評論
打印
I want your money
我要用的就是你的錢
No government bail-out of the banking system was ever going to be pretty. This one deserves support
政府對銀行系統的救助永遠不可能完美，但當下的這個理應得到支持。
SAVING the world is a thankless task. The only thing beyond dispute in the $700 billion plan of Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, to stem the financial crisis is that everyone can find something in it to dislike. The left accuses it of ripping off taxpayers to save Wall Street, the right damns it as socialism; economists disparage its technicalities, political scientists its sweeping powers. The administration gave ground to Congress, George Bush delivered a televised appeal and Barack Obama and John McCain suspended the presidential campaign. Even so, as The Economist went to press, the differences remained. There was a chance that Congress would say no.
拯救世界是一個費力不討好的任務。財長鮑爾森和聯儲主席伯南克為了阻止金融危機而主張了7000億美元救助計劃，其中只有一點是毋庸置疑的：每個人都能從該計劃中挑出些毛病來（不可能讓每個人都滿意—）。左翼勢力控訴該計劃無異于搶劫納稅人的錢財去救助華爾街，右翼勢力譴責該計劃為社會主義運動；經濟學家鄙視計劃的學術性，政治科學家崇拜它橫掃一切的強大威力。執政當局向國會進行了妥協：布什發出了電視呼吁，奧巴馬和麥凱恩也暫停了競選大戰。即使如此，經濟學人雜志在付印時分歧仍在（還是保留了異見）。國會曾經是有機會拒絕該計劃的。
Spending a sum of money that could buy you a war in Iraq should not come easily; and the notion of any bail-out is deeply troubling to any self-respecting capitalist. Against that stand two overriding arguments. First this is a plan that could work (see article). And, second, the potential costs of producing nothing, or too little too slowly, include a financial collapse and a deep recession spilling across the world: those far outweigh any plausible estimate of the bail-out’s cost.
花掉相當于伊戰軍費規模的一大筆銀子不應該如此輕松，況且救助的理念令任何一個有自尊心的資本家都感到非常不安。但針對上述論調有兩大主要反對觀點：第 一，這是一個可能行之有效的方案；第二，那些毫無效果或者收效甚微的潛在支出已經大大超過了救援計劃合理的成本預測，上述支出包括蔓延全球的金融崩潰和經 濟萎縮所招致的損失。
Mr Market goes to Congress
讓國會來判決市場
America’s financial system has two ailments: it owns a huge amount of toxic securities linked to falling house prices. And it is burdened by losses that leave it short of capital (although the world has capital, not enough has been available to the banks). For over a year, since August 2007, central bankers, principally Mr Bernanke, have been trying to make this toxic debt liquid. But by September 17th, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the nationalisation of American International Group earlier that week, the problem started to become one of the system’s solvency too. The market lost faith in a strategy that saved finance one institution at a time. The economy is not healing itself. If credit markets stay blocked, consumers and firms will enter a vicious spiral.
美國金融體系微恙有二：過量持有與狂跌房價相關的有毒債券；損失的負擔致使體系內呈現出資本短缺（盡管全球擁有很多資本，但是銀行可用部分確嚴重不足）。 自2007年8月以來的一年時間里，以伯南克為主要代表的央行一直致力于有毒債務的清償。但截止到9月17日，緊隨雷曼兄弟的破產和美國國際集團的國有 化，該難題發展成了金融體系清償能力的麻煩之一。市場對于采取逐個機構救助的方法來挽救金融體系的策略已經失去了信心，美國經濟不可能實現自救。如果信貸 市場依然一片僵局，消費者和公司必將卷入更為兇殘的漩渦。
Mr Paulson’s plan relies on buying vast amounts of toxic securities. The theory is that in any auction a huge buyer like the federal government would end up paying more than today’s prices, temporarily depressed by the scarcity of buyers, and still buy the loans cheaply enough to reflect the high chance of a default. That would help recapitalise some banks—which could also set less capital aside against a cleaner balance sheet. And by creating credible, transparent prices, it would at last encourage investors to come in and repair the financial system: this week Warren Buffett and Japan’s Mitsubishi-UFJ agreed to buy stakes in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Some banks would still not have enough capital, but under Mr Paulson’s original plan, the state could put equity in them, or, if they become insolvent, take them over and run them down.
鮑爾森先生的計劃依賴于大量購買有毒債券，其理論依據在于：在任何競價中，買家數量匱乏會造成價格的暫時性壓低，雖然像聯邦政府這樣的大買家所付出的成交 價格很可能高于現值，但仍然會以易于形成違約的便宜價格購買貸款。此舉不僅可以調整一些銀行的資本，還可以減少為了調整資產負債比例而擱置的資本。建立可 靠透明的價格將會最終鼓勵投資者們重新進入市場并且修復金融體系：本周巴菲特和日本三菱UFJ銀行同意購買高盛和摩根斯坦利的股份。一些銀行還處于資本不足的狀態，但是根據鮑爾森計劃的原意，國家可以向銀行注資，如果他們出現了清償問題，政府可以接管銀行并阻止其繼續惡化。
