劃仍被視為為職業生涯做了極好的準備。
But it also puts pressure on attrition rates in an industry already known for the mercenary outlook of its employees.
但在一個員工唯利是圖的行業，這也給員工流失率帶來了壓力。
These forces are changing the way banks recruit and retain their staff.
這些力量正在改變銀行招聘和留住員工的方式。
Many have long tried to draw employees from a more diverse pool.
許多公司長期以來一直試圖從更多樣化的人群中吸引員工。
That task is now more urgent, and goes beyond lines like race and gender.
這項任務現在更加緊迫，而且超越了種族和性別等界限。
Mr Pollner sees banks at all levels recruiting from a much broader range of universities than they used to—and, just as important, trying to hire people with personalities “different to the stereotype of the average banker”.
波勒認為，與過去相比，各個級別的銀行開始從更寬范圍的大學中招聘員工——同樣重要的是，銀行也在招聘性格“與人們對一般銀行家的刻板印象不同”的人。
Retention efforts have a darker side, too: an investment manager at a London private-equity fund reports having hired juniors from two separate banks, only to have both receive letters from their former employers suggesting they might have to repay bonuses (in the end, they did not).
為了留住員工，這些努力也有其陰暗的一面：倫敦的一家私募股權基金的投資經理報告稱，他們從兩家不同的銀行聘用了初級員工，結果他們都收到了前雇主的來信，暗示其可能需要歸還獎金(但最終，他們并沒有這么做)。
The net result within investment banking is likely to be a widening gap between the largest and most profitable banks, chiefly American ones, and “second-tier” firms, including European banks.
這一切在投資銀行內部產生的最終結果可能是，最大和最賺錢的銀行(主要是美國銀行)與“二線”公司(包括歐洲銀行)之間的差距會越來越大。
The latter have long had to pay more, and take greater risk, to compensate for not having the prestige and huge domestic market of the Wall Street giants.
長期以來，后者都被迫付出更多，承擔更大的風險，只為彌補缺乏華爾街巨頭那樣的聲望和龐大的國內市場。
That has sometimes had dire consequences: Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank have suffered such frequent losses from scandals and exposure to dubious clients that they have become the butt of industry jokes.
這有時會帶來可怕的后果：瑞士信貸(Credit Suisse)和德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)曾因丑聞和可疑客戶的曝光而頻繁遭受虧損，以至于它們成了業界的笑柄。
As second-tier banks struggle to muster the financial firepower to recruit senior talent, that problem will only worsen.
二線銀行越來越難集中財力聘請高級人才，這個問題只會更加惡化。
The fewer skilled staff they attract, the less deal-flow they capture, and the faster their investment banks must shrink.
他們吸納的熟練員工越少，獲得的交易流就越少，投資銀行就會萎縮地更快。
In recent years many European banks have been forced to flee Wall Street, or close their racier outfits altogether.
近年來，許多歐洲銀行被迫逃離華爾街，或者干脆關閉其活躍的分支機構。
More of them may become casualties of the talent war raging at the cutting edge of capitalism.
在資本主義的刀口之下，有更多人可能會成為受害者。
