leading current and former U.S. officials to question whether his talk of reform masks a crackdown on dissent.
"More people today probably feel better about their country, particularly young people," says a former top White House official.
"But people have suffered, and the political repression has not lightened up. This is not a democratic reform."
“但民眾是遭過罪的,政治壓迫也并沒有比過去減輕??梢姳尽に_拉曼的改革并不是民主改革?!?/div>
In the U.S., bin Salman has found some important supporters, though,
盡管如此,本·薩勒曼還是在美國拉到了一些重要的支持者,
including President Donald Trump and his influential son-in-law Jared Kushner.
比如總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普和他頗有影響力的女婿賈里德·庫什納。
The President has not only pursued a tighter alliance with the kingdom and embraced it as a bulwark against a surging Iran;
總統(tǒng)不僅竭力緊密與沙特的聯(lián)盟關(guān)系,將其視為防御伊朗崛起的堡壘;
he has also invested deeply in the crown prince personally, tweeting reassurances through a string of controversies.
還對王儲投入了很深的個人感情,在王儲陷入一連串的爭議時上推特為他發(fā)表安撫言論。
If White House support were enough to gain backing for his reforms,
如果白宮的支持已經(jīng)足以幫他實(shí)現(xiàn)改革的話,
bin Salman would not have proceeded from Washington to Boston, New York City, Seattle, Silicon Valley, Beverly Hills and Dallas.
本·薩爾曼就不可能離開華盛頓再去波士頓、紐約、西雅圖、硅谷、貝弗利山和達(dá)拉斯。
The question is whether others will buy what the White House has signed on for.
問題是,白宮表態(tài)支持了,其他人會不會買賬。
"Is this a savvy transaction by a young guy who knows his country has to change,
這究竟是一個知道自己的國家必須改變卻還想繼續(xù)保持嚴(yán)格的專制統(tǒng)治的年輕人
but who intends to maintain strict and authoritarian control at home,
提出來的一筆精明的買賣呢,
or is this a transformation that will fundamentally alter the American conception of Saudi Arabia? "
還是一場將從根本上改變美國對沙特阿拉伯的印象的變革呢?”
asks Aaron David Miller, a longtime State Department official now at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
曾在國務(wù)院長期任職,現(xiàn)在伍德羅·威爾遜中心工作的亞倫·戴維·米勒問道。

"When I was at the State Department, we prayed for a leader like this.
“在國務(wù)院的時候,我們還盼著沙特能出現(xiàn)這樣一位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。
(But) beware of wishing something you don't really want."
(只是)對你并不是真正想要的東西許愿可得留神啊?!?/div>
UPON THE DEATH or abdication of bin Salman's father,
本·薩勒曼的父親離世或退位后,
the throne will skip an entire generation—hundreds of middle-aged princes—and fall to him.
王位將跳過整整一代人——數(shù)百名已經(jīng)步入中年的王子——最終落到他的頭上。
The crown prince is a man in a hurry.
王儲是個急性子。
"I don't want to waste my time," he says. "I am young."
“我不想浪費(fèi)時間,”他說。“因?yàn)槲疫€很年輕。”
The dire condition of the kingdom kindly accommodated his impatience.
在王國現(xiàn)在面臨的嚴(yán)峻形勢下,王儲的急躁情緒顯得稍微情有可原了。
By 2015, when the crown reached bin Salman's father, the Saudi oil economy was running on fumes.
2015年本·薩勒曼父親繼承王位之時,沙特的石油經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)奄奄一息。
The price of a barrel, which Saudis had projected to remain at at least $100 a barrel, had fallen to $50,
曾預(yù)計(jì)至少將維持在每桶100美元的油價(jià)跌至每桶50美元,
and immense cash reserves stood a few years from exhaustion.
當(dāng)時還有巨額的準(zhǔn)備金能勉強(qiáng)支撐幾年。
At the same time, the U.S., having edged closer to energy independence with natural gas and oil shale,
與此同時,隨著天然氣和油頁巖的開采,美國已經(jīng)逐漸接近能源獨(dú)立,
no longer needed Riyadh the way it once did, and was noticeably less attentive.
已經(jīng)不再像過去那樣需要利雅得了,對沙特也明顯不那么在意了。
More worrying still, President Barack Obama, unlike other past Presidents, was willing to engage persistently with Iran, the Saudis' chief nemesis.
更令人擔(dān)憂的是,美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克·奧巴馬,與以往歷屆總統(tǒng)不同,愿意保持和沙特的頭號宿敵伊朗的接觸。
Iran, despite remaining a thorn in Washington's side, was aligned with the U.S. in its desire
因?yàn)楸M管伊朗那時仍是華盛頓的眼中釘,但它和美國一樣,
to destroy ISIS, the Sunni extremists who executed Americans on camera and used Saudi textbooks in their schools.
也渴望摧毀ISIS這群公然在鏡頭前處決美國人,在學(xué)校使用沙特的教科書的遜尼派極端分子。
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來源:可可英語 http://www.ccdyzl.cn/Article/201901/576710.shtml