評(píng)論
打印
A first possible tack would be to take America to the WTO, in the hope of a ruling that its new subsidies are illegal.
第一個(gè)可能的策略是將美國(guó)告上世貿(mào)組織，希望世貿(mào)組織裁定美國(guó)新的補(bǔ)貼非法。
Such wranglings are long, dull and unrewarding: the transatlantic battle over aircraft subsidies to Airbus and Boeing lasted 17 years.
這樣的爭(zhēng)論是漫長(zhǎng)、乏味且沒有回報(bào)的：大西洋兩岸圍繞空客和波音飛機(jī)補(bǔ)貼的爭(zhēng)端持續(xù)了17年。
By the time it ended in 2021, it was impossible to say who had won (apart from the lawyers).
到2021年這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)端結(jié)束時(shí)，除了律師，很難說究竟誰是勝者。
Nowadays it is unclear that the WTO even has the capacity to process such a case.
如今，人們甚至不清楚世貿(mào)組織是否有能力處理這樣的案件。
(Donald Trump, and later Mr. Biden, paralysed its dispute-resolution mechanism by blocking all new appointments of judges to it.)
（唐納德·特朗普，以及后來的拜登，都拒絕任命爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制下上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的新法官，此舉讓世貿(mào)組織的爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制陷入了癱瘓。)
And if Europe were somehow to prevail at the WTO, and win permission to retaliate with its own tariffs, it might not want to do so.
就算歐洲能以某種方式在世貿(mào)組織獲勝，并獲得許可，能夠利用自己的關(guān)稅對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)，它可能也不想這樣做。
A trade war would expose a rift between Europeans who are sceptical of globalisation—France, say, which has been pushing for "Buy European" schemes—and others like the Netherlands and Ireland who believe their prosperity depends on open trade.
貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將暴露出歐洲（例如法國(guó)，一直在推動(dòng)《購買歐洲商品》法案的進(jìn)程）和荷蘭，愛爾蘭等其他國(guó)家之間的裂痕：歐洲對(duì)全球化持懷疑態(tài)度，而荷蘭等國(guó)家認(rèn)為其國(guó)家繁榮有賴于開放貿(mào)易。
Both America and Europe know that China, a common economic rival, is happy to watch them squabble.
美國(guó)和歐洲都知道，他們共同的經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)手——中國(guó)，對(duì)他們的爭(zhēng)吵樂在其中。
America's trade envoy, Katherine Tai, has suggested a second possibility for Europe: it should simply respond to the IRA with a jumbo subsidies programme of its own.
美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表戴琪為歐洲提出了第二種可能性：歐洲應(yīng)該采取簡(jiǎn)單一點(diǎn)的措施，利用自己的巨額補(bǔ)貼計(jì)劃來回應(yīng)《通貨膨脹削減法案》。
That would indeed level the playing field - if Europe could afford it.
這確實(shí)能創(chuàng)造公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境——前提是如果歐洲能夠負(fù)擔(dān)得起。
Some countries can.
有些國(guó)家可以做到。
Germany, say, has lots of industry and little debt.
例如德國(guó)，它擁有大量的工業(yè)，并幾乎沒有債務(wù)。
But if it splurges on aid to domestic firms, that would deal a harsh blow to the EU's single market.
但如果它大力援助國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)，那將對(duì)歐盟單一市場(chǎng)造成沉重打擊。
A 200bn Euro ($206bn) German plan to help households and businesses deal with higher energy prices has irked other Europeans.
德國(guó)為幫助本國(guó)家庭和企業(yè)應(yīng)對(duì)能源價(jià)格上漲而宣布的2000億歐元（合2060億美元）計(jì)劃惹惱了其他歐洲人。
How can a Slovak firm compete with a German one, given the Slovak government's tiny budget?
在斯洛伐克政府預(yù)算微薄的情況下，一家斯洛伐克公司該如何與德國(guó)公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)？
Here the divide is between big EU countries with deep-pocketed governments and big global firms, and smaller countries that have neither.
分歧在于，歐盟中的大國(guó)擁有財(cái)力雄厚的政府和大型全球公司，而歐盟中的小國(guó)則沒有這些。
A third option would be to imitate America's subsidy-fest, but have it funded by the EU.
第三種選擇是由歐盟提供資金，和美國(guó)一樣進(jìn)行大力補(bǔ)貼。
Some would like a reprise of the NGEU, a 750bn Euro post-pandemic fund raised by joint borrowing that will be repaid mainly by rich countries but will be spent across the bloc.
一些人希望重啟“下一代歐盟”計(jì)劃，這是一項(xiàng)疫情后用于歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的7500億歐元資金，通過聯(lián)合借款籌集。該資金主要由富裕國(guó)家償還，但將用于整個(gè)歐盟。
Mere talk of such a scheme has reopened the oldest European rift of all, pitting spendthrift southerners against skinflint northerners who don't want to subsidise them.
僅僅是啟動(dòng)這樣一個(gè)計(jì)劃的傳言就讓歐洲最古老的裂隙重新顯現(xiàn)：一邊是揮霍無度的南方人，另一邊是不想補(bǔ)貼對(duì)方的吝嗇的北方人。
It looks like a non-starter.
這讓事情看起來成功無望。
European grumbling about American protectionism would carry more weight if the EU hadn't itself already devised policies quite similar to Mr. Biden's.
如果歐盟自己還沒有制定出與美國(guó)《通貨膨脹削減法案》相當(dāng)?shù)恼撸敲礆W洲對(duì)美國(guó)保護(hù)主義的抱怨將更有分量。
Mr. Macron proclaims the need for "strategic autonomy" so loudly and so often that America has clearly overheard.
馬克龍如此高調(diào)、如此頻繁地宣稱需要“戰(zhàn)略自主”，美國(guó)顯然聽到了。
No European scheme is as brazenly trade-hampering as the IRA.
沒有哪個(gè)歐洲制定的計(jì)劃像《通貨膨脹削減法案》那樣肆無忌憚地阻礙貿(mào)易。
But the EU's planned tariffs on imports from countries with no intention of cutting carbon emissions are protectionism-adjacent, as are new rules designed to keep some foreign firms from investing in the EU.
但歐盟計(jì)劃向無意削減碳排放的國(guó)家征收進(jìn)口商品的關(guān)稅，這一行為就像是保護(hù)主義的變體，其它一些旨在阻止外國(guó)公司在歐盟進(jìn)行投資的新規(guī)定也是如此。
And while it is true that subsidies paid out in Europe are also available to foreign firms, local ones know better how to lobby to get more than their fair share.
雖然歐洲發(fā)放的補(bǔ)貼確實(shí)可以提供給外國(guó)公司，但當(dāng)?shù)毓靖宄撊绾斡握f，以獲得超過合理份額的補(bǔ)貼。
Europe is getting burnt by American policies, but it helped start the fire.
歐洲正因美國(guó)的政策到了火燒眉毛的地步，但它自己也是火上澆油的一份子。
