賄賂
Graft work
移花接木
A new study lights up the shadows
無(wú)處遁形
GONE are the days when multinationals could book bribes paid in far-flung countries as a tax-deductible expense. These days would-be palm-greasers have to contend with ever-tougher enforcement of old laws, such as America's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and a raft of new ones in countries from Britain to Brazil.
有種日子一去不復(fù)返了,想當(dāng)年,跨國(guó)公司可以先行賄,然后在遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)找個(gè)國(guó)家支付以抵扣公司稅。 如今,想要伸手的人必須面對(duì)依然嚴(yán)峻的原有法令,例如1977年的美國(guó)反海外賄賂法,以及從英國(guó)到巴西等國(guó)家的一大堆新頒法令。

As policing is stepped up, however, much about the practice of bribery remains murky. The OECD's first report on the subject, published on December 2nd, sheds some light by analysing more than 400 international bribery cases that have been brought since the anti-bribery convention of this group of mostly rich countries came into force in 1999.
雖然加強(qiáng)了監(jiān)管,但是,許多賄賂行為仍然在暗處作祟。國(guó)際經(jīng)合組織首次就此問(wèn)題撰寫(xiě)的首次報(bào)告在12月2日發(fā)表,通過(guò)分析從1999年主要是由發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家組成的該組織頒布的反賄賂公約生效以來(lái)的超過(guò)400起跨國(guó)賄賂案例,而發(fā)人深省。
Some findings confirm what was known or suspected. The most bribe riddled sectors are oil, gas, mining, construction and transport. At the other end of the spectrum, financial services and retailing are fairly clean. Most bribes go to managers of state-owned companies, followed by customs officials. And America leads the enforcement pack, with 128 cases that resulted in sanctions (see chart).
一些調(diào)查結(jié)果證實(shí)了那些所知到的和所懷疑的東西。賄賂最泛濫的領(lǐng)域是石油、天然氣、采礦、建筑和運(yùn)輸業(yè)。而在該序列的另一端,金融服務(wù)和零售業(yè)則相當(dāng)清白。大多數(shù)賄賂聚焦在國(guó)有企業(yè)的管理人員,其次是海關(guān)官員。美國(guó)查處力度最大,處置了128起案件。
But the report also undermines some common beliefs. Bribery is not a sin of rogue employees or poor countries. In 53% of cases payments were made or authorised by corporate managers (and in 12% of them by the chief executive). More than 40% of the time, the bribe-taking official was in a developed country (though this figure is probably inflated by rich countries' greater willingness to criminalise bribery and co-operate with cross-border investigations). Authorities are often alerted by firms themselves: those that co-operate quickly are often treated leniently.
但報(bào)告也對(duì)一些常識(shí)造成了沖擊。賄賂不是居心不良的員工和貧窮國(guó)家才有的罪惡。在53%的案件中由公司管理者親自或授權(quán)支付賄款,其中12%由總裁進(jìn)行。超過(guò)40%的案件中,受賄的公務(wù)人員來(lái)自發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家(雖然這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)可能被發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的懲治賄賂以及進(jìn)行跨國(guó)協(xié)作調(diào)查的強(qiáng)烈意愿夸大了)。當(dāng)局常常收到公司自己的報(bào)案:畢竟坦白從寬嘛。
Nevertheless, the cleanest countries tend to be rich, and the dirtiest poor. Four of the five best-performing countries in Transparency International's latest corruption-perceptions index, also published this week, were Nordic. The worst were North Korea and Somalia. (Interestingly, China's score slipped despite a recent high-profile campaign against corrupt officials.)
盡管如此,最清廉的國(guó)家仍然是那些富國(guó),而最糟糕的還是窮國(guó)。五個(gè)在“透明國(guó)際”組織最新的清廉指數(shù)中(也是本周剛剛發(fā)布)表現(xiàn)得最好的國(guó)家是北歐。最差的是朝鮮和索馬里。(有意思的是,盡管近期有高調(diào)的反腐運(yùn)動(dòng),中國(guó)的評(píng)分仍然下降了)
The cost of bribery varies by industry. Builders pay a modest average of 4% of a transaction's value; extractive companies a hefty 21%. Add to that the rising costs of paying penalties and conducting internal probes—these cost Siemens, for example, $2.4 billion when it was mired in a graft scandal a few years ago—and bribery starts to look bad not just for reputations, but also for bottom lines.
行賄的成本因行業(yè)而異。建筑商平均支付成交價(jià)的4%,較為適中;而采掘業(yè)企業(yè)則高達(dá)21%。加上那些日益上升的罰款和進(jìn)行內(nèi)部調(diào)查的支出(以西門(mén)子為例,當(dāng)數(shù)年前深陷貪污門(mén)之時(shí),這些費(fèi)用高達(dá)24億美元),于是,如今行賄可不僅僅是名譽(yù)上看起來(lái)不妙,更關(guān)乎盈虧生死。
Even for firms that are not caught, the business case for bribery is far from clear. A 2013 study by Harvard Business School and America's National Bureau of Economic Research found that what bribe-paying companies gain in higher sales in corrupt countries, they lose in lower profit margins. According to the OECD, the average bribe costs 11% of the transaction's value and 35% of associated profits.
即使是對(duì)那些還沒(méi)有東窗事發(fā)的公司,搞賄賂的生意也是一攤爛賬。2013年由哈佛商學(xué)院和美國(guó)全國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局的研究表明,行賄公司雖然在一些腐敗國(guó)家的贏得了更高的銷(xiāo)售額,但實(shí)際上由于降低了利潤(rùn)率而蒙受損失。根據(jù)經(jīng)合組織的調(diào)查,平均的行賄支出占到交易額的11%和相關(guān)利潤(rùn)的35%。
Nevertheless, graft remains alive and well. One of the OECD report's authors told a conference this week that 390 cases are under investigation—not far short of the total number resolved since the OECD convention took effect 15 years ago. The number of cases concluded each year has dipped since a peak in 2011 as the time taken to complete investigations and prosecutions has climbed to more than seven years, from under four in 2008.
即使這樣,貪腐仍然搞得有聲有色。經(jīng)合組織報(bào)告的一位作者在本周的一次會(huì)議上談到目前正在調(diào)查390起案件,與自從經(jīng)合組織公約15年前生效以來(lái)已了結(jié)總案件數(shù)差的不遠(yuǎn)了。每年結(jié)案的數(shù)量自從2011年達(dá)到峰值以來(lái)逐年下降,因?yàn)槟钦_(kāi)展全面調(diào)查和起訴,從2008年不到4起攀升到七年來(lái)的最高峰的時(shí)候。
One possible reason for the slowdown is that bribery techniques are growing more sophisticated and thus harder to detect. Another could be the widespread use of opaque corporate structures to conceal wrongdoing. These can be devilishly difficult to unpick, especially when they are stacked in several layers and fronted by nominee directors. Anonymous shell companies and other intermediaries—sometimes dressed up as “consultants”—were used to move or to house payments in more than 70% of cases. The OECD report underlines the importance of cracking down on the misuse of shell companies and enforcing more clarity over ownership of companies and trusts, whether through accessible corporate registers—a move being pushed by some G20 countries, led by Britain—or by tougher regulation of service providers that do the paperwork for new firms.
放緩的原因之一是收受賄賂的手段越來(lái)越玄妙,從而更難于察覺(jué)。另一個(gè)原因可能是普遍使用的不透明公司結(jié)構(gòu)隱匿了丑行。剝離這些結(jié)構(gòu)異常艱難,特別當(dāng)是這種組織層層堆疊,由提名董事來(lái)在前面頂缸的時(shí)候。在70%的案例中,匿名的皮包公司和其他中間人(通常扮演“顧問(wèn)公司”角色)用來(lái)轉(zhuǎn)移或隱匿所支付款項(xiàng)。經(jīng)合組織的報(bào)告凸顯了打擊濫用空殼公司和明晰公司及信托公司權(quán)屬的重要性,要么是通過(guò)方便的公司注冊(cè)檢索(一些G20國(guó)家推動(dòng)了該項(xiàng)運(yùn)動(dòng),由英國(guó)牽頭),要么對(duì)負(fù)責(zé)經(jīng)辦新公司事宜的服務(wù)商的嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管。 翻譯:沈竹 校對(duì):劉苗苗