評論
打印
If India's statistics are overstated, who or what is to blame?
如果印度的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)被夸大，那么哪些人或物應(yīng)受到責(zé)怪呢？
Political meddling is an inadequate answer, although this government, under Narendra Modi, has done plenty to arouse suspicion.
僅責(zé)怪政治干預(yù)是不夠的，雖然在納倫德拉·莫迪領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的政府已經(jīng)做了很多引起懷疑的事情。
In November statisticians revised down growth figures from last decade, taking the shine off the previous government's record.
在11月，統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家對過去十年的增長數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了下調(diào)，使上屆政府的政績黯然失色。
In January they revised up growth in 2016-18, the two fiscal years most affected by Mr Modi's daft
在1月，他們上調(diào)了2016-18年的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，這兩個財(cái)年受到了莫迪愚蠢行為
and disruptive decision to remove highdenomination bank notes from circulation. Both exercises raised eyebrows.
以及取消流通高面額紙幣的破壞性決定的極大影響。兩項(xiàng)行動均引人側(cè)目。
But Mr Subramanian sidesteps these two recent controversies, excluding the latest revisions from his analysis.
但薩勃拉曼尼亞先生回避了這兩個近期的爭議問題，將最新的修訂排除了他的報(bào)告。
Instead he concentrates his fire on a more fundamental technical change:
相反，他把精力集中在一個更根本的技術(shù)變革上：
a new method of calculating GDP, from 2011-12 onwards, that was adopted in early 2015.
2015年初采用了一種計(jì)算GDP的新方法，從2011年至2012年開始。
Much of the preparation for this switch dated back to the previous government.
這一轉(zhuǎn)變的大部分準(zhǔn)備工作可以追溯到上屆政府。
And one of the new method's strangest results was an upward revision of growth in the tumultuous year before Mr Modi took office,
而新方法最奇怪的結(jié)果之一是對莫迪上任前動蕩年份的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長進(jìn)行了上調(diào)，
when the economy was reeling from high inflation and capital outflows. That contradicts the charge of political interference.
當(dāng)時經(jīng)濟(jì)正受到高通脹和資本外流的沖擊。這與政治干預(yù)的指控相矛盾。
Why would Mr Modi's government fiddle the figures to flatter its hated predecessor?
莫迪政府為何要篡改數(shù)據(jù)，以討好其令人憎恨的前任呢？
The new method may nonetheless suffer from other shortcomings.
盡管如此，新方法可能還存在其他缺點(diǎn)。
It may, for example, have failed to cope with the drop in oil prices in 2014.
例如，它可能無法應(yīng)對2014年的油價下跌。
To illustrate: if an Indian company imports 10,000 rupees-worth of crude oil and adds 100 rupees of value to it,
舉例來說：如果一家印度公司進(jìn)口價值一萬盧比的原油并增加100盧比的價值，
it might sell the refined product for 10,100 rupees.
它可能會以10100盧比的價格出售這種精制產(chǎn)品。
If the oil price subsequently halves, the company might try selling the same product for 5,110 rupees, boosting its margin.
如果油價隨后下跌一半，該公司可能會試著以5110盧比的價格出售同樣的產(chǎn)品，以提高利潤率。
An unwary statistician might conclude that Indian prices have dropped dramatically.
一個不太謹(jǐn)慎的統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家可能會得出結(jié)論，印度的物價已大幅下跌。
But the Indian part of the total (the only bit that matters for GDP) has increased in price (from 100 to 110 rupees).
但是其中印度的那一部分（GDP中唯一重要的部分）價格上漲了（從100盧比漲到了110盧比）。
The confused statistician may then treat an increase in rupee profits as evidence of real growth, not merely higher prices.
然后困惑的統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家可能會將盧比利潤的增長視為實(shí)際增長的證據(jù)，而不僅僅是價格上漲。
Such problems are less likely in more developed G20 countries, which keep better track of the prices of inputs.
在更發(fā)達(dá)的20國集團(tuán)（G20），此類問題不太可能發(fā)生，因?yàn)檫@些國家對投入價格的跟蹤能力更強(qiáng)。
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