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Finance and Economics；The world economy；Mountains to climb
財經(jīng)；世界經(jīng)濟；任重而道遠
August was a nerve-racking month for the world economy. September and October will be no better
對世界經(jīng)濟來說，八月是傷腦筋的一個月，而九月和十月經(jīng)濟形勢也不見得好轉(zhuǎn)。
Central bankers are not known for seeking solace in the heavens. But at their annual symposium in Jackson Hole, organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, the world’s leading monetary mavens could be found, after dinner, peering enthusiastically into telescopes set up by the local astronomy club. As he spied the M82 galaxy, 12m light-years away, one central banker remarked: “That puts our problems into perspective.”
央行行長不是因向天空尋求安慰而出名，但是由堪薩斯城美聯(lián)儲組織召開的杰克遜霍爾年度研討會上，世界首席貨幣專家們在晚宴后，通過當(dāng)?shù)靥煳膶W(xué)俱樂部設(shè)置的望遠鏡滿腔熱情地凝望著天空。一位央行行長在找到離地球1200萬光年的M82星系時說：“這讓我們?nèi)婵吹轿覀兊膯栴}。”
On the ground, though, those problems are as big as ever. Christine Lagarde, the new managing director of the IMF, voiced a collective sentiment when she said the world economy found itself in a “dangerous new phase”. Things could get riskier still in the coming weeks.
盡管研討會當(dāng)場，那些問題像原來一樣嚴重，當(dāng)國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）新總裁克里斯蒂娜·拉加德（Christine Lagarde）認為世界經(jīng)濟處于“危險的新階段”，她說出了集體的觀點。在接下來的幾周，經(jīng)濟形勢有可能會更加危險。
In America, the worry is dashed expectations. The Federal Reserve’s policy-setting committee next meets on September 20th and 21st and has scheduled an extra day’s discussion on its arsenal of unconventional monetary weapons. Wall Street hopes it will mark the onset of “QE3”, another big bout of bond-buying. The mood in Jackson Hole suggested that any action will be modest and incremental.
在美國，對經(jīng)濟前景的擔(dān)憂擊垮了人們的期望。美聯(lián)儲政策制定委員會下一次的會議原定于9月20、21日召開，現(xiàn)會期額外增加一天，用于討論其非常規(guī)的貨幣武器。華爾街希望這標(biāo)志著再一次大量購買國債的第三輪量化寬松政策（QE3）的啟動。杰克遜霍爾的氣氛表明任何措施將會是適度的、遞增的。
Many central bankers, including Ben Bernanke, the Fed’s chairman, think it is time for fiscal policy to do more. He gave Congress a scolding at Jackson Hole, arguing that politicians need to address the medium-term fiscal mess while leaving room to cushion the economy now. Barack Obama is working on a jobs plan but the chances of a political rapprochement on issues like America’s payroll-tax cut, due to expire soon, remain uncertain. No deal implies sharply tighter fiscal policy.
包括美聯(lián)儲主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在內(nèi)的很多央行行長認為，到了財政政策發(fā)揮更大作用的時候了。伯南克在杰克遜霍爾大會上大肆責(zé)罵國會，認為政客們應(yīng)該集中精力解決中期的財政混亂，同時給目前的經(jīng)濟留下緩沖的空間。奧巴馬總統(tǒng)正著手于一項就業(yè)計劃，但是在即將到期的美國減少工資稅等問題上兩黨達成協(xié)議可能性仍然不確定。沒有達成協(xié)議意味著更緊的財政政策。
Far more serious danger lies in Europe. Policymakers there put great faith in an agreement they struck on July 21st, which promised more money for Greece as well as more resources and a broader remit for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). That expanded role is due to be ratified by euro-zone parliaments in the next few weeks. The European Central Bank (ECB) regards its recent decision to buy Spanish and Italian bonds as a stopgap until the expanded EFSF is up and running.
歐洲則面臨更加嚴重的危險。歐洲決策者極大地相信于7月21日緊急達成的協(xié)議，該協(xié)議保證為希臘提供更多的資金，同時也保證給予歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）更多的資源和更大的借貸范圍。其擴大的范圍應(yīng)該在隨后的數(shù)周內(nèi)經(jīng)過歐元區(qū)議會批準(zhǔn)。在歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）借貸范圍擴大并運轉(zhuǎn)之前，歐洲中央銀行（ECB）將其最近購買西班牙和意大利國債的決定視為權(quán)宜之計。
But three shadows hang over the EFSF. First, the political timetable for its ratification could slip. Potential causes include Finnish demands for collateral against its contribution to the Greek bail-out and a vote by Germany’s constitutional court, due on September 7th, on the legality of the rescue package (see table).
但是，歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）面臨著三大障礙。第一，其借貸范圍擴大得到批準(zhǔn)的政治時間表有可能一拖再拖，可能的原因包括芬蘭要求其對希臘緊急救助進行抵押，以及定于9月7日由德國憲法法院對其一攬子救援計劃的合法性進行投票。（見圖表）
Second, there is growing confusion about what the revamped rescue fund should do. Europe’s central bankers are desperate for it to take over the bond-buying duties if markets stay skittish over Italy and Spain. Ms Lagarde is pushing another priority. She thinks Europe’s banks urgently need more capital to “cut the chains of contagion” and wants a mandatory recapitalisation, using public funds if necessary and the EFSF in particular. In effect, the IMF wants a repeat of what America’s Treasury did in 2008, when it bullied big banks into taking capital injections.
第二，對于如何使用修訂后的儲備金的疑問越來越多。如果意大利和西班牙的市場保持活躍的話，歐洲的央行行長極度渴望歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）能夠承擔(dān)起購買國債的重擔(dān)。拉加德正敦促優(yōu)先考慮另一件事。她認為歐洲的銀行急切需要更多的資金來阻斷金融危機蔓延的趨勢，而且需要對銀行進行一次強制的資本重組，如果必要的話將使用公共基金，以及尤其是歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）提供的基金。實際上，國際貨幣基金組織想要重復(fù)2008年美國財政部的措施，當(dāng)時美國財政部迫使大型銀行注入資金。
Many Europeans were furious at Ms Lagarde’s comments, denying any serious capital shortage and arguing instead that if there is a problem, it is one of attracting funding from skittish wholesale markets. Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB’s president, tried to damp down even that concern, pointing out that banks could tap unlimited liquidity at the ECB and that they had ample collateral left to post in return.
很多歐洲人對拉加德的評論大為光火，他們否認存在任何嚴重的資本短缺，同時爭論如果存在問題的話，那也是如何從活躍的批發(fā)市場吸引資金的問題。歐洲中央銀行行長讓·克羅德·特里謝（Jean-Claude Trichet）試圖消除這樣的擔(dān)心，他指出各銀行能夠從歐洲中央銀行取得無限制的流動資金，反過來，歐洲中央銀行則可以獲得足夠的保證金。
Mr Trichet is right, but only up to a point. The sheer scale of European’ banks’ funding needs (about 1.7 Euro trillion, or 2.5 dollor trillion, in the next three years) is daunting: an idea from Morgan Stanley, to use the EFSF to offer European guarantees on new bank debt, has gained traction recently. And illiquidity is a symptom of concerns about solvency. So Ms Lagarde is right that strengthening banks’ buffers is important. The July stress tests, which did not allow for sovereign defaults, offer scant guidance. Using the market price of sovereign bonds, the IMF thinks that European banks could have unrecognised losses of Euro200 billion, meaning lots more capital would be needed. The EFSF is one sensible source.
特里謝說的沒錯，但也不完全如此。歐洲各銀行的基金需求的絕對規(guī)模（在接下來的三年大概1.7萬億歐元，或2.5萬億美元）讓人瞠目：摩根史坦利的想法是用歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）在新的銀行債務(wù)上作為歐洲擔(dān)保，最近該想法獲得青睞。而且非流動性是對償還能力擔(dān)心的一個特征。因此，拉加德認為加強銀行的緩沖是非常重要，這樣的觀點是正確的。7月份的壓力測試，因為沒有考慮到主權(quán)違約，缺乏指導(dǎo)意義。國際國幣基金組織認為，如果采用國債的市場價格，歐洲銀行看不到的損失將達到二千億歐元，這意味著需要更多的資金。歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）則是一個明智的資金來源。
The third and biggest reason to worry is that the EFSF is too small. The fund is being increased to Euro440 billion. But subtract the money already committed to bail-outs as well as the extra Greece might need if “voluntary” private debt-restructuring falls short (see article), and only around Euro 200 billion may be left. At the ECB’s current pace of bond-buying (Euro 6 billion-22 billion a week), that will not last long, especially if some is also set aside for banks.
第三，也是最主要的原因，歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）規(guī)模太小。基金已經(jīng)增長到4400億歐元。但是減去已經(jīng)用于應(yīng)急措施的資金，以及如果“自愿的”私有債務(wù)重組資金短缺時希臘可能需要額外的資金（見圖表），那么大概只剩2000億歐元。在目前歐洲中央銀行購買國債的速度下（每周達60億—220億歐元），這筆資金將不會維持很長時間，特別是其中有些是為銀行留著的。
European politicians are unlikely to cough up more, so much discussion behind the scenes is about how to lever up the rescue facility. Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies and Thomas Mayer of Deutsche Bank think the EFSF should be registered as a bank and allowed to borrow from the ECB, using the government bonds it buys as collateral. That kind of arms-length arrangement, they argue, would be much better than having the ECB buy bonds itself, and would give the EFSF huge firepower. Conservative central bankers worry that it would still break the rule that bans direct purchases by the ECB, in spirit at least.
歐洲政客不愿意被迫支付更多，秘密地討論如何抬高救援額度。歐洲政策研究中心的丹尼爾·格羅斯(Daniel Gros)和德意志銀行的托馬斯·梅耶爾(Thomas Mayer)認為，歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）應(yīng)該以銀行資質(zhì)進行注冊并且能夠?qū)⑵滟徺I的國債作為抵押從歐洲中央銀行貸款。他們認為，這種保持距離的安排將比歐洲中央銀行自己購買國債要好很多，而且將給予歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）更大的能力。保守的央行行長們擔(dān)心這仍將會破壞禁止歐洲中央銀行直接購買債券的規(guī)定，至少在精神上破壞了規(guī)矩。
An alternative, quietly touted by some North American officials, is to tempt investors into buying bonds by giving them access to non-recourse loans from the ECB. The model is another American innovation from the financial crisis—the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF. Soft loans from the Fed were designed to tempt investors into buying securities; the Treasury promised to take the first tranche of any losses, thus protecting the Fed. In a European version, cheap, non-recourse loans would encourage investors to buy Italian or Spanish bonds and bring down yields. The ECB would provide leverage, but any initial losses would be borne by the EFSF. The facility’s resources would be magnified, private investors would be drawn in and the price of bonds would still be set by the market.
還有種方式，一些北美洲的官員私底下大肆吹捧，就是通過讓投資者得到歐洲中央銀行的無追索權(quán)貸款來引誘他們購買債券。該模式是美國在金融危機中的另一項創(chuàng)新——定期資產(chǎn)支持證券貸款工具（TALF）。美聯(lián)儲提供的軟貸款計劃用于引誘投資者購買證券。財政部許諾如果出現(xiàn)任何虧損將承擔(dān)第一筆款項，從而保護美聯(lián)儲。在歐洲，低價、無追索權(quán)貸款將會鼓勵投資者購買意大利或西班牙債券，而且減少收益。歐洲中央銀行將會提供杠桿，但是任何前期損失將由歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）來承擔(dān)。歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機構(gòu)（EFSF）的資源將擴大，私人投資者將被引誘進行投資，而且債券價格仍然由市場決定。
Dusting off America’s crisis-management ideas makes sense: they were effective. But Europe’s task is far harder, not just because there are many more parties involved but because the end goal is so unclear. American officials were battling the temporary collapse of a financial system. European politicians need to create a new one, either with a more integrated fiscal union or a break-up of the current euro area. Without political leadership, the technocrats cannot solve the problem.
復(fù)制美國的金融危機管理理念是說得通的，因為它們有效。但是，歐洲的任務(wù)更加艱巨，不僅僅是因為歐洲牽涉的黨派較多，而是因為最終的目的還不明確。美國官員為了金融系統(tǒng)的臨時崩潰而戰(zhàn)斗。歐洲官員需要通過創(chuàng)建一個更加和諧的財政聯(lián)盟，亦或?qū)⒛壳暗臍W元區(qū)分開來創(chuàng)造一個新的金融系統(tǒng)。沒有政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，技術(shù)專家將無法解決這個問題。
