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Deutsche Bank
德意志銀行
Two’s company
兩人成伴
Hard questions loom for the new bosses of Germany’s national banking champion
德國最大銀行的新總裁們面臨著隱隱出現的棘手問題
Dual passports
雙重護照
IN THE entrance to Deutsche Bank’s London office is a giant silver ball with a hole in the middle that offers an inverted reflection of the viewer and bank. The sculpture, which is called “Turning the World Upside Down III”, is a fitting metaphor for the changes sweeping the banking industry. Deutsche itself has had a good crisis, eschewing direct help from the German government and rebuilding its balance-sheet to regain its place as the biggest bank in Europe by total assets. Yet its world is turning upside down, too.
德意志銀行倫敦分行的入口處有一巨型銀球，球中有洞，窺洞中可見觀者與德行的倒影。這尊名為“顛倒世界III”的雕塑對于席卷銀行業的變革浪潮是一個貼切的暗喻。德意志銀行獨善其身，很好的度過了危機，他們避開德國政府的直接援助，重建自己的資產負債表，欲借資產總額重歸歐洲最大銀行之席。然而，德行的世界也正發生著翻天劇變。
The most obvious upheaval is in the executive suite. On June 1st two new co-chief executives, Jürgen Fitschen and Anshu Jain, will take over from Josef Ackermann, who has run the bank for a decade. Mr Fitschen, the boss of Deutsche’s German operations, is a far less controversial figure than Mr Jain, an Indian-born, American-educated British citizen who has propelled Deutsche’s rise in investment banking. Mr Jain’s elevation is a remarkable one in a corporate culture as crusty as Germany’s: most bosses are either German or native German-speakers from Switzerland or Austria. His appointment has also provoked a backlash from an “old guard” within Deutsche who fear the growing influence of the investment bank, which is based almost entirely in London and is staffed largely by non-Germans.
管理層的劇變尤為明顯。新任聯合首席執行官安舒·賈恩(Anshu Jain)和尤爾根·菲茨岑(Jurgen Fitschen)將于6月1日走馬上任，從執掌德意志銀行十年的約瑟夫·阿克曼（Josef Ackermann）的手中接過大權。論爭議性人物，德行德國業務主管菲茨岑先生遠不如賈恩先生。英國人賈恩先生出生于印度，求學于美國，他一手推動了德意志銀行在投資銀行中的崛起。德國企業文化素來頑固保守，高層大都以德國人或瑞士、奧地利的德語區人士為主，故賈恩先生的高升著實令人驚嘆。這次任命同樣也激起了德行內部“保守派”的對抗情緒——德行的投行部幾乎完全設立在倫敦，員工多為非德裔，投行部日益增大的影響力令“保守派”擔憂。
Yet the focus on Mr Jain is a distraction. The bank’s biggest task is not to convince investors that it has the right executives in place—big investors and fund mangers see the new team as more shareholder-friendly than the old one. It is to prove that it has enough capital and liquidity to satisfy regulators and that it can adapt its business model to a topsy-turvy landscape.
然而對賈恩先生的關注是件分心事。 依大投資者和基金管理人之見，新領導團對股東比上任要友好的多，因此德行目前的最大任務不是說服投資者，自己選對了領導人選，而是向他們證明，自己有足夠的資本和流動資金來滿足監管機構的要求，并能在業界一片顛倒混亂的情況下調整自己的業務模式。
Start with capital Deutsche has total assets of close to 2.1 trillion ($2.7 trillion), and total equity of 56 billion.In terms of simple leverage, the bank has just 1 in equity backing every 38 of assets.
先談談資本。德行的資產總額約2.1萬億歐元（2.7萬億美元），權益總額560億歐元。而就簡單杠桿率而言，德行每38歐元的資產僅兌換1歐元股本。
The bank argues that these figures are misleading. By netting off derivatives that offset each other and making a few other adjustments, it calculates its leverage ratio at 21 times, still considerably higher than most peers in Europe and America.
德行辯稱上述數據有誤導性。在扣掉了可互相抵消的衍生品，進行其他幾項微調之后，德行自我估算的杠桿率為21倍，這仍舊遠高于多數歐美同類銀行。
Like other banks, Deutsche also argues that a simple leverage ratio is not much use in assessing the risks that lenders take.
與其他銀行一樣，德行也爭論道，說簡單杠桿率在評估貸方承擔的風險時并無大用。
So a second measure to consider is its levels of risk-weighted assets (RWAs), in which the size of the balance-sheet is adjusted to reflect its riskiness.
如此一來，第二種要考慮的評估方法就是銀行的風險加權資產等級，即通過資產負債表的規模標準推算貸方的風險。
Using RWAs as a lens is like looking at Deutsche Bank through its lobby sculpture, with the picture turned on its head.
以風險加權資產為透鏡，就如同透過倫敦分行的大堂雕塑審視德意志銀行，所見景象皆顛倒。
On this view Deutsche is a midsized and reasonably well-capitalised bank, ranking just eighth in size in Europe. Deutsche’s risk-weighted assets are calculated to be a mere 17% of its gross assets, compared with 53% at JPMorgan Chase and 25% at Barclays.
依此觀點看，德行就是一家中型、資本相當雄厚的銀行，論大小僅位列歐洲第八。德行的風險加權資產僅占其總資產的17%，與之相比，摩根大通為53%，巴克萊銀行為25%。
Different accounting standards and the high quality of German corporate and mortgage lending explain some of this gap, but not all. “Deutsche is the most complex institution I have to deal with,” confesses one banking analyst. The question many investors ask is which of these two pictures is more accurate.
不同行的會計準則，高質量的德國企業和德國抵押貸款只能解釋這些差距中的部分原委，卻無法解釋全部。一名銀行分析師坦誠的說，“德意志銀行是我遇到過的最復雜的機構。”眾投資者需要問的問題是，以上兩種情況哪一個更貼近事實。
Part of the answer is already being provided by regulators, who are tightening the definitions of what counts as core capital, capping total leverage and carefully scrutinising the risk-weightings that banks apply.
監管機構早已給出了部分解答。近日來，監管機構一直在緊縮核心資本的界定標準，壓制全部杠桿作用，并謹慎詳核銀行上報的風險加權資產。 翻譯：王葭葦
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