評論
打印
Something similar happened again in 1997 but by then the banks had learned to securitize their loans so they could not be forced into a collective system of lending and most of the losses had to be taken by the debtor countries. This set the pattern: the debtor countries were subjected to harsh market discipline but when the system was in danger, the normal rules were suspended. Banks, whose collective failure would have endangered the system, were bailed out.
1997年，類似的事情再次發生。但那時，銀行已經學會了將貸款證券化，不至被迫采用集體出借的做法，而大部分損失不得不由債務國承擔。于是形成了一種新的模式：債務國遵守嚴格的市場戒律，但如果體系遭遇困難，一般規則將暫停執行。這樣，銀行就得到挽救，盡管它們的集體失敗也許已危及到了體系本身。
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 was different because it originated at the center and the periphery countries were drawn into it only after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The IMF was faced with a novel task: to protect the periphery from a storm that originated at the center. It did not have enough capital but, member countries banded together and raised a trillion dollars. Even so, the IMF has had some difficulties in coping with the situation because it was designed to deal with problems in the public sector and the shortage of credit was impacting mainly the private sector. But, on the whole, the IMF adapted itself to its novel task remarkably well.
2007年至2008年的金融危機則與此不同，因為它起源于中心國，而邊緣國家則是在雷曼兄弟公司破產后才被卷入其中的。國際基金組織面臨著一項新任務：保護邊緣國免受由中心國引發的風暴的影響。雖然該組織沒有足夠的資金，但各成員國聯合起來，籌了一萬億美元的款。即便如此，它在應對該局面時還有—定困難，因為它主要是為解決國營機構的問題而設，而這次信貸危機主要影響的是私營機構。 但從總體上講，國際貨幣基金組織在處理這項新任務時表現得還是相當出色的。
