評論
打印
Europe French foreign policy
歐洲 法國對外政策
The Bamako effect
巴馬科效應
Will France’s intervention in Mali make Francois Hollande popular at home?
弗朗索瓦·奧朗德對馬里的干涉會能否使其在國內大受歡迎？
Bienvenue, Papa Hollande!
奧朗德先生，歡迎您的到來
“Vive la France!” read one home-made placard; “Merci Papa Hollande!” declared another. The spontaneous outpouring of gratitude on the streets of Bamako and Timbuktu, during Francois Hollande’s lightning one-day visit to Mali on February 2nd, was part of a storybook sequence that the unpopular French president could only have dreamed of. It was, he gushed, “the most important day in my political life”. Two days later, Joe Biden, the American vice-president, stood beside Mr Hollande in Paris and applauded his “decisiveness” and “the incredible competence and capability” ofFrance’s military forces. For a politician whom members of his own party compared variously to a marshmallow, a woodland strawberry and a caramel pudding, this was bliss indeed.
一個自制的標欄上寫著“法蘭西萬歲！”，而另一個則標著“奧朗德爸爸，謝謝你”的字樣。2月2日，奧朗德在對馬里（Mali）為期一天的閃電訪問期間，在巴馬科（Bamako）和廷巴克圖（Timbuktu）， 像這樣自發張貼的感激標語隨處可見。此般戲劇性的發展恐怕是這位人氣不佳的總統都難以預料。奧朗德不斷的重復道，“在我的政治生涯中，今天是至關重要的一天”。兩天之前，美國副總統喬·拜登（Joe Biden）在巴黎與奧朗德會見的時候，就稱贊他在管理法國軍隊上的“果斷”和“令人難以置信的能力和才干”。相比于被自己黨內同僚評價為軟弱無能（棉花糖，樹莓和焦糖布丁是法國人給奧朗德的綽號，暗指其軟弱，并非贊揚），美國副總統的評價真算得上是贊美了。
Under the Fifth Republic, a French president is expected to act at once as a kind of monarch (solemnity, distance) and an active executive (decisiveness, authority). This is a tricky mix, and for the right, Charles de Gaulle has long served as the ideal. For the left, it is Francois Mitterrand, the only other Socialist president. Ever since he decided to run for election, Mr Hollande has become an adept Mitterrand mimic, in gesticulation, pace and tone of voice. Yet it takes more than physical imitation to earn authority. Before France’s Mali operation he struggled to overcome a reputation for consensus-seeking and fudge.
在法蘭西第五共和國，總統曾被期許擁有國王般(莊嚴，距離感)的威嚴及強有力的執行能力(果斷、權威) 。這是一個棘手的混合，戴高樂（Charles de Gaulle）作為法國右翼政黨總統，曾長期執政并被視為榜樣性的法國總統。而對法國左翼政黨來說，榜樣便是密特朗（Mitterrand）了，社會黨另一位總統的總統。自從奧朗德決定參加競選，無論是從手勢節奏還是語調上，他儼然已經熟練成為另一個密特朗了。然而想獲得權威，不僅僅是表面上的模仿。在法國對馬里問題的處理上，他努力擺脫先前人云亦云，逃避責任的名聲。
Now, the military intervention is prompting a reassessment. The decision to dispatch fighter jets and attack helicopters to blast advancing jihadists was taken quickly and pragmatically. It was bold, with the French enjoying little allied help. “His image has changed” and he has “dispelled doubts about his authority,” says Zaki Laidi at Sciences-Po university.
現在，軍事干預使得人們對奧朗德的看法有所改觀。奧朗德決定派遣戰斗機和攻擊型直升機用來轟炸圣戰分子的進程被迅速有效地推進著。法國只有小部分盟軍的幫助，這是十分大膽的決定。巴黎政治大學的Zaki Laid說道“奧朗德的形象已經改變了，而且他已經消除了人們對他權威的懷疑。”
Might such uncharacteristic boldness abroad translate into the same at home? In some ways, the French decision over Maliwas not difficult: Mr Hollande judged that he had no choice. As Jean-Yves Le Drian, the defence minister, put it, “there was a spectacular acceleration” of the jihadists towards Bamako the day before the French strikes began: “if nobody had intervened, Bamako would have fallen two or three days later”. Mr Hollande did not have to take on a war-weary or doubting public opinion, or hostile political opposition.
奧朗德此般大膽舉措，在法國國內是否能一如國外般受到認可？在某些方面，法國所作出的在馬里的決定并不難：因為奧朗德認為，除此之外他別無選擇。正如國防部長Jean-Yves Le Drian當圣戰者直指巴馬科，但法國依舊按兵不動時說的那樣“事態演變的太快了。如果再沒有人干預，巴馬科在2-3天內絕對會被攻占。”因為奧朗德先生不需要面對厭戰、質疑的公眾意見或者持敵對態度的反對黨。
A greater test is whether Mr Hollande is bold enough to take on his own constituencies with domestic reform. He has begun to implement some measures to improve competitiveness, including a softening of labour-market regulation, which does not appeal naturally to the left. Yet these have been offset by crowd-pleasing tax increases on the rich and on companies, and a reluctance to cut public spending. Given that the public sector supplies many of his deputies and voters, upcoming attempts to reform pensions and the civil service will be a better test of his willingness to take risks.
另一個更大的考驗是,奧朗德是否敢于站到自己支持者的對面進行國內改革。他已經開始實施一些措施來提高競爭力，包括放寬勞動力市場監管，此舉當然不會獲得法國左派支持。但是，奧朗德同時施行了口碑甚好的富人稅和企業稅增稅，以及反對政府開始削減，這些政策抵消了左派的不滿。如果考慮到法國的公共部門（指政府部門、事業單位等）為奧朗德總統選票、議員的主要來源，即將到來的對養老金及行政部門的改革嘗試，將會是對其是否愿承擔風險的一次更好測試。
Even less clear is whether a more authoritative image will transform Mr Hollande’s poor poll ratings. The link is not automatic. Nicolas Sarkozy, his predecessor, got no ratings jump from the war in Libya. For Mr Hollande, much depends on whether things go horribly wrong in Mali; for the moment, the French have had only one soldier killed. So far the polling evidence is mixed. One recent survey suggested that Mr Hollande’s low ratings have barely moved. A poll in Paris-Match, a weekly, showed a six-point jump in his popularity, to 43%—but a mere 37% applauded his economic policy.
現在還不是很清楚的是，是否還有更權威的形象將改變奧朗德可憐的民調支持率。兩者并非必然相關的。前任法國總統尼古拉·薩科齊（Nicolas Sarkozy）,他的前任沒有從利比亞戰爭中得到民意支持率上升的好處。對于奧朗德來說，更多的是取決于馬里事態究竟會不會向恐怖、惡劣的方向發展；目前，法國人也只有一個士兵站亡。到目前為止，調查證據是喜憂參半。最近的一個調查顯示，奧朗德的低支持率幾乎沒有任何變動。《巴黎競賽》（Paris- Match）周刊的一項民意調查顯示，奧朗德的支持率激增6個百分點，達到43%。但是其中只有37%贊揚他的經濟政策。翻譯：周穎
譯文屬譯生譯世
