Questions of equity
公平問題和股權問題

Salary caps are a rotten idea; but the crisis also carries lessons for regulators and workers
薪酬限制是個極糟糕的主意；但是這場危機也給監管者和工作者都上了一課

IT IS easy to understand why many in Congress and beyond have demanded salary caps on bank executives as a condition of approving the Bush administration’s bail-out of the financial system. After all, many of the people who will be leading the effort to get the banks back on their feet were the very same masters of the universe whose greed and myopia brought the industry to its knees in the first place. Nonetheless the lawmakers’ apparent decision to impose some form of still unspecified wage limit, a demand reluctantly accepted by Hank Paulson and the Bush administration this week, is a mistake.

為何眾多國會議員和廣大群眾都要求將銀行高管的薪酬限制作為批準布什政府金融救援計劃的一個條件呢？這個很好理解。畢竟，盡管是這些銀行高管將要用他們的力量來幫這些銀行擺脫困境，恢復原樣。而正是由于這些曾是世界霸主的銀行高管的貪婪和短視，首先將整個行業拖入泥淖。盡管如此，立法者這個強制限制薪酬–本周被保爾森和布什政府勉強接受–也是個錯誤的決定。

Just now, it is a struggle to keep a straight face when you read the words “talent” and “Wall Street” in the same sentence. And yet, precisely because it is in a mess, the financial system will need decent managers if it is to return to the health that benefits the rest of the economy. The sort of sums that would satisfy Congress as a cap may be far above the incomes of average Americans, but there is no surer way of driving finance offshore or into hedge funds where it is beyond the gaze of regulators. Besides, if ever there was a time when pay in banking and broking is likely to be depressed by the market, it is now. The bubble did not only inflate asset prices, it also inflated pay. Now the bubble has burst and hundreds of thousands of finance professionals want work.

剛才，當你在同一個句子里讀到”人才”和”華爾街”這些詞的時候，會努力控制自己不要笑出聲來。可是，恰恰由于其正處困境，金融系統要想恢復健康進而使其余經濟部分也從中獲益，必須要有優秀的經理人。國會滿意的薪酬上限應該比美國人平均收入要高的多，但是并不能保證那些金融資本不會轉移到離岸金融公司或者對沖基金，在那里不必擔心金融監管者的監視。此外，現在正是銀行和經紀業由于市場疲軟而薪酬低迷的時候。以前的泡沫不僅膨脹了資產的價格，同時也膨脹了薪酬。現在泡沫破裂了，成千上萬的金融專業人士在尋找工作。

American politicians have a lamentable record of intervening in setting executive pay. In the early years of the Clinton administration, Congress imposed a salary cap of $1m, beyond which firms faced a tax penalty. Pay rose, as one set of executives, beneath the cap, realised that they were “underpaid” and another set gained from an outpouring of creativity, as consultants invented myriad option schemes, perks and pension benefits to get around the limit. This only made it harder for shareholders to know who was getting what.

美國政客在干預高管薪酬設定上曾經有段不愉快的歷史。在克林頓政府早期，國會將高管薪酬強制定在100萬美元，超過這個數字將會受到稅收懲罰。于是，對于高管來說有就一套低于那個最高限制薪酬標準。薪酬提高了，一部分高管，意識到薪酬限制讓他們受到”剝削”了，而另外一部分人通過創新方式，作為公司顧問發明出諸多的期權計劃，補助，養老津貼等等來繞過薪酬限制。這么做的唯一結果就是讓股東更難知道那些高管拿多少薪酬了。

If the foolishness of Congress setting corporate pay levels is an old lesson, the financial crisis is teaching some new ones to shareholders. First, forget the received wisdom that paying people in large amounts of shares in their own firm ensures they take sensible value-maximising decisions. In the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, the management did not just take reckless gambles with other people’s money. Dick Fuld and Jimmy Cayne took reckless gambles with their own-and still they failed to do the right things and ended up losing most of their fortunes. Outside shareholders should remember that loading up the people at the top with shares can be an aid to corporate governance, but not a substitute for it.

如果國會愚蠢地設定公司的薪酬是個老教訓，那么這場金融危機正在給股東帶來一個新的教訓。首先，不要相信廣為認可的論斷–給那些經理人大量本公司的股份就能保證使他們做出利益最大化的決定。在雷曼和貝爾斯登倒臺中我們可以看到，那些管理層不僅僅是拿著別人錢的在魯莽賭徒。迪克福德和杰米凱恩還是拿著自己的錢來魯莽地下賭注，但最終他們都未能做出正確的抉擇從而失掉了其絕大部分的財產。處于管理層外的股東要牢記，給那些管理者以股票只能對其管理有幫助，但是并不能代替公司管理。

Esop’s fables
員工持股的寓言
For employees, the tale of Lehman, especially after Enron, is a reminder of the danger of having too many savings tied up in the firm where you work. More of the truly talented will now demand their bonuses in cash, or perhaps ask for even more shares. That surely will have an effect on the way that firms recruit staff and on employee share-ownership schemes. Paying ordinary workers in shares is expensive-because equity is costly to issue and discounted by employees. And the idea that ordinary workers who own shares in their firm will stop senior managers taking bad decisions has taken another knock.

在安然倒臺之后，對雇員來說雷曼事件應該特別引起注意，它提醒雇員不要將自己太多的儲蓄和公司綁到一起。許多有才干的雇員從今之后將會要求他們的獎金以現金形式發放，也許或者要求更多的股份。這肯定會對公司招募新員工和員工持股計劃產生影響。給普通員工股權會非常昂貴–因為股票發售代價很高，而在員工那里又打折不少。而普通員工持股會阻止高級經理做出錯誤決定的想法也遭重創。

The structure of bonus schemes is more important than their level-especially in finance. Foolish short-term risk-taking could be discouraged by matching the timing of bankers’ pay to the timing of the risks they are trading. Britain’s Financial Services Authority may ask banks to put up more capital if their pay structures are dangerously risky. That makes far more sense than capping pay. But in the end companies and shareholders are better at setting salaries than bureaucrats.

獎金方案的結構遠比其數量更為重要–在金融界尤其如此。根據其對風險的交易時機制定支銀行家付薪酬的時機，不失為防止愚蠢的短期冒險行為的良策。英國金融服務當局可能會要求銀行持有更多的資金以防薪酬結構改變而帶來的風險。這比限制薪酬要有意義的多。但是最終公司和股東會比官僚設定的薪酬要好得多