評(píng)論
打印
United States
美國(guó)
Trade with Mexico: Playing Chicken
美墨交易：威脅
Farmers and Texans would lose most from barriers to trade with Mexico.
農(nóng)民和德州人將因墨西哥貿(mào)易障礙損失慘重
MEXICO sells America more goods than America sells Mexico, and it enrages President Donald Trump.
墨西哥出售給美國(guó)的產(chǎn)品比美國(guó)賣給墨西哥的多，這一點(diǎn)讓特朗普總統(tǒng)大為惱火。
In 2015 the difference was $58 billion (0.3% of GDP).
2015年這一差值為580億美元（占美國(guó)GDP的0.3%）。
That is enough, thinks Mr Trump, to justify rewriting the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which allows goods to flow across the Rio Grande free of tariffs.
這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)在特朗普看來(lái)，已足以證明修改北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定（NAFTA）的合理性，該協(xié)定對(duì)穿越格蘭德河的貨物實(shí)行零關(guān)稅。
Yet the trade deficit masks bigger figures: America sends almost $240bn in goods to Mexico every year.
不過(guò)貿(mào)易逆差背后隱藏著更大的數(shù)字：美國(guó)每年銷往墨西哥的貨物價(jià)值大概為2400億美元。
Were NAFTA to disappear in a renegotiation-gone-wrong, many Americans would pay a price—and not just as consumers faced with dearer avocados.
假如北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定再次談判出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題而失效，很多美國(guó)人將為此付出代價(jià)——這不僅僅是消費(fèi)者要承受更貴的牛油果那么簡(jiǎn)單。
Which American producers would suffer?
那么作為美國(guó)廠商，誰(shuí)將首當(dāng)其沖呢？
Suppose, optimistically, that each side followed World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.
樂(lè)觀的設(shè)想是，雙邊均遵守世貿(mào)協(xié)定。
Then, tariffs would revert to so-called “most favoured nation” rates. (That might sound vaguely friendly, but it simply means neither side can offer a different deal from what it gives to any other WTO member.)
那么關(guān)稅將恢復(fù)成所謂的最惠國(guó)稅率（聽(tīng)起來(lái)可能有種含蓄的親切感，但簡(jiǎn)單來(lái)說(shuō)就是任何一方都不能提供給對(duì)方不同于其他WTO成員的待遇）。
By matching these tariffs to trade flows for about 5,000 goods, The Economist has estimated which states’ exporters would be worst-affected by the levies.
通過(guò)將關(guān)稅與大約5000種產(chǎn)品想對(duì)應(yīng)，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人雜志對(duì)哪個(gè)州的出口商將受到征稅的最嚴(yán)重影響進(jìn)行了估算。
Farm states face the highest charges.
農(nóng)業(yè)州面臨著最高的費(fèi)用。
Whacking tariffs on malt, potatoes and dairy products would cause Idaho’s exports to Mexico to incur an average levy of nearly 15%.
麥芽、馬鈴薯及乳制品高昂的關(guān)稅將使愛(ài)達(dá)荷州對(duì)墨西哥的出口產(chǎn)品的平均稅率高達(dá)15%。
Iowa and Nebraska would pay on average 12.5% for the privilege of sending goods over Mr Trump’s wall.
愛(ài)荷華州及內(nèi)布拉斯加州也將支付平均12.5%的稅才有權(quán)穿越“特朗普墻”。
Some products would be particularly badly hit.
部分產(chǎn)品將尤其受到重創(chuàng)。
In 2015 Iowa’s farmers shipped $132m of high-fructose corn syrup to Mexico.
2015年愛(ài)荷華州的農(nóng)民運(yùn)送了價(jià)值13200萬(wàn)美元的高果糖玉米糖漿到墨西哥。
Without NAFTA, Mexico would slap a tooth-aching 100% tariff on the stuff.
如果沒(méi)有北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定，墨西哥將對(duì)此征收100%的關(guān)稅。
Little wonder that the farm lobby tends vocally to support free trade.
農(nóng)業(yè)團(tuán)體發(fā)聲支援自由貿(mào)易不足為奇。
Yet farm states are lucky to have plenty of customers elsewhere.
但幸運(yùn)的是農(nóng)業(yè)州在別處也有大量的消費(fèi)者。
Idaho’s exports to Mexico are worth less than half a percent of its GDP.
愛(ài)達(dá)荷州對(duì)墨西哥的出口不到其GDP的0.5%。
Other state economies are more tangled up with Mexico’s.
其他州的經(jīng)濟(jì)卻和墨西哥緊密相關(guān)。
These places should worry about NAFTA’s fate despite facing low average tariffs.
盡管平均關(guān)稅不高，但這些州更應(yīng)該擔(dān)憂北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定的命運(yùn)。
Among this group, Texas stands out.
在這個(gè)組合里，德克薩斯州首當(dāng)其沖。
It faces an average tariff of only 3%, but its exports to Mexico are worth nearly 6% of its GDP (compared with 1.3% nationally).
盡管其平均關(guān)稅僅有3%，但對(duì)墨西哥出口占其GDP接近6%（全美為1.3%）。
As in Iowa, farmers would suffer.
同愛(ài)荷華州一樣，農(nóng)場(chǎng)主會(huì)蒙受損失。
Texan cuts of Gallus domesticus—otherwise known as chicken—would incur the largest tariff bill, $174m, of any single product category in the country.
德州出口家禽（也就是雞類）的減少，會(huì)造成被征收全國(guó)各類貨品中最高昂的關(guān)稅，高達(dá)1740萬(wàn)美元。
In total, as a percentage of GDP, Texas would pay more than any other state.
支出所占的GDP比例比其他州都要多。
Michigan also fits this category.
密歇根州同樣屬于這一范疇。
Its exports of cars and parts—many of which end up back in America—would attract tariffs averaging only about 5%.
其汽車及零部件出口將被征收平均大約5%的關(guān)稅，
But with such shipments totalling $4.1bn, the bill would be painfully large.
但如此大的運(yùn)輸量將使關(guān)稅支出達(dá)到42億美元，這是讓人難以承受的高昂費(fèi)用。
All this gives Mexico some leverage.
這給墨西哥帶來(lái)了一些優(yōu)勢(shì)。
But Mr Trump has a stronger hand, because Mexican firms depend more on American consumers than vice versa.
不過(guò)特朗普更為強(qiáng)勢(shì)，因?yàn)橄噍^美國(guó)企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，墨西哥企業(yè)更為依賴美國(guó)消費(fèi)者。
Part of the problem may be that rural America is already in the bag for the Republicans.
問(wèn)題在于，美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)州已經(jīng)是共和黨的囊中之物。
Of the 25 states which would pay most in tariffs, as a percentage of their GDP, only four voted for Hillary Clinton in November.
即將承擔(dān)關(guān)稅占GDP比例最高的的25個(gè)州，在11月僅有4個(gè)州對(duì)希拉里克林頓投了贊成票。
Mr Trump may not feel any need to obey WTO rules.
特朗普并無(wú)意遵守WTO規(guī)則。
The White House’s latest trade spat is with Germany, a country already paying WTO tariffs (because no trade deal exists with the European Union).
白宮最近指責(zé)了德國(guó)的貿(mào)易政策，盡管德國(guó)已經(jīng)支付了WTO規(guī)定的關(guān)稅。
Peter Navarro, Mr Trump’s chief trade adviser, told the Financial Times on January 31st that the “grossly undervalued” euro has allowed Germany to “exploit” America.
特朗普的首席貿(mào)易顧問(wèn)Peter Navarro在1月31日告訴金融時(shí)報(bào)，價(jià)值被極度低估的歐元導(dǎo)致德國(guó)“剝削”美國(guó)。
The White House has also recently hinted that it will adopt a congressional plan to “border-adjust” the corporate tax, which probably breaches WTO rules.
白宮近期已經(jīng)暗示將采取一項(xiàng)國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)劃對(duì)企業(yè)稅進(jìn)行“邊境調(diào)整”，這可能將違背WTO規(guī)定。
If Mexico retaliated with rule breaking of its own, the costs to American producers would be greater—and harder to predict.
如果墨西哥也違背其原則來(lái)進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)，美國(guó)生產(chǎn)者為此付出的代價(jià)將更為巨大，同時(shí)也更難以預(yù)測(cè)。
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