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The media accounts of his relationship with the President are largely true.
媒體對他與總統(tǒng)關系的報道大部分都是真實的。
When we get an assignment in the military, we call them “orders,”
我們在軍隊里接到任務時，我們稱之為“命令”，
and this was a set of orders he would gladly have passed on.
而這是一套他應該會很樂意傳達的命令。
But like a good soldier, he shouldered the pack and stepped into the White House
然而，他還是像一個好士兵一樣，扛起背包，走進白宮，
to do what he could to create at least part of a guardrail system around this mercurial and unstable President.
盡他所能在這位反復無常又不安定的總統(tǒng)身邊筑起一些護欄。
McMaster is a good judge of character.
麥克馬斯特看人很準。
From the beginning, he knew he would deal with whipsaw views on the key elements of foreign policy,
從一開始，他就知道，他要面對在外交政策的關鍵要素面前搖擺不定的觀點，
like watching positions on North Korea lurch from “fire and fury” to accepting a meeting with Kim Jong Un to cut a big, beautiful deal.
比如看著總統(tǒng)對朝鮮的態(tài)度從“怒氣沖天”轉變?yōu)橥馀c金正恩會面，再轉變?yōu)檫_成一項重大而美好的協(xié)議。
No National Security Adviser could bring order out of the policy chaos any more than McMaster’s fellow general John Kelly could bring order to the process chaos.
沒有哪個國家安全顧問能夠像麥克馬斯特的同僚約翰·凱利上將整治美國混亂的進程那樣整治美國政策的混亂。
This is a President who revels in chaos.
我們現(xiàn)在的總統(tǒng)是一位醉心于挑起混亂的總統(tǒng)。
For a national-security team, that gives birth to the worst quality from an international perspective, especially an allied one: inconsistency.
對于一個國家安全事務團隊而言，從國際角度來看，尤其是從國際盟友的角度來看，催生最糟糕的政府的做法就是：前后不一。
Trump has said he doesn’t want our enemies to know what we are thinking;
特朗普說過，他不想讓我們的敵人知道我們在想什么；
the problem is, neither do our friends nor even, it seems at times, do we ourselves.
問題是，連我們的朋友，有時候甚至連我們自己都不知道我們在想什么。
McMaster worked hard to bring talent to the National Security Council staff,
麥克馬斯特很努力地往國家安全委員會輸送人才，
avoid turf battles and generate a coherent national-security strategy.
很努力地避免爭奪勢力范圍的斗爭，還很努力地制定連貫的國家安全戰(zhàn)略。
When the strategy came out, I chatted with McMaster about it,
戰(zhàn)略制定出來后，我和麥克馬斯特聊了聊，
and he said, “America First doesn’t have to mean America Alone.”
他說，“美國優(yōu)先并不意味著美國要把自己孤立起來?！?/div>
He managed to make the document shockingly normal,
他成功地讓那份文件顯得出奇地正常了，
while dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate accord were battles he could not win,
然而，退出跨太平洋伙伴關系以及退出巴黎氣候協(xié)議兩件事上他實在沒有打贏的希望，
he managed to at least keep a sense of mainstream foreign-policy choices in play:
但他至少設法給了民眾一種是主流的外交政策選擇在發(fā)揮作用的印象:
a strong NATO, Asian alliances, countering a resurgent Russia and a rising China,
一個強大的北約-亞洲聯(lián)盟，對抗著逐漸復興的俄羅斯和日益崛起的中國，
a focus on cyber and energy, and other reasonable positions.
將精力集中在網絡、能源以及其他合理立場上。
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