評論
打印
We are at a moment in which the rage of uncertainties is unusually wide. We have just passed through the worst financial crisis since World War Two. It is quantitatively much larger and qualitatively different from other financial crisis. The only relevant comparisons are with the Japanese real estate bubble which burst in 1991 and from which Japan has still not recovered, and with the Great Depression of the 1930s. What differentiates this crisis from the Japanese experience is that the latter was confined to a single country, while this crisis has involved the entire world. What differentiates it from the Great Depression is that this time the financial system was not allowed to collapse but was put on artificial life support.
在我們這個時期，各種不確定因素?zé)o處不在。我們剛剛度過了二戰(zhàn)以來最嚴(yán)重的金融危機(jī)。危機(jī)不僅規(guī)模更大，而就其性質(zhì)而言，也與其他金融危機(jī)有所不同?？膳c之相提并論的只有日本至今依然飽受其害的1991年房地產(chǎn)泡沬破滅，以及20紀(jì)30年代的美國經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條。與日本的危機(jī)相比， 這次金融危機(jī)席卷了整個世界，而前者僅限于一個國家；與大蕭條相比，這次危機(jī)金融系統(tǒng)沒有崩潰，而是依賴生命保障系統(tǒng)來維持。
In fact, the magnitude of the credit and leverage problem we have today is even greater than in the 1930s. In 1929, total credit outstanding in die United States was 160% of GDP and it rose to 250% by 1932; in 2008 we started at 365% — and this calculation does not take into account the pervasive use of derivatives which was absent in the 1930s.
實際上，我們今天所面臨的信貸和杠桿問題比20世紀(jì)30年代嚴(yán)重的多。在1929年，美國信貸總額占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的160%，1932 年上升至 250%；2008年則高達(dá)365%，且這一數(shù)據(jù)不包括20世紀(jì)30年代沒有而現(xiàn)在廣泛使用的金融衍生品。
