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Economics brief: Financial stability: Minsky's moment
經濟概要：金融穩定：明斯基的時刻
The second article in our series on seminal economic ideas looks at Hyman Minsky's hypothesis that booms sow the seeds of busts.
六大經濟思想之二——明斯基的繁榮孕育泡沫破裂之種子的解說。
From the start of his academic career in the 1950s until 1996, when he died, Hyman Minsky laboured in relative obscurity.
從他學術生涯開始的上世紀50年代直到去世的1996年，海曼·明斯基一直在相對默默無聞中辛勤耕耘。
His research about financial crises and their causes attracted a few devoted admirers but little mainstream attention: this newspaper cited him only once while he was alive, and it was but a brief mention.
他關于金融危機及其成因的研究吸引了不少的忠實的崇拜者，但是幾乎沒有吸引主流的關注：本報在他在世時僅提到過他一次，但也只是稍微提了一下。
So it remained until 2007, when the subprime-mortgage crisis erupted in America.
這種情況一直持續到了次貸危機在美國爆發的2007年。
Suddenly, it seemed that everyone was turning to his writings as they tried to make sense of the mayhem.
一夜之間，好像每一個人在試圖解釋那場混亂時都在轉向他的著作。
Brokers wrote notes to clients about the “Minsky moment” engulfing financial markets.
經紀人在發給客戶的提示中提到了淹沒金融市場的“明斯基時刻”。
Central bankers referred to his theories in their speeches.
央行銀行家在演講中引用了他的理論。
And he became a posthumous media star, with just about every major outlet giving column space and airtime to his ideas.
他成為了一名身后的媒體明星，幾乎每一家主流媒體都給他的思想留出了專欄空間和直播時間。
The Economist has mentioned him in at least 30 articles since 2007.
本報自2007年以來已經至少在30篇文章中提到過他。
If Minsky remained far from the limelight throughout his life, it is at least in part because his approach shunned academic conventions.
如果明斯基終其一生保持遠離焦點，這至少部分是因為他的途徑有意回避了學術慣例。
He started his university education in mathematics but made little use of calculations when he shifted to economics, despite the discipline's growing emphasis on quantitative methods.
他開始讀大學是學的是數學，但是，在轉向經濟學時卻幾乎不用計算，盡管這門學科當時正在日漸重視量化方法。
Instead, he pieced his views together in his essays, lectures and books, including one about John Maynard Keynes, the economist who most influenced his thinking.
相反，他把自己的觀點都整合到了他的文章、演講和書籍之中，這其中就包括一本論述論約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯——這位對他的思考影響最大的經濟學家的專著。
He also gained hands-on experience, serving on the board of Mark Twain Bank in St Louis, Missouri, where he taught.
他還利用在自己教書的密蘇里州圣路易斯的馬克·吐溫銀行董事會服務的機會獲得了第一手的經驗。
Having grown up during the Depression, Minsky was minded to dwell on disaster.
在大蕭條期間長大的明斯基一心撲在了思考和研究災難上面。
Over the years he came back to the same fundamental problem again and again.
多年來，他一次又一次地回到這個同樣的根本問題上面。
He wanted to understand why financial crises occurred.
他想要理解金融危機發生的原因。
It was an unpopular focus.
這在當時是一個不受歡迎的關注點。
The dominant belief in the latter half of the 20th century was that markets were efficient.
20世紀后半期的主流觀點認為，市場是有效的。
The prospect of a full-blown calamity in developed economies sounded far-fetched.
發達經濟體的一次全方位災難的前景聽起來是遙不可及的。
There might be the occasional stockmarket bust or currency crash, but modern economies had, it seemed, vanquished their worst demons.
可能會有偶爾的股市泡沫或者貨幣危機，但是，當代經濟體似乎已經趕跑了最壞的惡魔。
Against those certitudes, Minsky, an owlish man with a shock of grey hair, developed his “financial-instability hypothesis”.
與這些確定性截然相反的是，一頭白發，面孔嚴肅的明斯基提出了他的“金融不穩定假說”。
It is an examination of how long stretches of prosperity sow the seeds of the next crisis, an important lens for understanding the tumult of the past decade.
它是對長期繁榮如何孕育下一次危機的種子的一次考證，是理解過去十年動蕩的一面重要的鏡子。
But the history of the hypothesis itself is just as important.
但是，這個假說本身的歷史也同樣重要。
Its trajectory from the margins of academia to a subject of mainstream debate shows how the study of economics is adapting to a much-changed reality since the global financial crisis.
它從學術邊緣到主流討論一大主題的軌跡表明，經濟學研究正在如何讓自己去適應一種自全球金融危機已經天翻地覆的現實。
Minsky started with an explanation of investment.
明斯基的切入點是解釋投資。
It is, in essence, an exchange of money today for money tomorrow.
投資，實質上是一種今天的錢對明天的錢的交換。
A firm pays now for the construction of a factory; profits from running the facility will, all going well, translate into money for it in coming years.
今天，企業為建設一座工廠而掏錢；明天，一切順利的話，出自運營這座設施的利潤將轉化為今天的錢。
Put crudely, money today can come from one of two sources: the firm's own cash or that of others (for example, if the firm borrows from a bank) .
概括地說，今天的錢可以來自以下兩個來源中的一個：企業自己的錢或是別人的錢（例如，企業從銀行借錢）。
The balance between the two is the key question for the financial system.
兩者的平衡是金融體系的關鍵問題。
Minsky distinguished between three kinds of financing.
明斯基對三種籌措資金的行為做了區分。
The first, which he called “hedge financing”, is the safest: firms rely on their future cashflow to repay all their borrowings.
他稱之為“避險籌資”的第一種是最安全的：企業依靠自己的未來現金流償還全部借款。
For this to work, they need to have very limited borrowings and healthy profits.
為了使之進行下去，企業需要有非常有限的借款和健康的盈利。
The second, speculative financing, is a bit riskier: firms rely on their cashflow to repay the interest on their borrowings but must roll over their debt to repay the principal.
第二種——投機性籌資，有點風險：企業依靠現金流來償還借款利息，但是必須讓債務延期才能支付本金。
This should be manageable as long as the economy functions smoothly, but a downturn could cause distress.
只要經濟體運轉平穩，這中籌資應當是可控的，但是，衰退可能帶來災難。
The third, Ponzi financing, is the most dangerous.
第三種——龐氏籌資——最危險。
Cashflow covers neither principal nor interest; firms are betting only that the underlying asset will appreciate by enough to cover their liabilities.
現金流既不夠還本也不夠支付利息；企業當前所賭的，僅僅是相關資產將升值到足以支付負債。
If that fails to happen, they will be left exposed.
倘若這沒能發生，他們將被完全暴露在風險之中。
Economies dominated by hedge financing—that is, those with strong cashflows and low debt levels—are the most stable.
由避險籌資行為主導的經濟體——即有著強大現金流和低債務水平的經濟體——是最穩定的。
When speculative and, especially, Ponzi financing come to the fore, financial systems are more vulnerable.
當投機性籌資行為，特別是龐氏籌資行為大行其道時，金融體系是更加脆弱的。
If asset values start to fall, either because of monetary tightening or some external shock, the most overstretched firms will be forced to sell their positions.
如果資產價格因為貨幣政策收緊或是某種外部沖擊而開始下跌時，最過度擴張的企業將被迫賣出頭寸。
This further undermines asset values, causing pain for even more firms.
這進一步摧毀了資產價格，給更多的企業帶來痛苦。
They could avoid this trouble by restricting themselves to hedge financing.
企業能通過將自己局限于避險籌資而避免這種困境。
But over time, particularly when the economy is in fine fettle, the temptation to take on debt is irresistible.
但是，隨著時間的推移，尤其是在經濟體欣欣向榮之時，舉債的誘惑是難以抵擋的。
When growth looks assured, why not borrow more?
當增長看上去確定無疑時，為什么不多借進點呢？
Banks add to the dynamic, lowering their credit standards the longer booms last.
銀行推波助瀾，不斷降低信貸標準，繁榮持續的時間不斷延長。
If defaults are minimal, why not lend more?
如果違約少得不能再少，為什么不多借出點呢？
Minsky's conclusion was unsettling. Economic stability breeds instability.
明斯基的結論令人不安。經濟穩定孕育不穩定。
Periods of prosperity give way to financial fragility.
繁榮期讓位于金融脆弱。
With overleveraged banks and no-money-down mortgages still fresh in the mind after the global financial crisis, Minsky's insight might sound obvious.
由于過度放債的銀行和零首付抵押貸款在全球金融危機后仍舊記憶猶新，明斯基的這種真知灼見可能聽起來很明顯。
Of course, debt and finance matter.
當然了，債務和融資非常重要。
But for decades the study of economics paid little heed to the former and relegated the latter to a sub-discipline, not an essential element in broader theories.
但是，幾十年來，經濟學研究卻很少去關注前者，而且還把后者降級為一門分支學科，沒有使之成為更廣泛的理論的一個基本組成部分。
Minsky was a maverick.
明斯基特立獨行，劍走偏鋒。
He challenged both the Keynesian backbone of macroeconomics and a prevailing belief in efficient markets.
一方面，他挑戰了宏觀經濟學的凱恩斯主義支柱；另一方面，又挑戰了對有效市場的盲目崇拜。
It is perhaps odd to describe his ideas as a critique of Keynesian doctrine when Minsky himself idolised Keynes.
在明斯基自己已將凱恩斯當成是偶像的情況下還把他的思想說成是對凱恩斯主義學說的一種批判似乎有點奇怪。
But he believed that the doctrine had strayed too far from Keynes's own ideas.
但是，他相信這種學說已經遠遠地背離了凱恩斯自己的思想。
Economists had created models to put Keynes's words to work in explaining the economy.
為了讓凱恩斯的思想在解釋經濟時管用，經濟學家打造出了一大批模型。
None is better known than the IS-LM model, largely developed by John Hicks and Alvin Hansen, which shows the relationship between investment and money.
其中最出名的是展示了投資與資金間的關系的IS—LM，這個主要是由約翰·希克斯和阿爾文·漢森提出的模型。
It remains a potent tool for teaching and for policy analysis.
目前，這個模型仍然是教學和政策分析的一個有力工具。
But Messrs Hicks and Hansen largely left the financial sector out of the picture, even though Keynes was keenly aware of the importance of markets.
但是，希克斯和漢森甚至在凱恩斯已經強烈地意識到了市場的重要性的情況下，仍將金融部門大都留在了畫面之外。
