It is quite something else, however, to proceed from this analysis to an accord on how power and responsibility should be shared in a new international system. The rich nations are reluctant to give up their power in the institutions they created in the middle of the past century; the rising powers, notably but not solely China and India, ask why they should be stakeholders in a system in which they have so small a stake.

然而，從這種分析出發(fā)，到就如何在一個(gè)新的國(guó)際體系分擔(dān)權(quán)力和責(zé)任達(dá)成一致，這就是另外一回事了。富國(guó)不愿放棄它們?cè)谄渖蟼€(gè)世紀(jì)中葉創(chuàng)建的機(jī)構(gòu)中的權(quán)力；新興國(guó)家（尤其但不單單是中國(guó)和印度）提出，它們?yōu)槭裁磻?yīng)該在其權(quán)益如此之小的體系中擔(dān)當(dāng)利益相關(guān)者。

Thus the US still bridles at any suggestion it should accept arrangements that would limit its national freedom of action. Europeans are more adept at speaking the language of inclusion but, clinging on to the illusions of past greatness, they too find it hard to cede power. Why else would Benelux still have more votes at the IMF than China?

有人建議，美國(guó)應(yīng)接受安排，限制其國(guó)家行動(dòng)自由。美國(guó)對(duì)這些建議嗤之以鼻。歐洲人更善于說(shuō)出包容的語(yǔ)言，但仍堅(jiān)守著過(guò)去輝煌的幻想。它們也發(fā)現(xiàn)很難放棄權(quán)力。比利時(shí)-荷蘭-盧森堡聯(lián)盟在IMF的投票權(quán)為何高于中國(guó)？

The hesitations are not only on the side of the old powers. China wants influence without responsibility: to prosper from international order without shouldering the burdens of sustaining it. India, for all its determination to be recognised as a great power, is overtly contemptuous of anything beyond a narrowly drawn definition of its national interest.

躊躇猶豫的并非只有過(guò)去的那些大國(guó)。中國(guó)希望在不承擔(dān)責(zé)任的情況下施加影響；在不承擔(dān)維持全球秩序的責(zé)任的情況下從國(guó)際秩序中繁榮。盡管印度決心被視為一個(gè)強(qiáng)國(guó)，但它公然輕視任何超出其被狹義定義的國(guó)家利益以外的事情。

Reconciling these conflicting interests and anxieties is not a realistic task for a single, or even several, summits, whether of the G20, G13 or some other combination. As with much else in the world today, the pace of progress will depend on the US – the insufficient but still indispensable power.

對(duì)于單獨(dú)一次甚至幾次峰會(huì)（不管是20國(guó)集團(tuán)峰會(huì)、13國(guó)集團(tuán)峰會(huì)還是其它峰會(huì)）而言，協(xié)調(diào)這些互相沖突的利益和擔(dān)憂并非一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)的任務(wù)。由于如今全球還有很多其它任務(wù)，前進(jìn)的步伐將取決于美國(guó)——這個(gè)不勝任但仍不可缺少的大國(guó)。

Those looking for a grand design for the international order are destined to be disappointed. The best one can hope for perhaps is a patchwork of “Gs” in which responsibility and power are more widely distributed. The signs from Washington, and from Beijing, are not all discouraging. Next month's summit, whatever it is called, might make a start.

那些為全球秩序?qū)ふ液陚ビ?jì)劃的人注定要失望。人們能夠期待的最好的事情是修補(bǔ)“類(lèi)似的集團(tuán)峰會(huì)”，讓責(zé)任和權(quán)力得到更廣泛分配。來(lái)自華盛頓和北京的跡象并非全都令人沮喪。下月的峰會(huì)（不管它的名字是什么）可能是一個(gè)開(kāi)端。