評論
打印
Back in 2009 the west was desperately seeking green shoots of recovery and paid little attention when Zhou Xiaochuan called for nothing less than a new world financial order.
2009年時，西方國家只顧竭力尋找復蘇苗頭，卻未在意周小川發出的、無異于建構世界金融新秩序的呼吁。
China’s central bank governor proposed replacing the US dollar as the international reserve currency with a global system controlled by the International Monetary Fund. If, as expected, the IMF this month approves the inclusion of the renminbi as a reserve currency, it will mark a small step for Mr Zhou’s 2009 vision but a big move for the renminbi.
中國央行行長當時提議，用國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)控制下的一個全球體系取代美元作為國際儲備貨幣。如果不出所料，IMF本月將同意把人民幣納為儲備貨幣，對周小川2009年提出的愿景來說，這將是向前邁出的一小步，但對人民幣來說卻是一個重大舉措。
The prospect of China’s currency joining the dollar, euro, yen and sterling in backing the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights — its unit of account, restricted to member governments — has been described as everything from a symbolic ego trip on the part of Beijing to the dawning of a new era.
人民幣加入IMF特別提款權（SDR，即分配給會員國的記賬單位）貨幣籃子——目前包括美元、歐元、日元及英鎊——的前景得到各種各樣的解讀：從北京方面得到象征性的自我滿足，到一個新時代的開啟。
In all probability it will be like many Chinese financial reforms: significant in hindsight, but hard to get excited about in the short term.
幾乎可以肯定，這將會像中國的許多金融改革一樣：雖然事后看來意義重大，但短期內很難激起熱情。
Market enthusiasm for early-stage reforms such as de-pegging the renminbi 10 years ago has given way to ennui as the changes get smaller and China gets bigger. The result is often disappointment in the numbers as China maintains an antipathy to the sweeping changes, accompanied by headline-grabbing figures, beloved of newly installed western executives and politicians.
市場對早期改革（如十年前人民幣與美元脫鉤）的熱情已讓位于怠倦情緒，因為中國的體量越來越大、改革的步伐卻越來越小。結果就是在數字方面往往令人失望，因為中國始終不愿進行全面的改革。
Even the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, a year old this week, was shrugged aside by many, because the absolute numbers involved are relatively small. However, its real significance lies in the fact that it was the first scheme under which foreign investors had been allowed in “blind” — without requiring individual approval.
即便是實施一年之久的“滬港通”，在許多人看來也不是什么值得大書特書的舉措，因為與之相關的絕對數字較小。然而，滬港通的真正意義在于，它是首個允許境外投資者直接購買在中國內地上市的公司股票的機制（不需要一個個審批）。
SDR inclusion risks being categorised the same way. That would miss the point. It is not about boosting short-term demand from central banks for renminbi. Rather it is about embedding the currency in the international system and committing Beijing to financial reform.
人民幣納入SDR也有可能被這種不值得大書特書的舉措。這就沒有抓住問題的關鍵。人民幣納入SDR的重點不是為了提升各國央行對人民幣的短期需求，而是為了將人民幣融入國際體系，促使北京方面推行金融改革。
If China were to constitute up to 10 per cent of the SDR basket, reserve managers would need to buy just $28bn of its currency — not a particularly meaningful number compared with the $20bn traded daily in the onshore spot market.
如果人民幣占到SDR貨幣籃子10%的份額，儲備管理機構將只需購買價值280億美元的人民幣——相對于在岸即期市場每天200億美元的交易量，這并非一個特別可觀的數字。
