The economics behind this is sound. Government support to the banking system can break the cycle of panic and pessimism that threatens to suck the economy into deep recession. Intervention may help taxpayers, because they are also employees and consumers. Although $700 billion is a lot—about 6% of GDP—some of it will be earned back and it is small compared with the 16% of GDP that banking crises typically swallow and trivial compared with the Depression, when unemployment surged above 20% (compared with 6% now). Messrs Bernanke and Paulson also have done well by acting quickly: it took seven years for Japan’s regulators to set up a mechanism to take over large broke banks in the 1990s.
支撐該計劃的經濟形勢健康度還算好，政府對于銀行系統的支持可以打破人們對經濟深陷衰退所產生的恐慌和悲觀的惡性循環。政府干預也許會幫到納稅人，因為他 們本身也是雇員和消費者。盡管7000億美元是一個不小的數目，幾乎相當于GDP的6%，但是其中的部分時可以被拿回的，并且與銀行危機所吞噬掉的GDP 的16%比較而言就小了很多；如果與上世紀的大蕭條相比就更是微不足道了，那時候的失業率飚升到20%，而現在只有6%。鮑爾森和伯南克也做到了該出手時 就出手：日本的立法者在90年代時用了7年時間才建立了接管破產銀行的機制。

Could the plan be better structured? Some economists want the state to focus on putting equity into the banks—arguing that it is the best way to address their lack of solvency. In theory you would need to spend less, because a dollar of new equity would support $10 in assets. Yet the banks might not take part until they were on the ropes and, if house prices later fell dramatically more, the value of the banks’ shares would collapse. The threat of the government taking stakes would scare off some private investors. And in the charged atmosphere after this bail-out meddling politicians, as part-owners, would have a tempting lever over the banks.
這個計劃得架構是否可以更優化呢？一些經濟學家希望政府可以向銀行注入更多的資本，因為他們認為這是清償能力缺乏的最佳解決之道。理論上而言應該減少消 費，因為注資1美元可以支撐10美元的資產。然而銀行存在著不撞南墻不回頭的心理，那么如果房價隨后會更夸張地下跌，銀行股票將會徹底崩潰。政府介入行為 所引發的恐慌也許會嚇跑部分私人投資者。政客們的干預計劃造成了非常緊張的氣氛，所以股東們有躲避銀行的傾向。

Mr Paulson’s plan also has its shortcomings. He will find it hard to stop sellers from rigging auctions, if only because no two lots of dodgy securities are exactly the same. Taxpayers may thus pay over the odds and banks may be rewarded for their stupidity. Yet these costs seem small against the benefit of putting a floor under the markets. And fine calculations about moral hazard are less pressing when investors are fleeing risk.
鮑爾森先生的計劃也有弱點：該計劃很難阻止賣方的提價行為，除非有兩個完全一樣的dodgy securities(這個我沒有查到)。納稅人會因為不對等的條件而要支付更多成本，而銀行會從他們的愚蠢舉動中獲利。投資者在規避風險的時候，道德風 險的精準計算就不那么重要了。

If the economics of Mr Paulson’s plan are broadly correct, the politics are fiendish. You are lavishing money on the people who got you into this mess. Sensible intervention cannot even buy long-term relief: the plan cannot stop house prices falling and the bloated financial sector shrinking. Although the economic risk is that the plan fails, the political risk is that the plan succeeds. Voters will scarcely notice a depression that never happened. But even as they lose their houses and their jobs, they will see Wall Street once again making millions.
如果鮑爾森先生計劃的經濟效果還勉強的話，那么其政治效果就應該算是極差了；因為錢已經揮霍到把你帶入混亂的人的身上了。如此理性的干預甚至都不能換來長 期的緩解：該計劃不能阻止房價的下跌和過度膨脹金融業的縮水，經濟風險在于計劃的失敗，而政治風險在于計劃的成功。選民們不會注意到一個永遠不可能發生的 經濟衰退，盡管目前失去了房屋和工作，但他們還將看到華爾街的東山再起。

Buckle a little, but do it briefly
政策緊縮一些，而且要快

In retrospect, Mr Paulson made his job harder by misreading the politics. His original plan contained no help for homeowners. And he assumed sweeping powers to spend the cash quickly. He was right to want flexibility to buy a range of assets. But flexibility does not exclude accountability. As complaints mounted, Mr Paulson and Mr Bernanke buckled—agreeing, for instance, to more oversight. Now that Messrs McCain and Obama have returned to Congress to forge a deal, more buckling may be necessary. Ideally, concessions should not outlast the crisis: temporary help for people able to stay in their houses, a brief ban on dividends in financial firms, even another fiscal package. They should not be permanent or so onerous that the programme fails for want of participants—which is why proposed limits on pay are a mistake (see article).
回顧過往，鮑爾森先生對政治的錯誤解讀給自己的工作平添了不少難度。他的計劃原本不包括對房屋所有者的救助，并且假想出可以迅速作出支出的強大權利。他對 于購買資產靈活性的需求是正確的，但是靈活性也不能犧牲應有的義務。鑒于抱怨的日益增多，鮑爾森和伯南克決定收緊政策：比如同意加強監管?，F在麥凱恩和奧 巴馬也同國會達成了進一步收緊政策的共識。在理想主義狀態下，讓步不會比危機延續更長的時間：暫時幫助人們保住自己的房產，暫時中斷金融公司的分紅以及其 他一攬子財政措施。但是這不應該是長期行為，而且也不應該太過繁瑣，否則就會因為缺乏參與者而導致計劃的失??；這就是限定支付額度的錯誤根源所在。

Mr Paulson’s plan is not perfect. But it is good enough and it is the plan on offer. The prospect of its failure sent credit markets once again veering towards the abyss. Congress should pass it—and soon.
鮑爾森先生的計劃并不完美，但已經足夠用、并且馬上可以用。失敗的前景會再一次讓信貸市場轉向深淵，所以國會應該盡快通過該方案。