These funds must be secured. America, to its credit, has already approved its share, but the biggest, richest members need to provide still more. The IMF should then follow a three-pronged approach to fighting the crisis.
這些資金必須得到保障。值得贊揚的是，美國已經(jīng)批準了其分擔的部分，但最大、最富有的成員國還需要提供更多。國際貨幣基金組織應該采取三管齊下的方法來應對危機。
First, it ought to create new special drawing rights (SDRs), a currency of sorts which is convertible into dollars but whose quantity the fund controls. This is a bit like printing money to finance a cheap perpetual credit line for every IMF member. In 2009, after the global financial crisis, the fund created $250bn in new SDRs; today it could create more than twice that amount before having to ask America’s Congress for permission to continue. Creating SDRs would provide indiscriminate, unconditional aid without draining the IMF’s reserves. However, it is controversial. The fund’s core mission is making conditional loans that are repaid, not printing money. It could take time to build the necessary support. In the meantime, rich countries should lend their SDRs to countries that are short of reserves. This may be more politically palatable than lending dollars.
首先，國際貨幣基金組織應該創(chuàng)造新的特別提款權(quán)(SDRs)，即某種可以兌換成美元的貨幣，但其數(shù)量由基金控制。這有點像印鈔票，為每個國際貨幣基金組織成員國提供價優(yōu)的永久信貸額度。2009年，全球金融危機爆發(fā)后，國際貨幣基金組織發(fā)行了2500億美元的特別提款權(quán)；如今，在不得不請求美國國會允許這種情況繼續(xù)下去之前，國際貨幣基金組織本可以創(chuàng)造超過當年兩倍數(shù)額的特別提款權(quán)。創(chuàng)建特別提款權(quán)將在不會耗盡國際貨幣基金組織儲備的情況下，提供無理由、無條件的援助。
Second, the IMF must alleviate the dollar liquidity shortage in solvent countries that have good institutions but which cannot borrow from the Fed. In 2017 the fund’s board rejected a proposal to provide its own swap-like funding to countries with strong institutions. It should revisit that decision. It should also explore ways of getting existing dollar reserves, which are ample at the global level, to where they are needed. For example, the fund could act as a clearing house for currency swaps, guaranteeing participating central banks against losses by graduating any debts that turn sour into a conventional IMF programme.
其次，國際貨幣基金組織必須緩解有償付能力的國家的美元流動性短缺程度，這些國家擁有良好的機構(gòu)，但無法從美聯(lián)儲借款。2017年，國際貨幣基金組織董事會否決了向擁有強大機構(gòu)的國家提供其互換式融資的提議。董事會應重新考慮這個決定。并應探索如何將現(xiàn)有的從全球來看充足的美元儲備轉(zhuǎn)移到需要的地方。例如，國際貨幣基金組織可以充當貨幣互換的清算機構(gòu)，為參與其中的各國央行提供擔保，使其免受損失，方法是將任何可能變成壞賬的債務轉(zhuǎn)化為IMF的常規(guī)計劃。
Third, the fund must persuade the world that many of the poorest countries, especially in Africa, are insolvent and need debt relief. Researchers at the fund and the World Bank judged in February that half of low-income countries had shaky finances even before the pandemic. In these countries there is a danger that emergency loans are used to pay off existing creditors, leaving the IMF holding the bag. (This is awkward given that, by one estimate, China lent $146bn to African governments and state-owned enterprises between 2000 and 2017.) Better to write down debts collectively. Doing this in an orderly manner takes time, but public-sector creditors should immediately suspend both principal and interest payments. And if possible, the world should co-operate to shield the poorest countries from payments to private creditors, too.
第三，國際貨幣基金組織必須讓世界相信，許多最貧窮的國家，尤其是非洲國家，已經(jīng)資不抵債，需要減免債務。今年2月，國際貨幣基金組織和世界銀行的研究人員判斷，甚至在疫情之前，半數(shù)低收入國家的財政狀況就已經(jīng)不穩(wěn)定。最好是集體減記債務。需要花時間有序完成這些，但公共部門的債權(quán)人應立即暫停償還本金和利息。如果可能的話，世界各國也應該進行合作，針對向私有債權(quán)人的借款向最貧困的國家提供保護。
These actions will be needed in addition to the IMF’s regular lending programmes, which will be called upon at a scale hitherto unseen. The fund has not faced a crisis like this before. It must fight it with every available tool.
除了國際貨幣基金組織的定期貸款計劃外，這些行動也需進行下去。國際貨幣基金組織此前從未面臨過這樣的危機。必須動員一切可以動員的力量。
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