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To Minsky, this was an “unfair and naive representation of Keynes's subtle and sophisticated views”.
對于明斯基而言，這是“對凱恩斯的精妙且成熟的觀點的一種不公平且天真的表述”。
Minsky's financial-instability hypothesis helped fill in the holes.
明斯基的金融不穩定假說幫助填補了這些漏洞。
His challenge to the prophets of efficient markets was even more acute.
他對有效市場預言家們的挑戰甚至更加激烈。
Eugene Fama and Robert Lucas, among others, persuaded most of academia and policymaking circles that markets tended towards equilibrium as people digested all available information.
尤金·法馬和羅伯特·魯卡斯等人已經說服了學術界和政策圈中的大多數人，讓他們相信，隨著人們對所有可以得到的信息的消化，市場將趨向于均衡。
The structure of the financial system was treated as almost irrelevant.
金融市場的結構得到了幾乎毫不相關的對待。
In recent years, behavioural economists have attacked one plank of efficient-market theory: people, far from being rational actors who maximise their gains, are often clueless about what they want and make the wrong decisions.
近年來，行為經濟學家痛擊了有效市場理論的一大支柱：人，遠非是能將其收益最大化的理性角色，經常對他們想要的東西一無所知，而且常常做出錯誤的決定。
But years earlier Minsky had attacked another: deep-seated forces in financial systems propel them towards trouble, he argued, with stability only ever a fleeting illusion.
但是，此前數年，明斯基就已經痛擊了有效理論的另一個支柱：他指出，鑒于穩定僅是一種轉瞬即逝的幻覺，金融體系中的深層次力量將其推向困境。
Yet as an outsider in the sometimes cloistered world of economics, Minsky's influence was, until recently, limited.
然而，作為有時是與世隔絕的經濟學世界的局外人，直到最近，明斯基的影響力都是有限的。
Investors were faster than professors to latch onto his views.
投資者比教授們更快地領會了他的觀點。
More than anyone else it was Paul McCulley of PIMCO, a fund-management group, who popularised his ideas.
普及了他的思想的正是資產管理集團PIMCO的保羅·麥考利。
He coined the term “Minsky moment” to describe a situation when debt levels reach breaking-point and asset prices across the board start plunging.
他創造了“明斯基時刻”這個詞匯來描述一種債務水平達到臨界點、整個市場的資產價格開始跳水的情況。
Mr McCulley initially used the term in explaining the Russian financial crisis of 1998.
最初，麥考利曾把這個詞用于解釋1998年俄羅斯金融危機。
Since the global turmoil of 2008, it has become ubiquitous.
自2008年的全球動蕩以來，它已經變得無所不在了。
For investment analysts and fund managers, a “Minsky moment” is now virtually synonymous with a financial crisis.
如今，對于投資分析師和基金經理而言，“明斯基時刻”實際上就是金融危機的代名詞。
Minsky's writing about debt and the dangers in financial innovation had the great virtue of according with experience.
明斯基關于債務和金融創新威脅的論述具有與經歷相符的偉大優點。
But this virtue also points to what some might see as a shortcoming.
但是，這種優點還指向別人可能認為是一種短處的東西。
In trying to paint a more nuanced picture of the economy, he relinquished some of the potency of elegant models.
在嘗試繪制一副更加細致入微的經濟畫卷的過程中，明斯基放棄了優雅模型中的某些影響力。
That was fine as far as he was concerned; he argued that generalisable theories were bunkum.
這是只有他才有的長處；他指出，凡是可以概括的理論都是夸夸其談。
He wanted to explain specific situations, not economics in general.
他想要解釋特殊情況，而不是一般意義上的經濟學。
He saw the financial-instability hypothesis as relevant to the case of advanced capitalist economies with deep, sophisticated markets.
他把金融不穩定假說視同于具有深度、成熟市場的發達資本主義經濟體的實例。
It was not meant to be relevant in all scenarios.
它并非在所有情況下都是一樣的。
These days, for example, it is fashionable to ask whether China is on the brink of a Minsky moment after its alarming debt growth of the past decade.
例如，如今，質疑中國在經歷了過去十年的令人警醒的債務增長后是否正處于“明斯基時刻”邊緣是很時髦的。
Yet a country in transition from socialism to a market economy and with an immature financial system is not what Minsky had in mind.
然而，正處于從社會主義向市場經濟轉型而且具有不成熟金融體系的國家不是明斯基所考慮的。
Shunning the power of equations and models had its costs.
避開等式和模型的力量是有代價的。
It contributed to Minsky's isolation from mainstream theories.
它直接造成了明斯基之于主流理論的孤立。
Economists did not entirely ignore debt, even if they studied it only sparingly.
經濟學家沒有完全無視債務，即便他們只是有所保留地研究研究。
Some, such as Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Ben Bernanke, who would later become chairman of the Federal Reserve, looked at how credit could amplify business cycles.
清瀧信宏和后來會成為美聯儲主席的本·伯南克等人曾對信貸如何放大商業周期做過研究。
Minsky's work might have complemented theirs, but they did not refer to it.
明斯基的工作或許補充了他們的研究，但是他們卻沒有提及它。
It was as if it barely existed.
好像它壓根不存在一樣。
Since Minsky's death, others have started to correct the oversight, grafting his theories onto general models.
明斯基去世后，其他人開始糾正這種疏漏，將他的理論移植到通用模型中。
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College in New York, where he finished his career (it still holds an annual conference in his honour) , has published work that incorporates his ideas in calculations.
他在那里走完了自己學術生涯的紐約巴德大學利維經濟研究所發表了包含他關于計算的思想的研究。
One Levy paper, published in 2000, developed a Minsky-inspired model linking investment and cashflow.
發表于2000年的一份利維論文提出了一個受明斯基啟發的將投資與現金流相連接的模型。
A 2005 paper for the Bank for International Settlements, a forum for central banks, drew on Minsky in building a model of how people assess their assets after making losses.
2005年，國際清算銀行的一份論文在構建一個人們如何在出現損失后評估自己資產的模型時也曾引用過明斯基。
In 2010 Paul Krugman, a Nobel prize-winning economist who is best known these days as a New York Times columnist, co-authored a paper that included the concept of a “Minsky moment” to model the impact of deleveraging on the economy.
2010年，現今以紐約時報專欄作家而聞名的諾貝爾獎得主經濟學家保羅·克魯格曼曾與別人共同完成了一份將“明斯基時刻”引入經濟體去杠桿效果模型的論文。
Some researchers are also starting to test just how accurate Minsky's insights really were: a 2014 discussion paper for the Bank of Finland looked at debt-to-cashflow ratios, finding them to be a useful indicator of systemic risk.
有些研究者也在開始驗證明斯基的洞見到底有多么精確：芬蘭銀行2014年的一份討論稿考察了債務/現金流比率，發現它們是一個很有用的系統風險指標。
Still, it would be a stretch to expect the financial-instability hypothesis to become a new foundation for economic theory.
然而，期望金融不穩定假說成為經濟理論的一個新基礎會是一大方向。
Minsky's legacy has more to do with focusing on the right things than correctly structuring quantifiable models.
明斯基留給我們的理念更多地與關注正確的事情有關，而不是正確地構建可量化模型。
It is enough to observe that debt and financial instability, his main preoccupations, have become some of the principal topics of inquiry for economists today.
看到他的主要關注點——債務和金融不穩定，已經成為當今經濟學家討論的一些主要話題就夠了。
A new version of the “Handbook of Macroeconomics”, an influential survey that was first published in 1999, is in the works.
1999年首版的有影響力的調查報告——《宏觀經濟學手冊》的新版本正在準備之中。
This time, it will make linkages between finance and economic activity a major component, with at least two articles citing Minsky.
這一次，它將把金融與經濟活動間的聯系列為一個主要部分，至少有兩篇文章引用明斯基。
As Mr Krugman has quipped: “We are all Minskyites now.”
正如克魯格曼所調侃的那樣：“我們現在都是明斯基主義者”。
Central bankers seem to agree.
央行銀行家似乎同意這種看法。
In a speech in 2009, before she became head of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen said Minsky's work had “become required reading”.
在成為美聯儲主席之前，珍妮特·耶倫曾在2009年的一次演講中稱，明斯基的著作“已經成為必讀書”。
In a 2013 speech, made while he was governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King agreed with Minsky's view that stability in credit markets leads to exuberance and eventually to instability.
默文·金爵士曾在2013年在英格蘭銀行行長任上發表2013年的一篇演講中，對明斯基關于信貸市場穩定導致過度充裕并最終帶來不穩定的觀點表示贊同。
Mark Carney, Lord King's successor, has referred to Minsky moments on at least two occasions.
他的繼任者馬克·卡尼已經至少在兩個場合提到過明斯基時刻。
Will the moment last? Minsky's own theory suggests it will eventually peter out.
這種時刻將持續下去嗎？明斯基本人的理論認為，這種時刻終將過去。
Economic growth is still shaky and the scars of the global financial crisis visible.
如今，經濟增長仍然不穩定，全球金融危機的創傷依舊可見。
In the Minskyan trajectory, this is when firms and banks are at their most cautious, wary of repeating past mistakes and determined to fortify their balance-sheets.
在明斯基時刻的軌跡中，這是企業和銀行萬分謹慎小心之時，一方面擔心再犯過去的錯誤，另一方面已經下定決心加固自己的資產負債表。
But in time, memories of the 2008 turmoil will dim.
但是，總有那么一天，2008年的危機記憶終將褪去。
Firms will again race to expand, banks to fund them and regulators to loosen constraints.
企業將再次競相擴張，銀行將再次競相為它們提供資金，監管者終將再次放松限制。
The warnings of Minsky will fade away.
明斯基的警告將逐漸消失。
The further we move on from the last crisis, the less we want to hear from those who see another one coming.
我們在遠離上一次危機的路上走得越遠，就越不愿意聽從看到另一場危機正在到來的人。
