評(píng)論
打印
Antony Jenkins’ efforts to change the culture of Barclays by cutting bankers’ pay? explain are on hold. At its investment bank, it is paying bonuses that are 13 per cent higher to “compete in the global market for talent”. The bank’s chief executive wants to reform the pay of US and Asian investment bankers but it is beyond his control.
安東尼•詹金斯(Antony Jenkins)試圖用降薪來(lái)改變巴克萊(Barclays)文化的努力被暫時(shí)擱置了。為了“在全球市場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)奪人才”，巴克萊的投行部門(mén)將員工獎(jiǎng)金提高了13%。該行的首席執(zhí)行官想要改革美國(guó)和亞洲投資銀行家的薪酬，但那是他無(wú)法控制的。
His problem – shared with the rest of an industry struggling to alter itsits behaviour – is that there is no such thing as a banker. There are equity brokers, foreign exchange traders, mortgage salespeople, corporate financiers and all kinds of specialists under one roof. butThere is no single set of employees unified by a professional culture and a willingness to pull together.
和其余試圖改變?cè)撔袠I(yè)行為的人一樣，詹金斯的問(wèn)題在于他沒(méi)有意識(shí)到：不存在一種叫銀行家的人。我們有股票經(jīng)紀(jì)人、外匯交易員、抵押貸款銷(xiāo)售人員、公司財(cái)務(wù)專(zhuān)員，以及各種處于同一屋檐下的專(zhuān)業(yè)人士。但沒(méi)有哪種職業(yè)文化和凝聚力可以將這么多不同職業(yè)的雇員擰成一股繩。
That spells trouble for banks such as Barclays or Deutsche Bank as they try to introduce “The Barclays Way” or Deutsche’s six new corporate values (“integrity”, “innovation”, “discipline” etc). Banks that werebanged together in a 20-year spree of mergers and leveraged risk-taking, while old skills were replaced by computers, have little culture left from which to rebuild.
這將給巴克萊和德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)帶來(lái)麻煩，因?yàn)樗鼈冋噲D分別引入“巴克萊道路”和德銀6點(diǎn)新的企業(yè)價(jià)值觀(guān)（正直、創(chuàng)新、紀(jì)律等）。20年來(lái)，銀行通過(guò)不斷的合并和高杠桿的冒險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)，被生拼硬湊到一塊，期間又發(fā)生了計(jì)算機(jī)取代傳統(tǒng)技能的變革，因此，這些銀行并沒(méi)有留下多少可供重建的文化。
Richard Lambert, head of the UK’s Banking Standards Review (and a former editor of the Financial Times) is trying to fill this vacuum with a new body that would champion good behaviour and encourage bankers to become qualified professionals in the same way as doctors. Restraint must come from individuals, not just banks, he believes.
英國(guó)銀行業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)評(píng)估項(xiàng)目(Banking Standards Review)主管、英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》前總編輯理查德•蘭伯特(Richard Lambert)正試圖通過(guò)一個(gè)新機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)填補(bǔ)這一真空，這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)將倡導(dǎo)良好的職業(yè)行為，鼓勵(lì)銀行家成為和醫(yī)生一樣獲得資格認(rèn)定的專(zhuān)業(yè)人士。他認(rèn)為，必須對(duì)個(gè)人加以約束，而不僅僅對(duì)銀行。
I sympathise with Sir Richard, not least because he appointed me as the FT’s banking correspondent two decades ago, when Royal Bank of Scotland and others were starting their trek towards self-destruction, but he does not have much to work with. The classic “banker”, an experienced, judicious loan expert, is a mythical figure.
我很理解理查德爵士，其中一個(gè)相當(dāng)重要的原因是他曾在20年前任命我為英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》銀行業(yè)記者，當(dāng)時(shí)蘇格蘭皇家銀行(Royal Bank of Scotland)和其他銀行正開(kāi)始自我毀滅的緩慢進(jìn)程。然而，他并沒(méi)有多少工作可做。典型的“銀行家”——一名富有經(jīng)驗(yàn)、具有明智判斷力的貸款專(zhuān)家——是個(gè)不存在的角色。
The best chance, maybe the only one, lies in organisations that are coherent enough for “culture” to have a meaning beyond bland statements of aspiration. That was true of the old Barclays – a patrician family-run bank – and is still true of a few banks, notably Goldman Sachs. Whether or not the culture is salutary, it exists.
最好的機(jī)會(huì)（也許是唯一的機(jī)會(huì)）存在于那些凝聚力足夠強(qiáng)的銀行，強(qiáng)到“文化”對(duì)它們而言具有實(shí)際意義，而不是蒼白的口號(hào)。曾經(jīng)的巴克萊銀行的確是這樣（這是一家由貴族家庭經(jīng)營(yíng)的銀行），現(xiàn)在只有少數(shù)幾家銀行能做到，其中比較突出的是高盛(Goldman Sachs)。不論高盛的文化是否是好的文化，它如今至少還在。
Goldman has grown rapidly but without merging with a commercial bank or losing its identity (its biggest deal was taking over J Aron, the commodity broker that employed Lloyd Blankfein, its chief executive, and several other senior partners). Its 450 partners remain a cohesive group in spite of the strains provoked by a shift towards trading.
高盛的成長(zhǎng)速度很快，但它從未與一家商業(yè)銀行合并，也沒(méi)有喪失對(duì)自己身份的認(rèn)識(shí)（其最大一筆并購(gòu)是收購(gòu)商品經(jīng)紀(jì)公司J Aron，它的雇員有后來(lái)成為高盛首席執(zhí)行官的勞爾德•貝蘭克梵(Lloyd Blankfein)和其他幾名高級(jí)合伙人）。盡管業(yè)務(wù)向交易傾斜引發(fā)了一些緊張關(guān)系，但高盛的450名合伙人一直是個(gè)團(tuán)結(jié)緊密的整體。
It was tarnished by how it behaved in the subprime mortgage crisis, and the jury is out on its ambition to be less avaricious and nicer to its customers, but Goldman is at least in control of itself. It cut bonuses after a fall in revenues for 2013, limiting them to 37 per cent of incomeso not just in line?. When Mr Jenkins tried to pull the pay lever, aiming for a similar result, it stuck.
高盛在次貸危機(jī)中的表現(xiàn)給它的名譽(yù)帶來(lái)了損失；它是否打算不再這么貪婪，并對(duì)顧客好一點(diǎn)，目前還不得而知，但它至少在控制自己。在2013年收入下滑之后，高盛削減了獎(jiǎng)金，其占公司收入的比重被限制在37%。而當(dāng)詹金斯試圖對(duì)薪酬動(dòng)刀，以期取得類(lèi)似效果時(shí)，卻受阻了。
This is hardly surprising, given how Barclays pulverised its old culture over two decades, as it grew in investment banking. “There was no sense of common purpose in a group that had grown and diversified . . . there were no clearly articulated and understood shared values,” according to the Salz review of the bank’s business practices.
考慮一下巴克萊在發(fā)展投行業(yè)務(wù)的20多年里是如何將其舊有文化徹底毀滅的，就不會(huì)對(duì)此感到意外。薩爾斯(Salz)就巴克萊的商業(yè)行為所做的報(bào)告指出：“在一個(gè)業(yè)已成熟和多元化的團(tuán)隊(duì)里，找不到共同的使命感…沒(méi)有被明確表述和理解的共同價(jià)值觀(guān)。”
Barclays is an amalgam of everything from a UK high street bank; to de Zoete & Bevan and Wedd Durlacher, the pre-Big Bang stock broker and jobber; to most of Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street investment bank. It would be amazing if a branch banker in Liverpool had fellow feeling for a debt trader in Singapore.
巴克萊進(jìn)行了一大堆收購(gòu)——從收購(gòu)英國(guó)高街的一家銀行，到在英國(guó)放松金融管制前收購(gòu)股票經(jīng)紀(jì)商de Zoete & Bevan和Wedd Durlacher，再到收購(gòu)華爾街投行雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)的多數(shù)業(yè)務(wù)。要是利物浦某家支行的員工能與一名新加坡的債券交易員產(chǎn)生同事之情，那才怪呢。
This does not make Barclays unusual; in fact, it is a run-of-the-mill creation of the long boom, like RBS (National Westminster, ABN Amro), Deutsche (Morgan Grenfell, Bankers Trust) or JPMorgan Chase (Bank One, Chemical Bank [WE SEEM TO SAY CHEMICAL BANK MORE OFTEN?], Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, Cazenove & Co etc). All kinds of professions and cultures were thrown together.
但巴克萊并不因此而顯得不尋常。事實(shí)上，它是經(jīng)濟(jì)長(zhǎng)期繁榮所帶來(lái)的再普通不過(guò)的產(chǎn)物，就像蘇格蘭皇家銀行（收購(gòu)了國(guó)民西敏寺銀行(National Westminster)及荷蘭銀行(ABN Amro)）、德意志銀行（收購(gòu)了摩根建富(Morgan Grenfell)、信孚銀行(Bankers Trust)），或是摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)（并購(gòu)了美國(guó)第一銀行(Bank One)、化學(xué)銀行(Chemical Bank)、貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)、華盛頓互惠銀行(Washington Mutual)和證券公司Cazenove & Co等）。對(duì)于它們來(lái)說(shuō)，所有的職業(yè)劃分和文化都被一股腦拋棄了。
Meanwhile, technology undermined the retail banking profession by allowing banks to replace individual judgment with credit scoring. The branch banker was turned into an overeager salesperson of mortgages and insurance policies, many of which were mis-sold. UK banks have paid £20bn in redress for mis-selling of payment protection insurance and other abuses since 2011).
同時(shí)，技術(shù)逐漸破壞了零售銀行這種職業(yè)，個(gè)人判斷被評(píng)級(jí)打分所替代。支行員工變成了心急如焚地推銷(xiāo)抵押貸款和保單的人，而這些產(chǎn)品有很多都被不當(dāng)銷(xiāo)售給客戶(hù)。2011年以來(lái)，英國(guó)各家銀行因?yàn)椴划?dāng)銷(xiāo)售支付保護(hù)保險(xiǎn)及其他不當(dāng)行為，已賠付了200億英鎊。
One way to solve this behavioural disaster – an option favoured by Sir Richard and others – is to encourage bankers to take professional exams and rebuild their sense of pride and identity. Bad bankers might be struck off by professional bodies, like bad doctors or lawyers lose licences. It was once common for British bankers to be qualified but only a small fraction is now.
解決這場(chǎng)行為災(zāi)難的辦法之一（這也是理查德爵士和其他人贊成的一個(gè)選擇）是鼓勵(lì)銀行家參加專(zhuān)業(yè)考試，恢復(fù)自豪感及身份認(rèn)同。濫竽充數(shù)的銀行家可以被專(zhuān)業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)除名，就像差勁的醫(yī)生和律師被剝奪行業(yè)執(zhí)照。資質(zhì)認(rèn)定曾在英國(guó)銀行家中很普遍，但如今已是鳳毛麟角。
Greater professional pride would not hurt but I doubt it is the answer. Financial analysts already study for qualifications, and that did not prevent problems in the past. Nor is the deskilling of retail banks likely to be reversed, creating a fresh need for traditional bankers – if anything, more work is likely to be done by machines.
更強(qiáng)的職業(yè)自豪感不會(huì)有壞處，但我對(duì)這種辦法表示懷疑。金融分析師們已經(jīng)在為獲取資格認(rèn)證進(jìn)行學(xué)習(xí)，但這并沒(méi)有阻止過(guò)去的問(wèn)題發(fā)生。零售銀行去技能化的趨勢(shì)也不太可能被逆轉(zhuǎn)，因此也不太可能出現(xiàn)對(duì)傳統(tǒng)銀行家的新的需求。要說(shuō)可能的情況，那就是更多的工作將被機(jī)器完成。
Ultimately, banks will have to tighten their discipline or create the cultures they lack. The former is a lot simpler than the latter. A bank with a coherent identity and strong leadership can tell its managers to alter course. “We had sessions where we told everyone, ‘Things that were OK then are not OK now’,” says one banking executive.
銀行最終還是要加強(qiáng)紀(jì)律，或創(chuàng)造出它們所缺少的文化。前者比后者要簡(jiǎn)單得多。具有一貫認(rèn)同感和強(qiáng)有力領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的銀行可以告訴其管理者調(diào)整路線(xiàn)。一家銀行的高管說(shuō)：“我們?cè)_(kāi)會(huì)告訴每個(gè)人，‘過(guò)去OK的事，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不OK’了。”
If the bank is in effect starting from scratch, having mislaid its original culture and instead amassed a mish-mash of financial specialists with conflicting skills and attitudes, it is another matter. Mr Jenkins is trying very hard to pull off what may be an impossible task.
如果銀行已經(jīng)遺失了原有文化，聚集了各種亂七八糟的金融專(zhuān)家，而他們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和態(tài)度彼此沖突，因此銀行實(shí)際上是從零開(kāi)始建設(shè)文化，那便是另一回事了。詹金斯試圖費(fèi)力完成的或許是一項(xiàng)不可能的任務(wù)。
