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On April 2, we saw China’s first response:
4月2日，我們看到了中國(guó)的第一輪反應(yīng):
tariffs on 128 goods from the U.S. worth $3 billion, with the threat of more to come,
宣布對(duì)來(lái)自美國(guó)的128種，總價(jià)值30億美元的商品征收關(guān)稅，還威脅說(shuō)后續(xù)還會(huì)有更多關(guān)稅，
as a reply to the initial steel and aluminum gambit.
作為對(duì)當(dāng)初美國(guó)針對(duì)中國(guó)征收鋼鋁關(guān)稅的回應(yīng)。
The proportionate response from Beijing signaled
北京方面的相應(yīng)回應(yīng)表明，
that China doesn’t want a fight but won’t back down if Trump escalates.
中國(guó)無(wú)意挑起紛爭(zhēng)，但如果特朗普得寸進(jìn)尺，中國(guó)就絕不退縮。
On April 3, the Trump Administration revealed its list
4月3日，特朗普政府公布了
of recommended Chinese products to target in his broader tariff proposal–including more than 1,300 of them.
特朗普廣泛征稅的提案中他建議征稅的中國(guó)產(chǎn)品清單——共計(jì)1300多種。
On April 4, China sharply upped the stakes, with tariffs on U.S. goods worth about $50 billion.
4月4日，中國(guó)加大了賭注，將征收關(guān)稅的美國(guó)商品規(guī)模提高到了500億美元。
There is a risk of further escalation,
時(shí)態(tài)還可能進(jìn)一步惡化，
because both sides believe they hold the stronger hand.
因?yàn)殡p方都認(rèn)為占上風(fēng)的是自己一方。
Trump knows that China’s economy is susceptible to trade action,
特朗普知道，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)很容易受到貿(mào)易方面的牽制，
since it depends on it more than the U.S. does.
因?yàn)樗让绹?guó)更依賴貿(mào)易。
According to the World Bank, 37% of China’s GDP comes from trade–
世界銀行的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，中國(guó)37%的GDP都來(lái)自貿(mào)易——
though that’s down from more than 65% in 2006–vs. 27% for the U.S.
盡管這一比例比2006年的65%已經(jīng)有所下降，而美國(guó)的GDP只有27%來(lái)自貿(mào)易。
That creates a vulnerability for China.
這給中國(guó)造成了一個(gè)軟肋。
But Trump is more politically vulnerable than Xi.
但特朗普在政治上比習(xí)脆弱。
It’s not an accident that among the U.S. goods targeted by China are ginseng and pork,
中國(guó)這次將征稅矛頭對(duì)準(zhǔn)人參和豬肉之類的商品并非偶然，
products that will hurt farmers and business owners in states like Wisconsin and Iowa,
因?yàn)檫@些產(chǎn)品會(huì)影響到威斯康辛州和愛(ài)荷華州的農(nóng)民和企業(yè)主，
which are essential for Trump’s re-election bid in 2020.
而這群人對(duì)特朗普2020年的連任競(jìng)選有著至關(guān)重要的作用。
Trump will hear more public criticism for these moves than Xi will.
這些舉措給特朗普帶來(lái)的民眾批評(píng)之聲勢(shì)必蓋過(guò)給習(xí)帶來(lái)的批評(píng)之聲。
There are no swing states in China.
因?yàn)橹袊?guó)沒(méi)有民意搖擺不定的“搖擺州”。
Beijing’s second round of tariffs targets many U.S. goods,
北京的第二輪關(guān)稅將矛頭對(duì)準(zhǔn)了更多的美國(guó)商品，
including cars, orange juice and soybeans–a product that accounts for trade worth $14 billion per year.
比如汽車(chē)、橙汁和大豆——這些產(chǎn)品每年給美國(guó)帶來(lái)的貿(mào)易額高達(dá)140億美元。
This will have an even greater pocketbook effect on Trump’s base.
這一舉措將從財(cái)政上進(jìn)一步撼動(dòng)特朗普的根基。
And this is just the beginning.
而這還僅僅是個(gè)開(kāi)始。
Trump wants U.S. companies to have greater access to China’s vast marketplace.
川普希望美國(guó)的企業(yè)能夠更多地進(jìn)入中國(guó)這個(gè)巨大的市場(chǎng)。
He wants a much lower trade deficit–and a political win.
他想要降低赤字——同時(shí)奪取政治勝利。
China needs access to the technologies that can help its economy make the leap
而中國(guó)需要從制造業(yè)巨頭到尖端工業(yè)創(chuàng)造者那里
from manufacturing powerhouse to cutting-edge creator of industries
獲得能夠幫助其經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)飛躍的技術(shù)，
and jobs that flow from advances in artificial intelligence, robotics and advanced microchips.
需要人工智能、機(jī)器人技術(shù)和先進(jìn)微芯片的發(fā)展帶來(lái)的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。
The U.S. may win some concessions on market access,
美國(guó)在市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入方面或許能贏得一些讓步，
but China won’t end the practice of forcing U.S. companies to share technology as the price of admission.
但中國(guó)不會(huì)結(jié)束強(qiáng)迫美國(guó)公司以分享技術(shù)作為準(zhǔn)入條件的做法。
Whatever happens next, it’s clear that the Mar-a-Lago moment is long gone.
無(wú)論接下來(lái)發(fā)生什么，很明顯，馬阿拉戈莊園里的那個(gè)時(shí)刻早已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了。
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