Supporters suggest the G20 could eventually emerge, in a manner of which the Austrian statesman Metternich would have approved, as a global concert of powers: Americans and Asians, Europeans and Africans, Latin Americans and Antipodeans would all sit down to safeguard prosperity and settle conflicts.
支持者們表示,20國集團最終可能會以世界各國協作的面貌出現:美國人和亞洲人、歐洲人和非洲人、拉美人和北美人將一起坐下來維護繁榮并解決沖突。奧地利政治家梅特涅(Metternich)也將同意這種方式。
This enterprise, though, has already hit an embarrassing snag. Diplomats charged with the meeting's preparation confide that, contrary to popular belief, the G20 summit is, well, not really a G20 summit.
然而,該計劃已經遇到了令人尷尬的障礙。負責此次峰會準備工作的外交家表示,與普遍的看法相反,20國集團峰會并非20個國家參加的峰會。
It is true that heads of government from all points north, south, east and west will converge on London. For reasons too complicated to explain in this space, 28 delegations have been invited – 23 (or is it 24?) national leaders as well as the heads of organisations such as the International Monetary Fund.
確實,來自地球東西南北各國的政府首腦將齊聚倫敦。出于諸多過于復雜無法在這里解釋的原因,28個代表團受邀參加此次峰會——包括23(或者24?)位國家領導人以及國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)等機構的主席。
This numerical confusion, though, does not explain why the event is officially named the London (as opposed to the G20) summit. The problem is rather more substantive. Strange though it seems, there is as yet no agreement among the attendees that the G20 actually exists.
然而,這種數字混亂并沒有解釋為何此次峰會在官方被稱為倫敦峰會(而非20國集團峰會)。這個問題更為重要。盡管看似奇怪,但與會者迄今尚未就20國集團是否真正存在達成一致。
If this sounds surreal, let me refine the last statement. The G20 has long met at the level of finance ministers and central bankers. It has a rotating chairmanship and a secretariat.
如果這聽上去有些超現實,那么讓我來提煉一下最后一句吧。長期以來,20國集團一直在財長和央行行長級別的會議上碰面。各國輪流擔任主席和秘書長。
But there is no consensus that the group should reach beyond the financial and the economic to become a permanent political institution. To the contrary, some rich nations – Japan and Italy spring to mind – fear regular meetings of G20 leaders would undermine the G8 industrial nations. Others think a G13 – the G8 plus the five biggest emerging nations – would be a more effective global forum.
但尚未達成共識的是,20國集團是否應超越金融和經濟領域,成為永久性的政治組織。相反,一些富國——日本和意大利的名字在腦海中閃現——擔心,20國集團定期會議將破壞八國集團(G8)。其他人認為,13國集團(G13)——八國集團加上5個最大新興國家——將成為更有效的全球論壇。
The temptation is to laugh at the bureaucratic imbecility of such wrangling. Who but the diplomats could care about the precise number after the “G”; or whether we should talk about the London or the G20 summit? What matters surely is that governments, rich and rising, pull in roughly the same direction.
人們不禁嘲笑這種爭論的官僚愚蠢之處。除了外交家,誰會關心G后邊的確切數字;或者誰會關心我們是應討論倫敦峰會還是20國集團峰會呢?重要的問題肯定是富有和正崛起的政府差不多往同一個方向努力。
Sad to say, however, this argument is a painfully perfect metaphor for the more profound confusion and competition standing in the way of effective international co-operation.
然而,遺憾的來說,這種看法是一個完美的令人痛苦的比喻,體現了阻礙國際有效合作的更為深刻的混亂和競爭。
It is one thing for political leaders to agree that safeguarding globalisation requires more coherent international governance. After all, prominent among the causes of the financial crash was the failure of politics to keep up with economic integration. Global markets ran far ahead of the capacity of governments to oversee, even to understand, them.
政治領袖同意,捍衛全球化需要更為一致的全球管理,這是一回事。畢竟,在此次金融垮臺的原因中,一個突出的原因是政治未能跟上經濟一體化的步伐。全球市場遠遠領先于政府監管甚至理解市場的能力。