評(píng)論
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Effectively the international (financial) system has a tow-tier structure：Countries that can borrow in their own currency constitute the center, and those, whose borrowings are denominated in one of the hard currencies, constitute the periphery. If individual countries get into difficulties they receive assistance but only on strict conditions. That holds true whether they are from the center or from the periphery. But if tie center itself becomes endangered, then, preserving the system take precedence over all other considerations.
事實(shí)上國(guó)際金融體系擁有雙層結(jié)構(gòu)：能用本國(guó)貨幣進(jìn)行借貸的國(guó)家構(gòu)成了該體系的中心，而只能通過(guò)硬通貨進(jìn)行借貸的國(guó)家則構(gòu)成了這個(gè)體系的外圍。如果有成員國(guó)陷入困境，不論它們是處于該體系的中心或外沿，它們均可得到援助，但條件很苛刻。但是如果中心本身遇到了威脅，那么金融體系的維護(hù)就成了優(yōu)先考慮的問(wèn)題。
That happened for the first time in the international banking crisis of 1982. If the debtor countries had been allowed to default, the banking system would have collapsed. Therefore the international financial authorities banded together and introduced what I called at the time "the collective system of lending". The lenders were induced to roll over their loans and the debtor countries were lent enough additional money to service their debts. The net effect was that debtor countries fell into severe recession —Latin America lost a decade of growth —but the banking system was allowed to earn its way out of a hole. When the banks built up sufficient reserves the loans were restructured into so-called Brady bonds and the banks wrote off their remaining losses.
這一點(diǎn)在1982年的國(guó)際金融危機(jī)中第一次得到驗(yàn)證。當(dāng)時(shí)如果允許債務(wù)國(guó)拖欠還款，銀行系統(tǒng)就會(huì)崩潰。于是，國(guó)際金融權(quán)威機(jī)構(gòu)聯(lián)合起來(lái)，并采取了當(dāng)時(shí)被我稱(chēng)作“集體出借體制”的方法，即借貸國(guó)將貸款延期，借給債務(wù)國(guó)足夠的額外資金償還債務(wù)。實(shí)際的結(jié)果是，債務(wù)國(guó)陷入嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期——拉丁美洲的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)被阻滯了 10年——而銀行系統(tǒng)得以贏利而僥幸擺脫困境。當(dāng)各銀行積累了足夠的儲(chǔ)備，債款就被重組為所謂的“布雷迪債券"，其余的損失均由銀行自負(fù)。
