Finance and Economics;Bank capital;Half-cocked Basel;
財經(jīng);銀行資本;操之過急的巴塞爾;
Stop-gap rules on banks' trading books may add perilous complexity.
把銀行交易帳戶作為權(quán)宜之計可能增加了危險的復雜性。
The nnew year hangover throbbed agonisingly for investment bankers this year. Blame Basel 2.5, a new set of international rules which charges banks higher capital for the risks they run in their trading books (as opposed to their banking books, where they keep assets that they intend to hold to maturity). Those charges were too low before. And heaping higher costs on banks should please politicians and Joe Public. But they add another layer of complexity to banks' risk management.
今年,新年遺留問題沉悶地牽動了投資銀行家的神經(jīng)。這都得歸咎于巴塞爾協(xié)議2.5版(以下簡稱巴塞爾2.5),這是一套新的國際規(guī)則,它針對銀行交易帳戶(與銀行賬戶不同,在銀行賬戶里他們打算持有資產(chǎn)至到期日)中操作的風險性資產(chǎn)收取更多費用。以前收取的費用太低了。銀行成本累加應該會討政治家和普通百姓的喜歡。但是他們給銀行的風險管理增加了另外一層復雜性。
Basel 2.5 came into force on December 31st in most European and major world financial jurisdictions. Switzerland applied the rules a year early, and the costs are substantial. Third-quarter figures for Credit Suisse show a 28% increase in risk-weighted assets, and hence capital charges, for its investment-banking activities purely because of Basel 2.5.
12月31日,巴塞爾2.5在歐洲大部分地區(qū)和世界主要金融轄區(qū)開始實施。瑞士一年前貫徹了這一法規(guī),成本很高。瑞士信貸第三季度數(shù)據(jù)顯示風險加權(quán)資產(chǎn)增長了28%,因為巴塞爾2.5,今后資本費用僅僅是針對投行業(yè)務的。
The most notable laggard is America. US financial regulators do not oppose Basel 2.5, but it clashes with the Dodd-Frank act, America's big wet blanket of a financial reform. Basel 2.5 uses credit ratings from recognised agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's to calibrate capital charges. Dodd-Frank expressly forbids the use of such ratings agencies, whose poor judgments are held partly responsible for the crisis. Instead American regulators are working on their own cocktail of credit-risk calibrations for Basel 2.5, using market data and country-risk ratings from the OECD. Their solution is still months away from application (though not as distant as implementation by the Russians or Argentines).
最引人注意的拖延者是美國。美國金融監(jiān)管機構(gòu)并不反對巴塞爾2.5,但是巴塞爾2.5與美國大的金融監(jiān)管改革法案《多德-弗蘭克法案》卻存在沖突。巴塞爾2.5使用的信譽評級從評級機構(gòu)穆迪和標準普爾到校準資本收費。《多德-弗蘭克法案》特別禁止了使用評級機構(gòu),他們匱乏的判斷力對危機負有部分責任。而美國的校準人都忙于利用來自世界經(jīng)濟合作發(fā)展組織的市場數(shù)據(jù)和國家風險評級,應付他們自己在巴塞爾2.5下的信用風險校驗。他們的方案距離實施仍有數(shù)月之久(雖然執(zhí)行力不和俄國或者阿根廷一樣虛幻)
Basel 2.5 for the first time charges banks extra capital for the credit risk of what they hold in their trading portfolio (because the crisis showed that markets are not always liquid enough to be able to offload assets). That includes a charge for the risk that a counterparty goes bust. It also imposes heavy charges on securitised bundles of assets unless the credit risk of each piece of the bundle has an identifiable market price. Banks that have portfolios of trading positions which they reckon offset each other have to convince regulators that their risk models work or face being charged at a cruder, standardised rate.
巴塞爾2.5第一次針對于銀行交易性資產(chǎn)的信貸風險收取額外費用(因為危機顯示了市場并不是一直有足夠流通性來剝離資產(chǎn))。這包括了交易對象破產(chǎn)的風險。它也對資產(chǎn)證券化產(chǎn)品征收了高額的費用,除非產(chǎn)品包中每種資產(chǎn)的信貸風險有明確的市場標價。那些自己認為擁有彼此抵消投資組合的銀行必須說服監(jiān)管機構(gòu)他們所使用或者面臨的風險模型正在被以野蠻的、標準的費率收費。
The problem with Basel 2.5, recognised by regulators and bankers alike, is its complexity. The risk of a trading portfolio must now be broken down into five “buckets”—value at risk (VaR), a measure of how much could be lost in an average trading day; stressed VaR (how much could be lost in extreme conditions); plus three types of credit risk ranging from the risk of single credits to those of securitised loans. Traders are understandably confused. For some banks, developing risk models and getting them approved is just too expensive: more complex businesses will be shut down. That will please those who want banks to be more boring.
監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和銀行家似乎承認了巴塞爾2.5 問題的復雜性。交易性資產(chǎn)的風險現(xiàn)在必須分解成五個“桶”:風險值(VAR),估計平均每個交易日的可能損失;極限風險值(極限狀態(tài)下的可能損失);再加上三個不同類別的信用風險值,從單個信貸風險到抵押貸款依次排列。交易員都覺得很困惑。對于一些銀行而言,開發(fā)風險模型并獲得通過成本太高了:更復雜的業(yè)務將被停止。這將使一些想讓銀行更加令人厭煩的人非常滿意。
But unintended consequences will doubtless follow. Useful products may become less tradable. Trading of riskier products could migrate to unregulated entities. Banks may be tempted into new forms of regulatory arbitrage, by juggling assets between their trading book and their banking book. Worst of all, perhaps, is the increased risk of back-office bungling because of the extra complexity.
但是這無疑將招致意外的后果。實用的產(chǎn)品交易量會減少。風險產(chǎn)品的交易可能轉(zhuǎn)移至不受監(jiān)管的實體。銀行可能會被交易賬戶和銀行賬戶之間變換的資產(chǎn)誘惑,進入一套新的監(jiān)管套利模式。最壞的情況可能是由于額外的復雜性造成的后臺拙劣的工作風險增加 。
Regulators recognise this risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which drew up the rules and is also responsible for the full Basel 3 regime that will come into force in 2019, is still conducting what it calls a “fundamental review” of capital rules for banks' trading books. Publication is not expected before March. Those sore heads will not soon clear.
監(jiān)管部門認識到了這種風險。起草規(guī)則并負責2019年開始執(zhí)行的全部的巴塞爾3的巴塞爾委員會銀行監(jiān)督機構(gòu),仍在指揮著他們稱之為對銀行交易賬戶的資金制度“基本審查”的行動。三月前是不會發(fā)行官方文件的。頭疼的問題也一時不會被解決。