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“Coco” bonds
“可可”債券
Mass conversion
大規模轉變
Investors are panting for a risky new form of bonds issued by banks
風險投資者們在尋求銀行已發行債券之冒險新形勢
IT TOOK three separate bail-outs to get KBC, a Belgian bank, through the financial crisis. So one might expect bonds that automatically get wiped out if the bank runs into trouble again to reward investors handsomely. Not so: KBC's “contingent convertible” bonds, designed to lose all their value in a crisis, yield a meagre 4% a year. Egged on by investors, banks are issuing such securities in growing amounts. Regulators are watching anxiously.
為平安度過金融危機比利時央行已三次將優先股作為分紅發給股東們。因此有些人可能會認為：如果銀行再次因給予投資者豐厚回報而陷入困境的話，債券可能會因此而銷聲匿跡。恰恰相反：比利時央行發行的“或有可轉換”債券，被認為認為將會于危機中失去其所有價值，一年收益率也達到了4%。受投資者的煽動，銀行不斷的發行此類有價債券。監管機構對此也頗為焦慮。
Cocos, as these instruments are known, are a newish hybrid of bank equity and debt. Regulators globally are keen on banks having more equity. This makes bail-outs less likely and, if they prove inevitable, less painful for taxpayers. Bankers prefer debt because it lowers their tax bill, and juices both profits and bonuses. Cocos are the compromise.
Cocos，不同于這些已知票據，是銀行股本以及債務的新生兒。全球的監管機構都希望銀行能夠擁有更多的股本這會使得將優先股作為分紅發放變得極不可能并且有助于緩解納稅人壓力如若此舉不可避免的話。銀行則因為低稅率以及利潤和獎金的成本而更喜歡舉債。Cocos便是折中的結果。
Cocos take multiple forms, but all are intended to behave like bonds when times are good, yet absorb losses, equity-like, in a crisis. At a given trigger point, when equity levels are so low that bankruptcy threatens, cocos either lose some or all of their value, or get exchanged for shares. Regulators have allowed them to be used in limited quantities to meet increased equity requirements. Banks promise the coco bondholders will get “bailed in”, to use the regulatory argot, in lieu of taxpayers.
它采取了多重形式：在光景較好的時候和債券并無兩樣，在經濟危機承受損失之時更像是普通股。這之間有一個給定的觸發點—當股本水平低到有破產的危險之時，cocos要么失去部分或全部的價值，要么用來換取股份。監管者們已經允少量的cocos被使用來滿足增加的股本要求。銀行也允諾coco的債券持有者將會代替納稅人得到“援助”—用監管者的行話來講。
Fans describe cocos as “pre-funded rights issues”, a metaphorical fire extinguisher in an otherwise tinder-like capital structure. But similar “hybrid” instruments misfired in the last crisis; none of the new generation of cocos has ever been tested. Some fret that coco bondholders could incur losses even as the issuer continues to reward shareholders, in defiance of fundamental laws of capitalism.
擁護者將cocos形容為“先行投資的權利股發行”，是其他易燃資本結構的一個隱喻性的滅火器。但是類似的“混血”產物在過去的經濟危機中并未奏效；同時新生代的cocos從未接受過考驗。有些人苦惱coco的債券持有人將會在發行者無視資本主義規律繼續回報股東之時蒙受損失。
Such qualms have not stopped investors from piling in, at ever lower yields. Banks have duly stepped up issuance: from nearly nothing in 2010 to 64 billion so far this year. Credit Suisse, itself a coco-issuing bank, expects at least another 20 billion by year-end.
良心上的不安沒能阻止投資者們在收益率較低時涌入。銀行已經適當的加大了發行量：從2010年的幾乎為零到至今的640億美元。瑞士信貸作為其中的發行銀行之一，會在今年年底另增發行200億美元。
Much of this has come from big-name European lenders, such as HSBC, which is preparing a 6 billion issue. A mob of smaller banks is expected to follow suit later this year, after the European Central Bank vets their accounts. Peers in the Middle East and Asia are also lining up.
它們中的大多數都來自于諸如豐匯銀行之類的歐洲知名銀行。在歐洲中央銀行通過一些小型銀行的審查之后，它們預計將會在今年年底效仿發行。同時中東以及亞洲的銀行也在排隊。
Investors disagree whether cocos should be viewed as perilous bonds or slightly less risky shares. Amusingly and worryingly, a recent survey by Royal Bank of Scotland found that 90% of investors thought their understanding of cocos was better than average. Whizzy hedge funds used to dominate the market, but sleepier asset managers are investing in growing numbers.
投資者對于將cocos視為危險債券或者低風險股票持不贊成的態度。說起來有趣但同時又令人擔憂的是蘇格蘭皇家銀行一項近期的研究發現：90%的投資者認為他們對于cocos的了解高于平均水平。過去是高端的對沖基金來主導市場，但現在不活躍的資產管理公司越來越多。
Coco yields have fallen in part because banks' balance-sheets are growing sturdier. That could change in a flash, especially if the euro zone tips back into crisis. Alex Lasagna of Algebris, a hedge fund, says each bank and bond presents its own idiosyncratic risks. The diciest of them, he says, are equivalent to “picking up pennies in front of a bullet train”.
Coco投資效益下降的部分原因是由于銀行的資產負債表變得越來越堅實。但這可能會在瞬間改變，尤其是當歐元區可能會到退回危機中。對沖基金Algebris的Alex Lasagna認為每個銀行以及債券都呈現出了其特有的風險。它們的風險相當于“子彈頭列出前撿起硬幣”用他的話來說。
Regulators, who crave a simpler financial system, wonder whether cocos will make dealing with failing banks even trickier. The triggering of one coco will frighten investors away from all of them. Lawsuits will undoubtedly ensue, injecting panic at the most awkward time. Given recent experience, the watchdogs are right to be wary of anything banks are keen on.
監管機構的確渴望一個更為簡單的金融機構所以他們想知道是否cocos會使得處理銀行破產變得更加棘手。一個coco的失敗將會作為一個觸發點使得所有的投資者遠離他們。毫無疑問法律訴訟會隨之而來在最尷尬的時候注入恐慌。鑒于近期經驗，對于監管者而言警惕任何銀行熱衷的事情是再必要不過了。
