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A particular worry in the Treasury market is that a doom loop could arise from the “basis trade”.
國債市場特別擔(dān)憂的是“基差交易”可能引發(fā)惡性循環(huán)。
This is popular with hedge funds and has minted fortunes at some of America’s largest.
基差交易在對沖基金中很受歡迎，并且在美國一些最大的對沖基金中創(chuàng)造了巨額財富。
It attempts to profit from the difference in price between Treasury bonds and Treasury futures contracts, caused by high demand for the futures from asset managers.
這種交易試圖從國債與國債期貨合約之間的價格差異中獲利，資產(chǎn)管理公司對期貨的高需求會帶來這種價格差異。
Traders exploit this by buying Treasuries and selling futures contracts.
交易者通過購買國債并賣出期貨合約來從中牟利。
To amplify the returns, they borrow using the Treasuries they have bought as collateral, then recycle the cash into even more Treasuries.
為了放大收益，他們用已購買的國債作為抵押進行借款，然后將現(xiàn)金再次用于購買更多的國債。
Thanks to this procedure, hedge funds are short some $1trn-worth of Treasury futures.
得益于這一操作，對沖基金做空了價值約1萬億美元的國債期貨。
The trade is profitable for as long as the cost of borrowing, and meeting margin calls, remains lower than the difference between Treasury bonds and futures.
只要借貸成本和滿足保證金追繳的費用仍低于國債與期貨之間的價差，這種交易就能盈利。
With lots of leverage, it can generate vast returns.
憑借高杠桿，能帶來巨大回報。
But “it is like picking up nickels in front of a steamroller”, bristles one hedge-fund manager.
但是一位對沖基金經(jīng)理憤憤道，“這就像在壓路機前面撿硬幣”。
Funds can get squashed when markets plummet, either because credit dries up and leaves them unable to renew their borrowing, or because they must suddenly meet large margin calls on positions that have plunged into the red.
當(dāng)市場暴跌時，基金可能被碾碎，原因要么是信貸枯竭，導(dǎo)致無法續(xù)借資金，要么是因為必須突然為已陷入虧損的頭寸追加巨額保證金。
When the bet is unwound, perhaps because yields have moved sharply and unexpectedly, funds are forced to sell Treasuries fast—compounding the selling to meet margin calls in other asset classes.
當(dāng)押注被迫平倉時（可能是因為收益率出現(xiàn)劇烈且意外的波動），基金不得不迅速拋售國債，同時還需在其他資產(chǎn)類別中追加保證金，從而加劇拋售壓力。
In 2020 dealer banks were overwhelmed by the volume of Treasuries being sold, meaning that liquidity dried up.
2020年，交易商銀行因國債拋售量過大而不堪重負，這意味著流動性枯竭了。
Something similar may have happened this time, too.
這次可能也發(fā)生了類似的事情。
Before the ructions, banks’ inventories were already stocked full of Treasuries, giving them little capacity to handle more selling.
在關(guān)稅風(fēng)波之前，銀行的庫存已經(jīng)存滿了國債，讓它們無力應(yīng)對更多的拋售。
Should trading seize up once again, the Fed would have to intervene, acting as buyer of last resort and offering emergency loans to systemically important firms in need.
如果交易再次停滯，美聯(lián)儲將不得不介入，充當(dāng)最后買家，并向需要幫助的在金融體系中至關(guān)重要的企業(yè)提供緊急貸款。
Today’s political backdrop would put central bankers in an invidious position, however.
然而，當(dāng)今的政治背景會讓央行行長們陷入了招致怨恨的境地。
It was one thing for policymakers to backstop Treasuries when the problem they faced was a liquidity crunch brought on by covid lockdowns.
上一次政策制定者為國債提供支持，是因為新冠疫情封鎖引發(fā)了流動性緊縮。
This time, it is anyone’s guess how much of the move in Treasury yields was down to the system malfunctioning, and how much reflects a loss of faith by investors in the bonds themselves.
而這一次，國債收益率的變動有多少是系統(tǒng)故障所致，又有多少反映了投資者對債券本身失去信心，誰也說不準(zhǔn)。
After all, Mr Trump’s assault on the global trading system has dented confidence in American policymaking.
畢竟，特朗普對全球貿(mào)易體系的攻擊削弱了人們對美國政策制定的信心。
It is only natural to conclude that the country’s sovereign debt has become less safe, and that Treasury yields should accordingly incorporate more of a risk premium.
美國主權(quán)債務(wù)（即國債）的安全性下降，國債收益也相應(yīng)地包含更多的風(fēng)險溢價，這是理所當(dāng)然的結(jié)論。
Were the Fed to intervene in markets, in other words, it would prompt questions over whether it was simply protecting financial stability or also trying to suppress such a risk premium.
換句話說，如果美聯(lián)儲干預(yù)市場，就會引發(fā)疑問：美聯(lián)儲究竟只是為了維護金融體系穩(wěn)定，還是也在努力壓制這種風(fēng)險溢價？
Then there is the question of how far central bankers can use monetary policy to ease financial conditions and reduce the risk of systemic damage.
還有一個問題是，央行能在多大程度上運用貨幣政策來緩解金融狀況，并降低系統(tǒng)性損害的風(fēng)險。
Under other circumstances, they might opt for rapid rate cuts.
在其他情況下，央行可能會選擇快速降息。
Yet even though Mr Trump delayed his tariffs, investors are still betting inflation will rise.
然而，盡管特朗普推遲了征收關(guān)稅，投資者仍押注通脹將會上升。
They fear stagflation—a nasty combination of inflation and stagnant growth—that would constrain any doves at the Fed.
他們擔(dān)心滯脹（通貨膨脹與經(jīng)濟停滯并存的糟糕局面）將束縛美聯(lián)儲中任何鴿派人物的手腳。
The greatest threat surely still comes from politics.
最大的威脅無疑仍來自政治。
Even as some trade barriers have been postponed, those between America and China have been ratcheted to ludicrous levels.
盡管部分貿(mào)易壁壘的實施被推遲，但中美之間的壁壘已攀升至荒謬的水平。
And it would be reckless to assume the shocks are over, or that foreign investors’ faith in American assets, now shaken, can be magically restored.
如果認為沖擊已經(jīng)結(jié)束，或者外國投資者對美國資產(chǎn)的信心在已經(jīng)動搖后還能夠神奇地恢復(fù)，這種想法是魯莽的。
How much more can the system take before something really does break?
金融體系在真正崩潰之前還能承受多少沖擊？
