In the long term, the implications of this will probably be as profound as the invention of statistics was in the late 17th century. The rise of "big data" provides far greater opportunities for quantitative analysis than any amount of polling or statistical modelling. But it is not just the quantity of data that is different. It represents an entirely different type of knowledge, accompanied by a new mode of expertise.
長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看,其影響可能會(huì)像17世紀(jì)后期統(tǒng)計(jì)技術(shù)的發(fā)明一樣深遠(yuǎn)。“大數(shù)據(jù)”的興起為定量分析提供了比任何數(shù)量的投票或統(tǒng)計(jì)建模都大得多的機(jī)會(huì)。但不只是數(shù)據(jù)的數(shù)量不同,它代表了一種完全不同的知識(shí)類型,伴隨著一種新的專業(yè)技能模式。
First, there is no fixed scale of analysis (such as the nation) nor any settled categories (such as "unemployed"). These vast new data sets can be mined in search of patterns, trends, correlations and emergent moods. It becomes a way of tracking the identities that people bestow upon themselves (such as "ImwithCorbyn" or "entrepreneur") rather than imposing classifications upon them. This is a form of aggregation suitable to a more fluid political age, in which not everything can be reliably referred back to some Enlightenment ideal of the nation state as guardian of the public interest.
首先,它沒(méi)有固定的分析尺度(比如國(guó)家),也沒(méi)有固定的分類(比如“失業(yè)”)。這些龐大的新的數(shù)據(jù)集可以被挖掘出來(lái)以尋找模式、趨勢(shì)、相關(guān)性和突發(fā)情緒。它成為一種追蹤人們賦予自己身份的方式(比如“我支持科爾賓”或者“企業(yè)家”),而不是將分類強(qiáng)加給他們。這是一種適用于流動(dòng)性更大的政治時(shí)代的集合形式,在這個(gè)時(shí)代,并不是每件事情都可以可靠地追溯到某種啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)的理想來(lái)作為公共利益的守護(hù)者。
Second, the majority of us are entirely oblivious to what all this data says about us, either individually or collectively. There is no equivalent of an Office for National Statistics for commercially collected big data. We live in an age in which our feelings, identities and affiliations can be tracked and analysed with unprecedented speed and sensitivity – but there is nothing that anchors this new capacity in the public interest or public debate. There are data analysts who work for Google and Facebook, but they are not "experts" of the sort who generate statistics and who are now so widely condemned. The anonymity and secrecy of the new analysts potentially makes them far more politically powerful than any social scientist.
其次,我們大多數(shù)人完全沒(méi)有注意到這些數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)我們個(gè)人或集體的影響。目前還沒(méi)有一個(gè)類似于國(guó)家統(tǒng)計(jì)局的機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)處理商業(yè)上收集的大數(shù)據(jù)。在我們所生活的時(shí)代,人們可以以前所未有的速度和敏感性追蹤和分析我們的情感、身份和從屬關(guān)系——但沒(méi)有什么能將這種新能力錨定在公眾利益或公眾辯論上。谷歌和臉書(shū)也有數(shù)據(jù)分析師,但他們不是產(chǎn)生統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)以及現(xiàn)在飽受譴責(zé)的的那種“專家”。新分析師的匿名性和保密性可能使他們?cè)谡紊媳热魏紊鐣?huì)科學(xué)家都強(qiáng)大得多。
A company such as Facebook has the capacity to carry quantitative social science on hundreds of millions of people, at very low cost. But it has very little incentive to reveal the results. In 2014, when Facebook researchers published results of a study of "emotional contagion" that they had carried out on their users – in which they altered news feeds to see how it affected the content that users then shared in response – there was an outcry that people were being unwittingly experimented on. So, from Facebook's point of view, why go to all the hassle of publishing? Why not just do the study and keep quiet?
像臉書(shū)這樣的公司有能力以極低的成本為數(shù)億人提供定量的社會(huì)科學(xué),但它將結(jié)果公開(kāi)的動(dòng)機(jī)少之又少。2014年,臉書(shū)的研究人員公布了他們對(duì)用戶進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)“情緒傳染”研究的結(jié)果——其中他們改變了新聞源以觀察它如何影響用戶之后分享的內(nèi)容——人們表示強(qiáng)烈抗議,稱自己在不知不覺(jué)當(dāng)中成了小白鼠。所以,從臉書(shū)的角度來(lái)講,為什么要自找麻煩將結(jié)果公布出來(lái)呢?本本分分地搞研究不香嗎?