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CAN a big financial firm's credit rating fall from AAA one month—good enough for pension funds and life insurers—to junk the next without causing a crash?
一個大型金融公司的信用評級在一個月內從AAA—對養老基金和壽險公司而言足夠好了—降至垃圾水平，還能不破產么？
India's government decided it did not want to find out. Last week it granted Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS),
印度政府決定不想去弄清楚這個問題。上周印度政府給基礎設施租賃和金融服務有限公司（IL&FS）
one of India's biggest shadow banks, a parachute. Plenty are worrying that it will not be enough.
這個印度最大的影子銀行之一提供幫助。很多人擔心政府的幫助還是不夠。
As recently as early September, IL&FS raised few concerns. A couple of weeks later it had defaulted on several payments to creditors.
早在九月初，沒什么人關注IL&FS。幾周后，IL&FS拖欠了幾位債權人的付款。
By the end of the month it had said it would raise 45bn rupees ($630m) of fresh capital through a rights issue from its owners,
截止月底，其表示公司所有者將配股籌集450億盧比（6300萬美元）新資金，
including the Life Insurance Corporation of India, a state-owned insurer.
公司所有者包括國有保險公司—印度人壽保險公司。
On October 1st the government forced out the board and appointed a new one. It was, in effect, a shadow-bank bail-out.
10月1日，政府迫使董事會辭職并任命了新的董事會。實際上，這是影子銀行救市。
IL&FS is a very Indian beast. It was founded in 1987, with the support of state owned banks, to provide finance to local governments for infrastructure.
IL&FS是一家非常印度式的強硬公司。在國有銀行的支持下，該公司于1987年成立，為當地政府基礎設施建設提供資金。
It has grown into a vast conglomerate, with 169 group companies.
該公司旗下有169家集團公司，已經成長為了一家大型企業集團 。
It finances, builds and runs everything from toll roads to "smart cities", not just in India but abroad.
該公司資助、建立并運營一切事物，比如收費公路和“智能城市”，且不僅僅是在印度還在海外。
Though it is private, the projects it runs, and the roughly 40% of its equity that is owned by nationalised firms,
雖然是私有企業，但它的運營項目及其約40%的股權都由國有公司所有，
make it what Indian analysts call "quasi-sovereign". If it went bust, projects across the country would stall, leaving taxpayers on the hook.
因此印度分析師稱其為“半獨立”。如果該公司破產，全國的項目將停滯不前，納稅人也會因此被套牢。
As India's state-owned banks have sought to repair their ropy balance-sheets,
當印度國有銀行試圖修復他們糟糕的資產負債表時，
IL&FS, which lends but does not take deposits, grew to satisfy demand for infrastructure finance.
IL&FS這樣有貸款卻沒有存款業務的公司已經成為了可以滿足基礎建設融資要求的公司了。
Its own debt nearly doubled from 2014 to 2018, to 910bn rupees. It used to borrow mainly from banks.
該公司的債務自2104年到2018年翻了一倍，至9100億盧比。過去它主要從銀行貸款。
Recently it has turned to the corporate-bond market. More than a third of its debt falls due within 12 months, up from a fifth a year ago.
近期，它已經開始轉向企業債券市場。公司將在12個月內到期的債務量從一年前的五分之一增長為三分之一。
The problem is that most of its assets are long-term, illiquid projects. This year interest due overtook operating profit; hence the cash crunch.
問題是公司大部分資產都是長期的非現金項目。今年的到期利息超過了營業利潤；因此出現了現金危機。
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