When a group of investors including Sequoia Capital’s China unit and company management took US-listed Qihoo 360 Technology, a Chinese internet company, private in December, they were surprised how easy it was to do so at the desired valuation of $9.3bn.

Since then, there have been at least half a dozen more such transactions, the latest being Jumei, an online cosmetics company. Even as the bears warn darkly that China is running out of money, Chinese outbound acquisitions set ever bigger records and capital outflows amount to a possible $800bn a year. There is still plenty of liquidity in China, as such take-private deals suggest. Moreover, these transactions come at a time when the Chinese financial markets are seemingly locked in a tug-of-war between regulators determined to support the prices of listed companies (however artificial) and the naysayers, who believe there is far worse to come.

Given the fact that the main attraction of such take-private transactions is to eventually relist in China at a much higher valuation, such deals suggest many local investors still have faith in their home market despite the volatility. While the valuation gap has come down, it is still attractive. And for hedge fund managers sitting in Hong Kong who have a much more nuanced view of China than their counterparts in the US, playing such proposed buyouts and outbound investment can be exceptionally lucrative. Generally, the risk that a deal falls through has been slight. There have been dozens of such offers since 2010 and only about 10 per cent have not gone through.

Senrigan Capital, a Hong Kong hedge fund with backing from Blackstone, for example, was up more than 18 per cent after fees in 2015, a performance most of its peers might well envy, in part by taking views on the privatisation trend.

For example, when HomeInns, China’s second-largest US listed hotel group, announced a proposal from a group of existing large shareholders including Sequoia’s Neil Shen (a founder), Ctrip.com and best of all state-owned Beijing Tourism Group (thus ensuring government support), Senrigan examined its merits closely and decided the proposed take-private deal was attractive for many reasons, according to its year-end letter to investors.

For one thing, the valuation was reasonable, which meant of course that the probability of an increase in the offer price was greater. Moreover, because Beijing Tourism already had an A share listed company which pledged to buy the hotel group, the uncertainty of a future mainland listing was greatly reduced. Senrigan’s calculations were confirmed when the offer price was increased almost 10 per cent in December.

Such deals have been funded by both the debt and equity money that continues to slosh around China. Chinese banks have been eager to finance take-private transactions, a sign that it is government policy to welcome its strays home, as well as companies’ plans to venture offshore. Now, asset managers are also offering wealth management products that give wealthy individual investors the opportunity to invest in take-private transactions. Indeed, in the case of Qihoo, much of the equity was syndicated out to dozens of investors through firms such as New York-listed Noah Wealth Management.

While outbound investments may, or may not, be equally illustrative of faith in a future with Chinese characteristics, such offers also represent opportunity for foreign investors. Not long ago, the probability of a Chinese offer for a listed company in the US successfully closing was considered slight, in part because of their relative lack of sophistication, in part because of US regulations and concerns over local financing. Today, they are making progress, which means merger arbitrage funds are beginning to be optimistic about the ability of mainland bidders to successfully close in on their targets.

China’s buying binge, whether in bringing companies back home or buying foreign companies, may seem questionable. After all, in the former case, higher valuations in China were partly a reflection of the scarcity of alternative investment opportunities and capital controls which prevented diversification offshore. And in the latter, can the Chinese actually manage their new foreign acquisitions — or even oversee them?

Yet for both buyers and investors surely it is better to invest in these sorts of transaction than in government securities around the world which pay almost nothing or less than nothing.