評論
打印
Let me begin by thanking the Bundesbank and the German Research Foundation for organizing this conference with us.
首先，我要對德國央行和德國研究基金會與我們共同組織這次會議表示感謝。
I will make three points in my remarks:
我的發言包括三個方面：
First, housing is an essential sector of the economy but also one that has been the source of vulnerabilities and crises. Hence, while the recent recovery in global housing markets is a welcome development, we need to guard against another unsustainable boom.
首先，房地產是經濟的重要部門，但同時也一直是脆弱性和危機的根源。因此，雖然近期全球住房市場的復蘇態勢良好，但我們需要警惕新一輪不可持續的高漲。
Second, detecting over-valuation in housing markets is still more of an art than a science. Broad measures, such as house price to rent ratios, provide a first pass. But detailed analysis and judgment are needed to make a call about overvaluation.
第二，對住房市場估值過高的監測仍然更多的是一門藝術，而非科學。寬泛的衡量標準如房價/租金比是第一道關口。但要確定地指出存在估值過高，則需要進行詳細分析和判斷。
Third, the policy toolkit to manage housing booms is still under construction. A variety of tools have been used and the evidence suggests some short-run success. But more analysis and sharing of experience are needed on what works and what doesn’t. Conferences of this kind are useful in adding to our stock of knowledge.
第三，管理住房市場高漲的政策工具包仍在制定過程中。已經使用了很多工具，并有證據表明，取得了一些短期成功。但是，關于哪些工具是可行的，哪些是不可行的，需要進行更多分析并共享經驗。今天這樣的會議有助于增加我們的知識儲備。
Role of the housing sector
住房市場的作用
Let me elaborate on these three points, beginning with the role of the housing sector. Food, clothing, shelter: these are traditionally thought of as basic needs of mankind; so the housing sector satisfies an essential need. Housing is also of course an important component of investment. And in many countries housing makes up the largest component of wealth. For instance, in the United States, real estate account for roughly a third of the total assets held by the nonfinancial private sector. The majority of households tend to hold wealth in the form of their homes rather than in financial assets: in France, for example, less than a quarter of households own stocks but nearly 60 percent are homeowners.
讓我對這三點進行闡述。首先，關于住房市場的作用。食物、衣服和住所：這些一般被認為是人類的基本需求；因此，住房市場滿足了人們的基本需要。當然，住房也是投資的重要組成部分。在許多國家，住房是財富的最大組成部分。例如，在美國，房地產約占非金融私人部門持有的總資產的三分之一。大多數家庭傾向于以住房形式持有財富，而不是金融資產：例如，在法國，只有不到四分之一的家庭持有股票，但是有近60%的家庭擁有住房。
Housing also plays other key roles; for instance, mortgage markets are important in the transmission of monetary policy. Adequate housing can also facilitate labor mobility within an economy and help economies adjust to adverse shocks. In short, a well-functioning housing sector is critical to the overall health of the economy. And as economies develop, we expect a corresponding deepening and growth of housing markets.
住房也發揮著其他關鍵作用；例如，抵押貸款市場在傳導貨幣政策方面很重要。充足的住房也可以促進勞動力在經濟體系內的流動，并有助于經濟體在面對不利沖擊時進行調整。總之，一個運作良好的住房部門對于經濟的整體健康至關重要。隨著經濟的發展，住房市場也應相應地深化和增長。
Despite its importance, however, the housing sector has not received adequate attention from macroeconomists. As Ed Leamer once noted, leading textbooks in the field often did not have any mention of the housing sector. Of course, all that has changed since the Great Recession. The bursting of the real estate bubble in the United States was followed by the deepest global downturn since the Great Depression. It reminded people of the collateral damage that can be triggered by housing collapses.
然而，盡管其重要性，但住房部門并未得到宏觀經濟學家的足夠重視。埃德·里默（Ed Leamer）曾指出，該學科領域的主要教材通常不會提及住房市場。當然，自大衰退以來，這一切都變了。美國房地產市場泡沫破滅之后，出現了自大蕭條以來最嚴重的全球經濟衰退。它提醒人們，住房市場崩潰可能引起附帶損失。
Indeed, all through history, housing booms and busts have quite often been detrimental to both financial stability and the real economy. Many major episodes of banking distress have been associated with boom-bust cycles in property prices. IMF research shows that of the nearly 50 systemic banking crises in recent decades, more than two thirds were preceded by boom-bust patterns in house prices. The cost of resolving housing crises can be very high—in the case of Ireland, for instance, government bailouts of banks from the housing collapse ate up 40 percent of the country’s GDP. In contrast to housing cycles, boom-bust cycles in stock prices are much less likely to trigger systemic banking crises.
事實上，縱觀歷史，住房市場的繁榮與衰退往往不利于金融穩定和實體經濟。幾次主要的銀行危機均與房地產價格的漲跌周期相關。基金組織的研究表明，在近幾十年來的50次左右的系統性銀行危機中，三分之二以上的危機在爆發之前，住房價格出現大漲大跌的情況。解決住房危機的成本可能很高，例如，愛爾蘭政府在住房市場崩潰后對銀行進行紓困的成本占該國GDP的40%。與住房周期不同，股票價格的漲跌周期不太可能引發系統性銀行危機。
Even when housing busts do not have a large financial stability impact, they can affect the real economy. Research shows that recessions in OECD countries are more likely given a house price bust. Such recessions also tend to be much deeper and generate more unemployment than normal recessions. In short, there is abundant evidence that housing cycles can be a threat to financial and macroeconomic stability. Hence it is crucial to keep an eye on current housing market developments to keep them from going through another boom-bust cycle.
即使住房市場暴跌沒有對金融穩定產生大的影響，它們也可能對實體經濟產生影響。研究表明，經合組織國家在住房價格暴跌后更可能出現經濟衰退。而這種經濟衰退也往往更深刻，并且其導致的失業人數要多于通常衰退下的失業人數。簡言之，有大量證據表明，住房市場可能會危及金融和宏觀經濟穩定。因此，必須密切關注當前住房市場的發展，防止其出現新一輪的暴漲暴跌周期。
Detecting overvaluation in housing markets
對住房市場估值過高情況的監測
So where do housing markets stand today? House prices and residential investment declined in many countries at the onset of the Great Recession. Since then, there has been a rebound. Overall, house prices are inching up again: the IMF’s Global House Price Index has increased for the last seven quarters in a row. Over the past year, 33 out of 51 countries in our index showed increases in house prices. In some cases house prices are recovering from a sharp correction during the Great Recession. In other cases, house prices have continued an upward march with only a bit of moderation during the Great Recession.
那么，目前的住房市場是什么情況呢？在大衰退開始時，許多國家的房價和住宅投資都有所下降。之后出現了反彈。總體而言，房價再一次上揚：基金組織的全球房價指數在過去七個季度里連續上升。在過去一年里，我們指數中所包含的52個國家中有33個出現了房價上漲。在某些國家，房價是從大衰退時期的大幅回調中恢復。但另有一些國家，其房價上行在大衰退期間只是稍有放緩，目前則繼續上漲。
Have these developments moved house prices closer to or further away from economic fundamentals? One common first pass attempt to answer this question is by looking at long-run valuation ratios. Theory asserts that house prices, rents, and incomes should move in tandem over the long run. If house prices and rents get way out of line, people would switch between buying and renting, eventually bringing the two in alignment. Similarly, in the long run, the price of houses cannot stray too far from people’s ability to afford them––that is, from their income. The ratios of house prices to rents and incomes can thus provide an initial check on whether house prices are out of line with economic fundamentals.
這些發展態勢使房價更接近還是更遠離了經濟的基本面？要回答這個問題，通常來說，第一輪測定是通過分析長期估值比率。理論認為，從長遠來看，房價、租金和收入應當一起移動。如果房價和租金不一致，人們會在買房和租房之間相互轉換，最終使兩者相一致。同樣，從長遠來看，房屋的價格不可能過于偏離人們的購買力，即收入。因此，房價與租金和收入的比率可以初步檢查房價是否偏離了經濟基本面。
What does the evidence show? Among the OECD countries, these ratios remain well above the historical averages for a majority of countries. This is true for instance for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway and Sweden. This evidence provides a broad indication of housing market valuation. But one cannot assess overvaluation from this evidence alone. Whereas the long-run relationships do generally act as an anchor, house prices often drift away from them strongly and for long periods. Demand momentum leads to increases in house prices, particularly in situations where the supply of housing cannot be adjusted quickly due to geographical or other constraints. Judgments about housing valuation thus require supplementary information, such as credit growth, household indebtedness, lender characteristics, and the method of financing.
現實情況如何？大多數經合組織國家的這些比率仍然遠高于歷史平均水平。例如，澳大利亞、比利時、加拿大、挪威和瑞典即是如此。這個證據提供了住房市場估值的寬泛指標。但是我們不能僅從這一證據來評估估值過高。盡管長期關系通常確實可作為一個標準，但房價往往會長期且大幅偏離之。需求增勢會導致房價上漲，特別是在住房供應因地域或其他限制而無法快速調整的情況下。因此，關于住房估值的判斷需要參考其他信息，如信貸增長、家庭負債情況、貸出人特點以及融資方法。
Of all these potential indicators of the risk of a boom-bust cycle, IMF research suggests it is particularly important to monitor credit growth. We find that there is a distinguishing feature of real estate booms that go ‘bad’: this feature is the coincidence between the housing boom and the rapid increase in leverage and exposure of households and financial intermediaries. During the global financial crisis, nearly all the countries with “twin booms” in real estate and credit markets—21 out of 23 countries that we analyzed—ended up suffering from either a financial crisis or a severe drop in GDP growth relative to the country’s pre-crisis performance. In contrast, of the seven countries that experienced a real estate boom but not a credit boom, only two went through a systemic crisis and these countries, on average, had relatively mild recessions.
基金組織的研究表明，在所有這些暴漲暴跌周期風險的可用指標中，對信貸增長情況的監測尤其重要。我們發現，房地產繁榮變“壞”有一個顯著特點：在房地產市場繁榮的同時，還出現了家庭和金融中介的杠桿率的驟升和風險暴露程度驟增。在全球金融危機期間，幾乎所有經歷房地產和信貸市場“雙繁榮”的國家（我們分析的23個國家中的21個）最終都爆發了金融危機，或者GDP增長較該國在危機前的表現嚴重下降。相比之下，在經歷了房地產繁榮但不是信貸繁榮的七個國家中，只有兩個經歷了系統性危機，且平均而言，這些國家的經濟衰退相對溫和。
IMF staff are thus increasingly paying attention to credit growth, along with several other country-specific features of the housing market. In recent months, IMF staff have provided detailed judgments about housing markets for Australia, Israel and Canada, which are all countries where the broad measures of valuation are high. We have also provided assessments for many emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America, where mortgage credit and house price growth remain strong, and house prices in metropolitan areas show signs of overheating. In some cases, this more detailed look suggests much more modest overvaluation than indicated by the house price to income and house price to rent ratios. One example of this is Belgium, where the IMF concluded that despite the high valuation ratios, risks of a sharp correction of real estate prices appear contained. These country-specific factors for housing cycles suggest that the policy response cannot be ‘one size fits all’.
因此，基金組織工作人員越來越關注信貸增長，以及其他幾個國家特有的住房市場特點。近幾個月以來，基金組織工作人員對澳大利亞、以色列和加拿大的住房市場進行了詳細判斷，這些國家的寬泛估值指標都很高。我們也對亞洲和拉丁美洲的許多新興市場經濟體進行了評估，那里的抵押貸款信貸增長和房屋價格上漲依然強勁，大城市的房價出現了過熱跡象。在某些國家，這種更加詳盡的分析顯示出的估值過高程度要低于根據房價/收入比以及房價/租金比所表明的高估程度。這方面的一個例子是比利時，基金組織認為，盡管比利時的估值比率很高，但房地產價格大幅回調的風險似乎已得到控制。這些國家特定的住房周期因素也表明，不可能制定一個“放之四海而皆準”的政策回應方案。
Constructing a policy toolkit
制定政策工具包
With that, let me move to the third—and last—part of my remarks: the role of policies to contain housing booms. At the outset, let me note that this is part of a broader discussion of the appropriate role for monetary policy in the ‘new normal’. While many aspects of this role remain under active discussion, on thing is clear: monetary policy will have to be more concerned than it was before with financial stability and hence with housing markets. The era of ‘benign neglect’ of house price booms is over.
下面是我發言的第三個也是最后一個方面：政策在遏制房地產暴漲方面的作用。 首先，我要指出，這個問題也是關于貨幣政策在“新常態”中作用的更廣泛討論的組成部分。雖然該作用的許多方面仍然在積極討論之中，但有一點是明確的，即貨幣政策將比以往更加關注金融穩定和住房市場。“善意忽視”房價暴漲的時代已經結束。
That said, regulation of the housing sector involves a complex set of policies. The noted economist Avinash Dixit suggested we use the acronyms “MiP, MaP, MoP” to remind ourselves of the set of policies. ‘MiP’ stands for microprudential policies, which of course aim to ensure the resilience of individual financial institutions. Such policies are necessary for a sound financial system but may not be sufficient. Sometimes, actions suitable at the level of individual institutions can destabilize the system as a whole. Hence we also need not just ‘MiP’ but ‘MaP’, that is, macroprudential policies aimed at increasing the resilience of the system as a whole.
即便如此，對住房部門的監管涉及一系列復雜的政策。著名經濟學家阿維納什·迪克西特（Avinash Dixit）建議我們使用“MiP, MaP, MoP”這些縮寫來提醒我們這套政策。‘MiP’ 代表微觀審慎政策，其目的自然是確保單個金融機構的應變能力。 這種政策對于健全的金融體系來說是必要的，但可能并不充分。有時候，在單個機構一級的適當行為可能會破壞整個系統。因此，我們不僅需要 ‘MiP’，也需要‘MaP’，即旨在提高整個系統抵御能力的宏觀審慎政策。
The main macroprudential tools that have been used to contain housing booms are limits on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios and sectoral capital requirements. Limits on LTV ratios cap the size of a mortgage loan relative to the value of a property, in essence imposing a minimum down payment. Limits on DTI ratios restrict the size of a mortgage loan to a fixed multiple of household income. The hope is to thereby contain unaffordable increases in household debt. Such limits have long been in use in some economies. For example, Hong Kong SAR has operated an LTV cap since the early 1990s and introduced a DTI cap in 1994. In Korea, LTV limits were introduced in 2002 and DTI limits in 2005. During and after the global financial crisis, over 20 advanced and emerging economies all over the globe have followed the example of Hong Kong SAR and Korea.
用于遏制房價暴漲的主要宏觀審慎工具是貸款/價值比（LTV）限制和貸款/收入比 （DTI）限制以及部門性資本要求。限制貸款/價值比可控制抵押貸款占房產價值的比例上限，這本質上是設定了最低首付。控制貸款/收入比的上限則可將抵押貸款規模限制在家庭收入的固定倍數。其目的在于遏制家庭債務增加到令人難以承受的程度。一些經濟體一直使用這種限制。例如，香港特別行政區自20世紀90年代初以來一直實施貸款/價值比上限，并于1994年推出了貸款/收入比上限。在韓國，分別于2002年和2005年引入貸款/價值比和貸款/收入比。在全球金融危機期間和之后，全球各地有20多個先進和新興經濟體效法了香港特別行政區和韓國的做法。
Evidence thus far suggests that these measures are somewhat effective in cooling off both house prices and credit growth in the short run. They are able to break the financial accelerator mechanism that otherwise leads to a positive two-way feedback between credit booms and housing booms. But more fine tuning of these measures is needed. Macroprudential measures need to take into account the ability of market participants to circumvent some of the limits on leverage. In some countries, such as in Canada, LTV limits usefully distinguish between owner-occupied vs. investor mortgages.
迄今為止的證據表明，這些指標在短期內對于控制房價和信貸增長有一些效果。它們能夠打破金融加速器機制——該機制會在信貸繁榮和房地產繁榮之間形成正雙向反饋。但是，需要對這些指標進行更多的微調。宏觀審慎措施需要考慮到市場參與者規避一些杠桿限制的能力。在一些國家，如加拿大，業主自用房和投資購房的抵押貸款的貸款/價值比限制得到了明確區分。
Another macroprudential tool is to impose stricter capital requirements on loans to a specific sector such as real estate. This forces banks to hold more capital against these loans, discouraging heavy exposure to the sector. In many advanced economies such as Ireland and Norway, capital adequacy risk weights were increased on mortgage loans with high LTV ratios. Sectoral capital requirements have also been used in a number of emerging markets such as Estonia, Peru, and Thailand. Evidence suggests that while this tool increases resilience from additional buffers, its ability to curb credit growth is mixed. Some IMF work suggests that higher capital requirements on particular groups of mortgage loans have some success in curbing house price growth in countries like Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, and Ukraine.
另外一個宏觀審慎工具是對房地產等特定部門設定更加嚴格的資本金要求。這會迫使銀行為這些貸款持有更多資本金，從而防止其過于暴露于該部門的風險。在許多先進經濟體，如愛爾蘭和挪威，貸款/價值比率較高的抵押貸款的資本充足率風險權重有所增加。一些新興市場如愛沙尼亞、秘魯和泰國也采用了部門性資本要求。有證據表明，雖然這個工具通過充實額外緩沖增強了抵御能力，但其遏制信貸增長的能力參差不齊。 基金組織的一些研究表明，對特定的抵押貸款類別設定較高的資本要求在遏制一些國家的房價增長方面取得了一些成功，這些國家包括保加利亞、克羅地亞、愛沙尼亞和烏克蘭。
There are a number of reasons why higher capital requirements may be less effective in containing credit growth. First, when banks hold capital well above the regulatory minimum, lenders may not need to make any change in response to increases in risk weights. This often happens during housing booms when policymakers hope the tool to be most effective. Second, when lenders compete intensely for market share, they may internalize the costs of higher capital requirements rather than impose higher lending rates.
更高的資本要求在遏制信貸增長方面可能不太有效，有幾個原因。首先，如果銀行持有的資本遠遠高于最低監管要求，貸出人可能不需要做出任何變化來應對風險權重的增加。這通常發生在決策者希望該工具最有效的房地產繁榮期間。其次，當貸出人激烈爭奪市場份額時，他們可能會將較高資本要求的成本內部化，而不是提高貸款利率。
Macroprudential tools may also not be effective to target housing booms that are driven by the shortage of housing or by increased housing demand from foreign cash inflows that bypass domestic credit intermediation. In such cases, other tools are needed. For instance, stamp duty has been imposed to cool down rising house prices in Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. Evidence shows that this fiscal tool did reduce demand from foreigners who were outside of the LTV and DTI regulatory perimeters. In other instances, high house prices could reflect supply bottlenecks, and hence the effectiveness of demand-focused instruments may be limited. In such cases, the mismatches should be fundamentally addressed by measures to increase the supply of housing.
宏觀審慎工具可能也無法有效解決一切房價暴漲情況，比如由于住房短缺或者國外現金流入繞過國內信貸中介而推升住房需求所導致的房價暴漲。在這種情況下，需要采用其他工具。例如，香港特別行政區和新加坡通過征收印花稅來為不斷上漲的房價降溫。有證據表明，這個財政工具的確減少了不受貸款/價值比和貸款/收入比監管的外國人的需求。在其他國家，高房價可能反映了供應瓶頸，因此，需求工具的效用可能是有限的。在這種情況下，應通過增加住房供應的措施從根本上解決供需錯配問題。
Along with micro and macroprudential policies, we need ‘MoP’: monetary policy. It is often said using policy interest rates is a blunt tool for containing house price booms. But as I noted earlier, housing booms have often coincided with a generalized private credit boom. This suggests that monetary policy could be an important tool in many cases in support of macroprudential policies. It is true, however, that in many relevant cases at the moment, policy interest rates have to remain low to support economic recovery.
除了微觀和宏觀審慎政策，我們需要‘MoP’：貨幣政策。人們常說，政策利率是遏制房價暴漲的笨拙工具。但正如我在前面提到的，房價暴漲往往適逢私人信貸的普遍上漲。這表明，在許多情況下，貨幣政策可成為支持宏觀審慎政策的一個重要工具。然而，在當前的許多國家，政策利率需要維持在低位，以支持經濟復蘇。
Conclusion
結論
Let me conclude. Housing booms have different characteristics across countries and time periods. What is common is that when the bust comes, it very often damages financial stability and the real economy. The tools for containing housing booms are still being developed. The evidence on their effectiveness is only just starting to accumulate. The interactions of various policy tools can be complex. But all this should not be an excuse for inaction. The interlocking use of multiple tools might overcome the shortcomings of any single policy tool. We need to move from “benign neglect” to an “all of the above” approach when it comes to policy choices.
讓我總結一下。不同國家和不同時期的房地產繁榮具有不同的特點。但共同的一點是，當暴跌到來時，它往往會損害金融穩定和實體經濟。遏制房價暴漲的工具仍在制定之中。關于其有效性的證據才剛剛開始積累。各種政策工具之間的相互作用可能十分復雜。但是所有這些都不應成為不作為的借口。對多種工具的聯合使用或能克服單一政策工具的不足。當談到政策選擇時，我們需要從“善意忽視”轉到“多多益善”。
It is only by maintaining an open dialogue on these issues that we will gain a solid understanding of how policies can contain housing booms. International coordination is also essential, since housing booms in one country can be fed by credit market developments abroad. The IMF intends to do its part. As I mentioned, assessments of housing markets are becoming a regular feature of our country reports. We also report on housing markets through our flagship publications, the World Economic Outlook and the Global Financial Stability Report, as well as through other reports to our Executive Board. We are working with other agencies to improve housing statistics. Next week, we are launching a new webpage where all this work will be given a home. I encourage you to visit the new Global House Watch page on imf.org over the coming weeks and see what we have to offer and to tell us how to do better.
只有通過繼續就這些問題進行開誠布公的對話，我們才可以深刻認識到政策如何才能遏制房價暴漲。國際協調也必不可少，因為一國的房價暴漲可由國外信貸市場發展所推動。基金組織打算開展力所能及的工作。正如我所說的，評估住房市場正在成為基金組織國別報告的常見內容。我們也通過我們的旗艦出版物《世界經濟展望》和《全球金融穩定報告》以及其他向執行董事會的報告來分析住房市場。我們正與其他機構合作，以改善住房統計數據。下周，我們將推出一個新的網頁，專門介紹所有這些工作。我希望大家能在未來幾周里訪問imf.org網站上的“全球住房觀察”這個網頁，看看我們的工作，并告訴我們如何改進的建議。
The IMF is also contributing to the sharing of cross-country experiences through regular consultations with policymakers and experts. We held a successful conference last November, co-organized with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, on housing issues. And I have no doubt that this conference will be just as successful. Thank you.
基金組織也在通過與決策者和專家的定期磋商來促進跨國經驗的共享。去年11月，我們與達拉斯聯邦儲備銀行成功舉行了一次關于住房問題的會議。毫無疑問，本次會議也將一樣成功。謝謝。
