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Books and Arts; American foreign policy;Please don't go;
文藝；華府外交政策;山姆大叔請(qǐng)留步;
A handful of books convey a mix of optimism and fear;
幾本書(shū)，樂(lè)觀與恐懼雜陳;
America is irrepressible. Even authors fixated on its decline are optimists in disguise. Times may be hard and the world order is changing, but America has what it takes to bounce back, according to five new books on foreign policy. Indeed, it has to bounce back, because no successor stands ready to shoulder these responsibilities.
美國(guó)的地位無(wú)法撼動(dòng)。每位宣揚(yáng)美國(guó)沒(méi)落的作者骨子里都是樂(lè)觀主義者。時(shí)代艱難，世界秩序更迭交替，但美國(guó)依然可重振威風(fēng)，美國(guó)政策的這五本書(shū)娓娓道來(lái)。實(shí)際上，美國(guó)一定會(huì)恢復(fù)，因?yàn)槲从泻罄^者準(zhǔn)備擔(dān)當(dāng)美國(guó)重任。
In “The World America Made” Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative, argues that the liberal order America created after the second world war may not endure if America loses the power or will to defend it. As hegemons go, America has been exceptional. Democracy has spread under its watch, and its geographical isolation has made the world surprisingly accepting of its use of force. No combination of nations has felt the need to join together to counter America's power, leaving it free to perform vital tasks in the common good, such as keeping open trading routes.
著名的新保守主義者羅伯特·卡根（Robert Kagan）的《美國(guó)塑造的世界》一書(shū)提出，二戰(zhàn)后美國(guó)創(chuàng)造的自由秩序有可能因?yàn)槊绹?guó)失去捍衛(wèi)的力量或意愿而無(wú)以為繼。隨著世界霸主的消逝，美國(guó)無(wú)可匹敵。在美國(guó)的捍衛(wèi)下，民主得以發(fā)展，地緣的獨(dú)立令世界甘愿接受其使用武力。沒(méi)有國(guó)家感覺(jué)有必要聯(lián)合一致共同挑戰(zhàn)美國(guó)的大國(guó)地位，反而任其自由擔(dān)當(dāng)重要任務(wù)捍衛(wèi)共同利益，例如保持貿(mào)易航線通暢。
To those who believe that a multipolar world could be at least as peaceful as the one dominated by America, Mr Kagan says history proves otherwise. Rules rarely outlast the powers that created them. Nations go to war when they are “in doubt about which is stronger,” he writes. The world is more stable when one nation dominates, especially when it is a nation like America.
對(duì)于相信多極世界至少會(huì)像由美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的單極世界一樣保持和平的人，卡根先生說(shuō)，歷史證明恰恰相反。規(guī)則無(wú)法抵得上創(chuàng)造規(guī)則的權(quán)力有效。國(guó)家彼此間“躊躇誰(shuí)最強(qiáng)悍”時(shí)，即會(huì)以戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)一決雌雄。一國(guó)主導(dǎo)的世界更加穩(wěn)定，尤其是由像美國(guó)這樣的國(guó)家主導(dǎo)。
It is therefore fortunate, Mr Kagan concludes, that most talk about America's decline is overblown. The country has passed through such moods before, during the trauma of Vietnam in the 1970s, for example, and then again in the 1980s during Japan's breakneck ascent as an industrial power. And yet it bounced back. Although past success does not guarantee future triumph, the American system, with its relative freedom, is uniquely capable of recovering and adapting. The danger will come only if Americans believe they can put their global responsibilities on hold while they set their own house in order.
故而所幸卡根先生得出結(jié)論：多數(shù)聲稱美國(guó)沒(méi)落的說(shuō)法都是言過(guò)其實(shí)。這個(gè)國(guó)家之前已歷經(jīng)這樣的悲觀情緒，例如上世紀(jì)七十年代在越南遭受重創(chuàng)，之后八十年代又經(jīng)歷日本作為一只工業(yè)力量快速崛起。然而數(shù)次還是恢復(fù)實(shí)力。盡管以往的成功并不能保證未來(lái)的勝利，美國(guó)的政治體系，以其相對(duì)的自由度，完全可以從低迷中恢復(fù)、適應(yīng)。要是美國(guó)覺(jué)得，整頓國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)之時(shí)，可暫且擱置國(guó)際責(zé)任，那么災(zāi)難將在所難逃。
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, is equally certain that a vigorous and powerful America is indispensable. But he shows more doubt in his new book, “Strategic Vision”. He contends that America must wrestle down its own debt, steady its financial system, reduce inequality, rebuild its infrastructure and fix its gridlocked politics. Abroad, it must promote and guarantee an expanded West (embracing Russia and Turkey) and balance the great powers of Asia.
前總統(tǒng)吉米·卡特的國(guó)家安全顧問(wèn)茲比格涅夫·布熱津斯基同樣同意，強(qiáng)大的美國(guó)必不可少。但他在自己的新書(shū)《戰(zhàn)略眼光》中表露出更多的擔(dān)憂。他堅(jiān)稱美國(guó)必須極力擺脫債務(wù)，穩(wěn)定金融體系，減少社會(huì)不平等，重建基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施并穩(wěn)固僵持的政治。對(duì)外方針，其必須推進(jìn)、保證擴(kuò)展西方勢(shì)力，并平衡亞洲各大國(guó)家。
Like Mr Kagan, Mr Brzezinski does not believe America's decline is foreordained. Its economy is still relatively vast, its population wealthy and young, its businesses and universities innovative. But if decline is not inevitable, nor is resurgence. He states that America is in danger of sliding into “systemic obsolescence”, caused by political stalemate at home and misguided engagement abroad in “l(fā)onely and draining campaigns” against sometimes “self-generated” enemies, such as Iraq.
與卡根先生一樣，茲比格涅夫先生不相信美國(guó)的沒(méi)落命中注定。其經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模仍舊相對(duì)巨大，人口富裕，偏于年輕，企業(yè)與大學(xué)富有創(chuàng)新精神。但是，如果衰落并非注定發(fā)生，重振威風(fēng)也不一定。他聲稱，美國(guó)因國(guó)內(nèi)政治僵持，與對(duì)外受誤導(dǎo)向間或“無(wú)中生有”的敵人（例如伊拉克）展開(kāi)“孤立無(wú)援，勞民傷財(cái)?shù)能娛滦袆?dòng)”，繼而有滑向“體系滯后”的危險(xiǎn)。
If American leadership does collapse, what then? Like Mr Kagan, Mr Brzezinski argues that no single power is ready to supplant it. He foresees instead a protracted period of chaotic realignments. China may be ambitious and proud, but it is still in the throes of modernisation; it knows that its continued rise depends for now on the present order. A nationalist and militaristic China would swiftly isolate itself as anxious neighbours allied against it.
如果美國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層衰落，那會(huì)怎樣？與卡根先生一樣，茲比格涅夫先生堅(jiān)稱尚未有獨(dú)立勢(shì)力有實(shí)力替而代之，有所擔(dān)當(dāng)。他預(yù)測(cè)世界反而會(huì)長(zhǎng)期處于動(dòng)蕩，勢(shì)力重新劃分的局面。中國(guó)可能野心勃勃，心存高遠(yuǎn)，但是其仍舊處于現(xiàn)代化的陣痛中；中國(guó)很清楚，其現(xiàn)今的持續(xù)發(fā)展有賴與當(dāng)前穩(wěn)定的秩序。一旦周邊國(guó)家聯(lián)合對(duì)抗，民族主義與軍事主義的中國(guó)有可能迅速置于孤立狀態(tài)。
For now it seems the alternative to a world dominated by America is “No One's World”, the title of Charles Kupchan's book. A professor of international relations and a veteran of the Clinton White House, he is the gloomiest of these authors. For the first time in history, he says, the world will have no global guardian. Western policymakers are deluded to think that they can use their twilight of pre-eminence to lock rising powers into their own values and institutions.
現(xiàn)在似乎美國(guó)主導(dǎo)世界的另外雛形就是“無(wú)主世界”，此為查爾斯·庫(kù)普乾（Charles Kupchan）的新書(shū)名。庫(kù)普乾為國(guó)際關(guān)系教授，曾為克林頓政府幕僚，他是這些作者中最為悲觀的。他說(shuō)，將不會(huì)再有世界守護(hù)者，此說(shuō)可謂首開(kāi)先河。西方?jīng)Q策者蒙蔽雙眼，自認(rèn)為他們可以利用自身統(tǒng)領(lǐng)世界的最后暮光限定崛起的力量于他們自己的價(jià)值觀與體系內(nèi)發(fā)展。
It is going to be much harder than that, Mr Kupchan says. The spread of liberal ideas has been driven less by their intrinsic appeal than by the material dominance of Western countries. Democracy might still advance, but not fast enough to match the great rebalancing of power now under way. And even if the rising powers do come to share the West's values, they will clash over status and prestige, because they feel that this is their turn for a place in the sun. The West “will have to give as much as it gets as it seeks to fashion a new international order that includes the rest”.
現(xiàn)實(shí)情況并非這么簡(jiǎn)單，庫(kù)普乾先生說(shuō)。驅(qū)動(dòng)自由思想傳播的，不再是西方國(guó)家的內(nèi)在吸引力，更多的是他們的物質(zhì)主導(dǎo)。民主仍在改善，但是速度緩慢，不足抵擋正在發(fā)展的勢(shì)力重新平衡的趨勢(shì)。即使崛起中的力量確實(shí)共享西方的價(jià)值觀，他們也會(huì)因攫取地位與威望而產(chǎn)生沖突，因?yàn)樗麄冇X(jué)得該輪到他們占居尊位。西方“將傾其所有，尋求塑造全新的國(guó)際秩序，將其他國(guó)家納入其中。”
For example, the West will need to stop preaching that only liberal democracies are to be considered legitimate governments: “responsible governance” should be enough to put a state in good international standing. To his mind, America's “overzealous” promotion of democracy in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan did more harm than good. The West must now show greater respect for the sovereignty of other nations and treat China with “a nuanced mix of engagement and containment”.
例如，西方將停止宣揚(yáng)只認(rèn)可自由民主為合法政府的條件：“有責(zé)任的政府”便足以使一國(guó)獲得適當(dāng)?shù)膰?guó)際地位。以庫(kù)普乾先生看來(lái)，美國(guó)在波斯尼亞、伊拉克和阿富汗“過(guò)度”推廣民主利大于弊。西方當(dāng)前必須對(duì)他國(guó)政府主權(quán)表示更多的尊重，以“協(xié)作與遏制相柔和的微妙政策”與中國(guó)交往。
Grand theories of foreign policy are entertaining. The actual work of it is far messier, as shown in “Bending History”, a close review of President Barack Obama's first term by three scholars at the Brookings Institution. They find that for all his inspiring speeches, the president's performance has at best been workmanlike. In fact the lofty speeches are a problem: they have often seemed detached from actual policy, raising expectations he cannot fulfil.
外交政策大理論具有娛樂(lè)性。但如《彎曲的歷史》一書(shū)所示，外交政策的實(shí)際工作遠(yuǎn)非有條有理。該書(shū)由布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)的三名學(xué)者所撰，細(xì)致剖析了奧巴馬總統(tǒng)的首屆任期。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)奧巴馬所有激動(dòng)人心的演說(shuō)中，最好的表現(xiàn)也是經(jīng)過(guò)精心設(shè)計(jì)。實(shí)際上，慷慨陳詞的演說(shuō)即是問(wèn)題所在：似乎演說(shuō)內(nèi)容經(jīng)常偏離實(shí)際政策，給人以無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)的期望。
The Brookings authors conclude that much of Mr Obama's agenda remains incomplete. Killing Osama bin Laden and decimating al-Qaeda were successes, but the outcome in Afghanistan and relations with Pakistan hang in the balance. Though “resetting” relations with Russia made possible the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and paved the way for tighter sanctions on Iran, Russia's mercurial politics could always throw such progress into reverse. The “pivot” to Asia in November 2011 was “appropriate”, but leaves future relations with a rising China unresolved.
布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)的作者們得出結(jié)論，奧巴馬的多數(shù)議程仍未完成。擊斃奧薩馬·本·拉登并摧毀基地組織算是成功，但是阿富汗的未來(lái)及與巴基斯坦的關(guān)系仍懸而未決。盡管“重調(diào)”與俄羅斯的關(guān)系有可能達(dá)成《新戰(zhàn)略武器消減條約》，為加緊對(duì)伊朗的制裁鋪平道路，但是俄羅斯的政治變換不測(cè)，隨時(shí)有可能反悔，放棄這一進(jìn)展。2011年證明為亞洲“軸心”“適時(shí)得當(dāng)”，但是與崛起中國(guó)關(guān)系的未來(lái)走向仍不明朗。
The abject failure of the first term was in Palestine. As these scholars see it, Mr Obama's determination to ignore Israeli public opinion while cultivating the Arab street doomed his diplomacy. In the Arab spring he balanced “prudent” support for the tide of democracy against a realistic regard for American interests. Even so, the net result is that the pillars of America's position in the region—its strategic alliances with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the virtuous triangle between Israel, Egypt and Turkey—are shaking.
奧巴馬首次任期的慘敗就是在巴勒斯坦。幾位學(xué)者注意到，奧巴馬先生在培育阿拉伯街頭運(yùn)動(dòng)之時(shí)，一意忽視以色列民意，毀掉了他的外交政策。阿拉伯之春期間，他權(quán)衡美國(guó)的現(xiàn)實(shí)利益，對(duì)這股民主浪潮的支持“審慎有度”。即便如此，他獲得的實(shí)際效果時(shí)就是美國(guó)在該地區(qū)的中心地位——美國(guó)與埃及和沙特阿拉伯之間及以色列、埃及和土耳其睦鄰三角之間的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系——岌岌可危。
If America cannot bend the Middle East to its will, what of China? In “Obama and China's Rise” Jeffrey Bader, one of the architects of Mr Obama's China strategy until leaving the White House in 2011, explains in a brisk insider's narrative just how tricky it can be to concoct the “nuanced mix” of engagement and containment that Mr Kupchan advocates. But in the end Mr Bader is one of the optimists. America prevailed over Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union, which had imperial ambitions. China, he asserts, does not—not yet, at any rate.
如果美國(guó)無(wú)法使中東順從自身的愿望，那中國(guó)又如何？擔(dān)任奧巴馬先生中國(guó)戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃師之一，直至2011年離開(kāi)華府的杰弗瑞·巴德（Jeffrey Bader）的《奧巴馬與中國(guó)崛起》中，以知情者身份簡(jiǎn)短敘述，掌控庫(kù)普乾先生所宣稱的協(xié)作與遏制“相柔和的微妙政策”多么詭異多變。但是，巴德先生起碼是個(gè)樂(lè)觀主義者。德國(guó)、日本及前蘇聯(lián)都曾具有帝國(guó)野心，而美國(guó)個(gè)個(gè)戰(zhàn)而勝之。他堅(jiān)稱，中國(guó)還沒(méi)有這一野心——至少現(xiàn)在還沒(méi)有。
Maybe. But America's clashes with these powers came when its own economy was growing. How will it fare if it is truly in decline? Ultimately, these authors agree, America's power abroad stands on its health at home. If its economy cannot be restored, and America really is indispensable, then the whole world is in serious trouble.
事實(shí)或許如此。但美國(guó)與這些強(qiáng)國(guó)的沖突都是在國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)改善之時(shí)出現(xiàn)。若美國(guó)果真衰落，那前景又如何？這幾位作者最后一致贊同，美國(guó)的國(guó)外權(quán)力取決于國(guó)內(nèi)的良性發(fā)展。如果美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)無(wú)法恢復(fù)，而其又真的不可或缺，那整個(gè)世界即將陷入混亂。
