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Finance and Economics；The LIBOR probes; An expensive smoking gun;
Court documents shed light on how LIBOR was allegedly manipulated;
It is supposed to be constructed using banks' own honest estimates of what it costs for them to borrow money. But regulators around the world suspect that LIBOR (the London inter-bank offered rate), a financial benchmark that is set every day by collating these estimates, has been subject to manipulation. Little information has been publicly released by the regulators that are investigating. But Canadian and American legal documents seen by The Economist paint a picture of what is alleged. It is not pretty.
銀行自己誠實的估算其借貸成本本是很有建設性的。但世界各地的監管機構懷疑倫敦銀行間拆放款利率，這一根據估算結果而每天確立的金融基準涉嫌操縱。負責調查的監管機構并沒有公開過多內幕。但是《經濟學人》了解到的加拿大和美國的法律公文描述了這些未經證實的指控，說的有些不堪入耳。
Suspicions that something was wrong with LIBOR were aroused in 2008 when financial risks began to pick up but the benchmark, which ought to have ticked upwards too, did not move. That same year a group of American academics circulated a paper showing that banks' individual estimates of their borrowing costs were surprisingly close, given their different levels of risk. That suggested something fishy but was not conclusive proof, according to Rosa Abrantes-Metz of New York University Stern School of Business, one of the paper's authors.
對倫敦銀行間拆放款利率的指控在2008年就有了，當時金融危機開始抬頭，但本應一同上漲的利率基準卻沒有變化。同一年，在一群美國學者間轉播著的一篇文章顯示，考慮到不同程度的風險，銀行出人意料的停止了自己的借款成本估算。這就驗證了可疑的，但又未經證實的證據，文章作者之一，紐約大學斯特恩商學院的Rosa Abrantes-Metz稱。
A case brought by the Canadian Competition Bureau provides harder evidence that some banks' submissions were being manipulated. The court documents suggest that a group of traders regularly contacted one another to discuss how to influence the yen LIBOR rate. If true, that would have breached two principles. One is that traders from different banks should not be aligning their positions in this way. The other is that traders are supposed to be separated from staff within the same bank who estimate LIBOR.
加拿大競爭管理局的一個案例提供了說明一些銀行的申報書被篡改的鐵證。法院公文稱一些交易員定期聯系另外一些交易員來商討如何改變日元拆借利率。如果情況屬實，那么就違反了兩項原則。其一是不同銀行的交易員不應該以這種方式調整他們的倉位。另一點是交易員本應該和同家銀行負責估算倫敦銀行間拆放款利率的交易員分離開。
The case filing summarises messages sent by “Trader A”, an employee of an unnamed whistle-blowing bank. Many institutions are implicated in the document but the following excerpt cites RBS to show how the alleged scheme worked:
這個滿是總結性信息的案例是由“交易員甲”，一名匿名揭發銀行內幕的雇員提供的。該文書稱許多機構涉嫌操縱，但接下來的一段摘錄引用到蘇格蘭皇家銀行顯示了所謂的方案是如何實施的：
“Trader A explained to one RBS IRD trader who his collusive contacts were and how he had and was going to manipulate Yen LIBOR. Trader A also communicated his trading positions, his desire for a certain movement in Yen LIBOR and gave instructions for the RBS IRD trader to get RBS to make Yen LIBOR submissions consistent with Trader A's wishes. The RBS IRD trader acknowledged these communications and confirmed that he would follow through. Trader A and the RBS IRD trader also entered into transactions that aligned their trading interests in regards to Yen LIBOR.”
“交易員甲向一位蘇格蘭皇家銀行稅務交易員交代其同伙是誰和他曾經和即將如何操縱日元拆借利率。交易員甲也告知了他的交易倉位，他是如何渴望調整日元拆借利率并指使蘇格蘭皇家銀行稅務交易員說服皇家銀行，讓日元拆借利率與交易員甲的期望值一致。稅務員得到這些指示，確認他會依照行事。交易員甲和稅務員也在關于日元拆借交易方面的貿易利息上進行交易。”
RBS says that it has “legal and factual defences” against such claims.
蘇格蘭皇家銀行稱其有“合法的事實依據”為其平反。
The Canadian case opens a window into how LIBOR manipulation may have happened. Civil cases brought by banks' customers in America suggest who might have suffered if the rate was being gamed.
加拿大案例為調查倫敦銀行操縱間拆放款利率的經過提供了線索。在美國由銀行客戶起訴的民事案件表明如果利率被操縱，誰會是受害者。
These cases can be grouped into four types, according to Bill Butterfield and Anthony Maton of Hausfeld, a law firm. First, there are large individual investment firms seeking damages on their own. The other three types of case are brought by customers acting as groups. One group includes traders who were on the wrong side of LIBOR bets. A second group includes investors in large companies' LIBOR-linked debt who may have lost out on interest payments if LIBOR was set too low.
根據Hausfeld的一家名為Bill Butterfield and Anthony Maton的法律公司稱，這些案例可以歸為四類。第一類是，大型的個人投資公司自己尋求賠償。剩下的三類是客戶團體提出的。其中一組包括在倫敦銀行間拆放款利率上判斷錯誤的交易員們。第二組是負擔與該利率有關聯的債務的大公司的投資商，如果拆放款利率定的過低，他們就會失去支付利息的能力。
The final group is made up of customers that bought interest-rate swaps from banks. This group includes the city of Baltimore, which is represented by Hausfeld and whose case is especially revealing.
最后的一組是由和銀行交換利率的客戶組成。這一組包括巴爾的摩市，其代表是Hausfeld和那些被揭露案例的銀行。
American cities borrow to finance the construction of large-scale public works like roads and sewerage systems. They can borrow most cheaply at floating rates but this option lacks the stability that fixed-rate borrowing gives. Swaps can help them get the best of both worlds. The city first borrows at a low floating rate. It then buys an interest-rate swap from a bank. Under the swap deal it receives a LIBOR floating rate which cancels out the payments it must make to investors in its debt. In exchange the city pays the bank a fixed rate.
美國的城市借錢來資助大型公共工程建設，比如道路和排水系統。它們在浮動利率較低的時候買入，但這個買賣特權缺乏像固定利率借款所具備的穩定性。利率掉期可以幫助它們兩者兼得。市政府首先在浮動利率低時借款，然后利率掉期時從銀行買入。在掉期交易時，它得到倫敦銀行間拆放款浮動利率，就可以抵消掉它必須要還清投資者當初支付的債務。于是交易時，市政府按固定利率給銀行還款。
Baltimore entered into over $100m in interest-rate swaps, according to case documents. Lower LIBOR-linked payments to the city would have meant less money to cover the outgoing fixed-rate payments. If LIBOR was artificially suppressed, the city would have been losing millions annually.
根據案例文書所稱，巴爾的摩在利率掉期時投入了1億美元。市政府低間拆放款利率的付款意味著用更少的錢來填補外向固定利率的付款。如果倫敦銀行間拆放款利率被人為的制止住，那么該城市每年將損失數百萬美元。
If the case is upheld, damages could be big. The American cases are being pursued under “class action” litigation. This means that if Baltimore's case is upheld other cities sold the same products will also be able to claim damages. Across America 40 states allow municipalities to enter into swap agreements. The total estimated amount in 2010 was $250 billion-500 billion, according to an IMF paper. What's more, cases are being brought under the Sherman Act, America's antitrust law, which allows for triple damages. Assume the worst and damages for American cities alone could go as high as $40 billion.
如果該案例勝訴，損失就是巨大的。美國的案例是被集體訴訟所追究的，這意味著，如果巴爾的摩案例勝訴，其他銷售同類產品的城市就可以要求賠償損失。美國的40個州允許市政公債簽訂通貨互換協定。根據世界貨幣基金組織的文件稱，2010年的總估算量是2.5億-5億美元。而且，被納入美國反壟斷法《謝爾曼法》的案件允許三重損害。如果做最壞的估算，會給美國城市帶來高達400億美元的損失。
