評論
打印
然而，接下來的事件大體上證明了撒切爾的觀點。英鎊加入歐洲匯率機制是一個全然的經濟政策災難。通過將英國的命運與法蘭克福德國央行的決策綁在一起，歐洲匯率機制的成員國地位導致英國在1990年至1992年期間不必要地陷入嚴重衰退，最終還是在喬治•索羅斯(George Soros)的幫助下，英鎊撤出歐洲匯率機制，衰退才告終結。
There were those who argued that the ERM fiasco illustrated the even greater advantages of a full monetary union over a system of fixed exchange rates. But once again subsequent events have confirmed the Thatcherite view that an independent monetary policy is an essential part of a nation’s sovereignty. Just ask yourself how Britain would have fared if we had been inside the eurozone when the financial crisis struck. I shudder even to think of it.
也有人認為，歐洲匯率機制的失敗，說明全面貨幣聯盟相對于固定匯率體系具有更大的優勢。但接下來的事件再次證明了撒切爾的觀點是正確的，她認為，獨立貨幣政策是一個國家主權的關鍵組成部分。想象一下，如果金融危機爆發的時候英國是歐元區成員國，英國會出現什么情況。我連想都不敢想。
It has long been conventional wisdom that Thatcher was wrong about one thing above all. She was wrong, so the argument goes, to oppose German reunification.
傳統觀點一直都認為，在一件事上撒切爾是錯的。這種觀點認為，撒切爾反對德國統一是錯誤的。
Indeed, most recent accounts of the events of 1989-1990 portray her as a kind of female Basil Fawlty, stuck in some kind of second world war time-warp.
實際上，最近關于1989年到1990年事件的敘述大都將她描述為類似于女貝塞爾•弗爾蒂(Basil Fawlty)的人物，認為她陷入了二戰的時間隧道。
