
We hate you guys.” This was how Luo Ping, a senior official at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, vented his frustration at the US in 2009. He and others in China believed that, as the US Federal Reserve printed money to resuscitate American demand, the value of China’s vast US Treasury bond holdings would plunge along with the dollar. “Once you start issuing $1tn-$2tn . . . we know the dollar is going to depreciate so we hate you guys – but there is nothing much we can do,” Mr Luo told a New York audience.
“我們討厭你們這些家伙。”2009年中國(guó)銀監(jiān)會(huì)(CBRC)高官羅平在發(fā)泄自己對(duì)美國(guó)的不滿時(shí)如是說(shuō)。他和中國(guó)其他一些人相信,隨著美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)為恢復(fù)美國(guó)需求而增印鈔票,中國(guó)所持有的大量美國(guó)國(guó)債會(huì)和美元一道貶值。羅平對(duì)一批紐約聽(tīng)眾說(shuō):“一旦你們啟動(dòng)1萬(wàn)億至2萬(wàn)億美元的印鈔……我們就知道美元會(huì)貶值,因此我們討厭你們這些家伙,但我們沒(méi)有辦法。”
These frustrations have been catalysts of great change. The authoritarian rulers of 1.3bn people felt an imperative to reassert control. Imbued with the resentful narrative of a “century of national humiliation”, they felt the prospect of the US squandering Chinese wealth was an indignity too far. In response, Beijing decided to hasten the promotion of the renminbi as a global currency. That way China’s exporters could earn “redbacks” rather than greenbacks, allowing their revenues to be invested at home rather than recycled into US Treasuries – the only pool of dollar liquidity big and safe enough to absorb significant investments from China’s reserves (which rose to $3.95tn at the end of March).
這些不滿成為中國(guó)發(fā)生巨變的催化劑。這個(gè)擁有13億國(guó)民的政府感到了重新掌握控制權(quán)的必要性。“百年國(guó)恥”這一充滿憤怒的說(shuō)法深入他們的內(nèi)心,他們一想到美國(guó)有可能揮霍中國(guó)的財(cái)富就倍感侮辱。對(duì)此,中國(guó)政府決定加快推進(jìn)人民幣的全球化。這樣中國(guó)的出口企業(yè)就可以賺回人民幣而不是美元,于是它們的收入就能投到國(guó)內(nèi),而不必重新流入美國(guó)國(guó)債——這是唯一一個(gè)流動(dòng)性和安全性都高到足以吸收中國(guó)外匯儲(chǔ)備大量投資的美元資產(chǎn)池。今年3月末中國(guó)的外匯儲(chǔ)備攀升至3.95萬(wàn)億美元。
Therefore, the genesis of renminbi internationalisation, which will be a key theme during the UK visit this week of Prime Minister Li Keqiang, is indivisible from China’s aspiration to blaze its own trail rather than integrate into a Pax Americana in whose creation it had no say.
因此,人民幣國(guó)際化(中國(guó)總理李克強(qiáng)本周訪英的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵主題)的起因,脫離不了中國(guó)對(duì)開(kāi)辟自己道路的渴望,它不愿融入“美國(guó)治下的和平”(Pax Americana),畢竟它在其中沒(méi)有發(fā)言權(quán)。
The scheme is showing signs of success. Financial capitals are competing for a slice of the fast-growing market in offshore renminbi. London plans to underline its credentials by designating China Construction Bank as a clearing bank for the currency. This should make trading in renminbi more efficient, more liquid and less risky. It could also attract Chinese companies keen to invest in Europe, and make it easier for investors to enter China’s capital markets.
中國(guó)人的計(jì)劃正顯露出成功的跡象。全球金融資本都爭(zhēng)著想在快速增長(zhǎng)的人民幣離岸市場(chǎng)上分一杯羹。倫敦想通過(guò)指定中國(guó)建設(shè)銀行(CCB)為人民幣清算銀行來(lái)凸顯自己的資格。此舉應(yīng)會(huì)令人民幣交易的效率和流動(dòng)性增加,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)減少。這還能吸引渴望在歐洲投資的中國(guó)公司,也能讓投資者更方便地進(jìn)入中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)。
The use of renminbi as a global payments currency is growing rapidly, though from a small base. In April it was the seventh most used currency, with 1.4 per cent of transfers, up from 0.6 per cent in January 2013, according to Swift, the international payments network. In the US the redback is also gaining a following, with the value of renminbi payments between the US and the rest of the world rising 327 per cent in April, compared with the value in April 2013.
人民幣作為全球支付貨幣的使用量增長(zhǎng)迅速,盡管基數(shù)很小。根據(jù)國(guó)際支付系統(tǒng)Swift的數(shù)據(jù),今年4月人民幣成為全球第七大支付貨幣,在所有轉(zhuǎn)賬支付中占1.4%,而2013年1月這個(gè)比例只有0.6%。人民幣在美國(guó)也獲得青睞,今年4月美國(guó)與其他國(guó)家之間的人民幣支付價(jià)值與去年同期相比增長(zhǎng)了327%。
At times, adopting the renminbi is portrayed as a snub to the US. Russian politicians have called for a “de-dollarisation” of their economy after sanctions imposed by the US and EU in response to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea.
使用人民幣有時(shí)會(huì)被描繪為對(duì)美國(guó)的冷落。俄羅斯吞并烏克蘭的克里米亞后招致歐美制裁,俄國(guó)政客們遂呼吁本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)“去美元化”。
Such are the easy wins. Creating a genuine world currency will be much harder, rubbing up against the central paradox of China’s emergence: its political system relies on control while acceptance into global free markets needs liberalisation.
這些都是人民幣全球化相對(duì)容易取得的進(jìn)展。但創(chuàng)造一個(gè)名副其實(shí)的世界貨幣要困難得多,它會(huì)與中國(guó)崛起的核心矛盾發(fā)生摩擦:其政治體制依賴于管控,而被全球自由市場(chǎng)接受則需要自由化。
Institutions that hold renminbi have precious little scope to invest them. China has opened only tiny apertures for foreign investors in its domestic capital markets, promoting instead an offshore renminbi capital market that is as yet minuscule in comparison with its US dollar counterpart. Jonathan Anderson, economist at the Emerging Advisors Group, estimates that in mid-2013 total capital market assets freely available to international investors in US dollars were worth $55tn; in euros, $29tn; in yen, $17tn; and, in sterling, $9tn. The renminbi offered a mere $250bn. “That is about 0.1 per cent of the global market, putting the renminbi on a par with the Philippine peso and just a bit higher than the Peruvian nuevo sol,” Mr Anderson wrote.
人民幣持有機(jī)構(gòu)鮮有將所持人民幣投出去的機(jī)會(huì)。中國(guó)在國(guó)內(nèi)資本市場(chǎng)只為外國(guó)投資者開(kāi)了一個(gè)小孔,卻努力推進(jìn)人民幣離岸資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,而與美元資本市場(chǎng)相比,它的規(guī)模仍微不足道。Emerging Advisors Group的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家喬納森•安德森(Jonathan Anderson)估計(jì),2013年年中,可供全球投資者自由投資的資本市場(chǎng)總資產(chǎn)中,美元資產(chǎn)總價(jià)值為55萬(wàn)億美元,歐元資產(chǎn)總價(jià)值為29萬(wàn)億美元,日元資產(chǎn)總價(jià)值為17萬(wàn)億美元,英鎊資產(chǎn)總價(jià)值為9萬(wàn)億美元。而人民幣資產(chǎn)總價(jià)值僅為2500億美元。安德森寫(xiě)道:“這一數(shù)額約為全球市場(chǎng)的0.1%,令人民幣的地位與菲律賓比索差不多,僅略高于秘魯?shù)男滤鳡枴!?/div>
Of course, Beijing could throw open its capital markets but doing so might leave it at the mercy of the type of capital outflow that precipitated the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. It would also require the opening up of its state-owned banks, local government bond issuers and state companies to scrutiny from foreign investors.
當(dāng)然,中國(guó)政府可以敞開(kāi)國(guó)內(nèi)資本市場(chǎng)的大門(mén),但這樣或許會(huì)使它遭遇嚴(yán)重的資本外逃,這樣的資本外逃曾引發(fā)20世紀(jì)90年代末的亞洲金融危機(jī)。而且中國(guó)的國(guó)有銀行、地方政府發(fā)債機(jī)構(gòu)和國(guó)有企業(yè)也要向外國(guó)投資者開(kāi)放監(jiān)督。
So reasserting one form of control would entail sacrificing another: winning a measure of freedom from the “dollar zone” and the concurrent influence of the Fed would imply inviting in the oversight of global capitalism, the rules of which were written under Pax Americana.
因此,想要重獲某種控制權(quán)就必須犧牲另一種:贏得脫離“美元區(qū)”及美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)影響的一定自由,就意味著邀請(qǐng)全球資本主義的監(jiān)督,而后者的種種規(guī)則正是在“美國(guó)治下的和平”框架下制定的。
來(lái)源:可可英語(yǔ) http://www.ccdyzl.cn/read/201406/308088.shtml