Western Europe is not the limit of this: the panic has also struck banks in Hong Kong, Russia and now India. And it is not just the geographical breadth of this crisis that is alarming, but also its economic depth. Because it is rooted in the money markets (see article and article), it will feed through to businesses and households in every economy it hits.
如此的境況不僅限于西歐：包括香港、俄羅斯和印度等國都陷入恐慌中。此次危機所預警的并不僅僅是地域的寬度，還包含經濟層面的深度。由于根源于金融市場，它必將直接影響到所有受打擊經濟中的企業和家庭。

Take a deep breath
深吸一口氣，做好準備

Most of the time nobody notices the credit flowing through the lungs of the economy, any more than people notice the air they breathe. But everyone knows when credit stops circulating freely through markets to banks, businesses and consumers. For almost a year the markets had worried about banks’ liquidity and solvency. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers last month, amid confusion about whom the state would save and on what terms, they panicked. The markets for three-, six- and 12-month paper are shut, so banks must borrow even more money overnight than usual.
大多數時間沒有人會留意到流通在經濟中的信貸，一如沒有什么人會留意他們呼吸的空氣；但是當信貸無法自由的通過市場循環到銀行、企業和消費者的時候，每個 人都覺察到了問題。在過去幾乎一年的時間里，市場一直為銀行的流動性和清償能力而憂慮。上個月雷曼兄弟倒下后，由于對政府會以什么樣的條件救助什么樣的銀 行充滿困惑，市場完全恐慌了。于是季度、半年和一年期的票據市場完全關閉了，這就意味著銀行必須在短時間內比以往籌集到更多的現金。

Banks used to borrow from each other at about 0.08 percentage points above official rates; on September 30th they paid more than four percentage points more. In one auction to get dollar funds overnight from the European Central Bank, banks were prepared to pay interest of 11%, five times the pre-crisis rate. Astonishingly, rates scaled these extremes even as the Federal Reserve promised $620 billion of extra funding.
銀行間過去以高于（低于）官 方利率十萬分之八的利率進行同業拆借；而9月30日他們卻要多付百分之四。一次為了在短時間內從歐洲央行得到美元基金進行的競拍中，銀行甚至準備以11% 的利率出價，這相當于危機前5倍的價格。令人震驚的是，在聯儲承諾6200億美元的額外基金后，利率仍然朝著這種極端攀升。

Bankers have always earned their crust by committing money for long periods and financing that with short-term deposits and borrowing. Today, that model has warped into self-parody: many of the banks’ assets are unsellable even as they have to return to the market each day to ask for lenders to vote on their survival. No wonder they are hoarding cash.
銀行通常用短期儲蓄和借貸來滿足資金需求，并通過這種運作形成積累；如今這種模式已經扭曲成了滑稽的自我模仿：很多銀行資產都沒有銷路，正如他們每天都必須回到市場上央求貸款者幫助他們存活下去。無疑他們需要儲蓄現金。

This is why those politicians who set the interests of Main Street against those of Wall Street are so wrong. Sooner or later the money markets affect every business. Companies face higher interest charges and the fear that they may one day lose access to bank loans altogether. So they, too, hoard cash, cancelling acquisitions and investments, in order to pay down debt. Managers delay new products, leave factories unbuilt, pull the plug on loss-making divisions, and cut costs and jobs. Carmakers and other manufacturers will no longer extend credit (see article) and loans will become elusive and expensive. Consumers will suffer. Unemployment will rise. Even if the credit markets work well, the rich economies will slow as the asset-price bubble pops. If credit is choked off, that slowdown could turn into a deep recession.
這就是那些政客為了小企業利益而犧牲大公司想法的錯誤所在：金融市場早晚會影響到所有的企業。那些承受高利率成本的公司也懼怕某天他們會無法從銀行得到貸款，于是他們也開始儲備現金，為了減少負債甚至取消了收購和投資；管理層 停止新品推出，暫緩工廠擴建，關閉不盈利機構，削減成本以及進行裁員；汽車及其它制造商不再延長消費信用，貸款銷售將變得難得并且昂貴；最終受罪的是消費 者，失業率必將上升。即使信貸市場運轉正常，發達國家的經濟發展也會由于資產價格泡沫的破裂而放緩；如果信貸市場阻塞，那么經濟的放緩將會發展成深度經濟 蕭條。

Financial markets need governments to set rules for them; and when markets fail, governments are often best placed to get them going again. That’s pragmatism, not socialism. Helping bankers is not an end in itself. If the government could save the credit markets without bailing out the bankers, it should do so. But it cannot. Main Street needs Wall Street; and both need Washington. Politicians—and President George Bush is the most culpable among them (see article)—have failed to explain this.
金融市場需要政府來設定規則；當市場失敗的時候，政府常常已經準備好了使之繼續前行：這是使用主義，不是社會主義。對銀行的救助不是最終目的，如果政府不 救助銀行就能挽救信貸市場，那么他應該這樣做；但是他卻無法實現這個目的。小企業也需要大公司，他們都需要政府。政客們沒有闡明這一點，而布什總統是他們 中最應受到責備的。

Governments need not just to communicate, but also to co-ordinate. Past banking crises show that late, piecemeal rescues cost more and work less well. Ad hoc mergers work for a while, but demands for help tend to recur. Inconsistency sows uncertainty. Cross-border banking can make one country’s policies awkward for the neighbours: the Irish government’s guarantee of all deposits threatens to suck in money from poorly protected British banks. France’s suggestion on October 1st that Europe’s governments should work together was a good one; Germany’s rejection of it was wrong.
政府需要做的不僅僅是溝通，還有協調。過往的銀行危機證明了遲到而零散的救助不僅成本更高，而且效果更差。臨時整合短時間內有效，但是需要持續才能有效。矛盾必然傳播不確定性結果?？鐕y行可以讓一國政策威脅到鄰國：愛爾蘭政府通過從保護措施少的可憐的英國銀行吸納現金來確保自己的存款不受威脅；法國在10月1日建議歐盟各國政府應該齊心協力，而德國政府對此表示出的反對是不正確的。

Central banks have co-ordinated their liquidity operations. Now that oil prices have plunged and worries about inflation are receding, interest-rate cuts are possible. They would be more powerful if co-ordinated. But it is not only central banks that need to combine. Whatever America’s Congress does, governments should work together on principles to stabilise and recapitalise banks—not just to stem panic but also to save money. Even if, as the Europeans claim, the crisis was made in America, it now belongs to everyone.
央行已經協調他們的流動性部門。目前油價下跌，通脹的 憂慮也有所減輕，削減利率的可能性加大。相互協調的能量會更大，但需要團結在一起的不光是央行。不管美國國會的意思如何，政府都應該以穩定和向銀行注資為 原則而共同努力，不光為了消除恐慌，更是為了拯救經濟。即使像歐洲人宣稱的那樣，危機源于美國，但現在已經是每一個人的問題了。