評(píng)論
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It's obvious.
這已經(jīng)顯而易見(jiàn)。
Global efforts to combat climate change have failed.
對(duì)抗氣候變化的全球努力都以失敗告終。
International summits are full of hot air and greenhouse gas pollution continues to rise.
國(guó)際峰會(huì)上探討著繼續(xù)上升的熱空氣及溫室氣體污染。
If a country bails on a climate commitment, they pay a price of, well, zero.
如果一個(gè)國(guó)家失約于氣候承諾,他們將付出零的代價(jià)。
Turns out that's okay, at least according to game theory analyses by researchers at the University of Lisbon.
這樣的結(jié)果不錯(cuò),至少是按照里斯本大學(xué)研究人員的博弈論分析得出。
Their models suggest that punishment by global institutions has no effect.
他們的模型顯示全球機(jī)構(gòu)的懲罰根本沒(méi)有效果。
They also say that global summits actually impede cooperation.
他們還坦言全球峰會(huì)實(shí)際上是在阻礙合作。
Now, in a new report,
現(xiàn)在,在一項(xiàng)新的報(bào)告中,
the researchers suggest that if punishment starts getting handed out at the local level, say city governments, what emerges is a much more cooperative global regime for combating climate change.
研究人員建議如果懲罰交予地方一級(jí)實(shí)施,比如市政府,呈現(xiàn)的則會(huì)是一種對(duì)抗氣候變化更加合作的全球機(jī)制。
The only other way for such collaboration to develop was for there to be a perception that the risks associated with climate change were devastating.
這些協(xié)作開(kāi)發(fā)唯一的其他方式是使其產(chǎn)生氣候變化相關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是毀滅性的感覺(jué)。
The report is in the journal Nature Climate Change.
這份研究報(bào)告已經(jīng)在《自然氣候變化》雜志上發(fā)表。
That's not the case at present, despite the reality of the environmental, economic and health threats posed by global warming.
這不是目前的情況,盡管全球變暖已經(jīng)威脅現(xiàn)實(shí)的環(huán)境,經(jīng)濟(jì)和健康。
In fact, such threats are reminiscent of the risks associated with the ongoing financial crisis, as noted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
事實(shí)上, 經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織的數(shù)據(jù)指出這種威脅讓人想起持續(xù)的金融危機(jī)。
Nevertheless, the math of how people play games suggests that successfully curbing carbon pollution will rely on the old adage: think globally… act locally.
然而，人們?nèi)绾瓮孢@場(chǎng)游戲的關(guān)鍵在于成功地遏制碳排放將遵循古老的格言:全球思維，地方行動(dòng)。
