評論
打印
Integrity in the financial system
2、金融體系的健全性
Let me now turn to the second dimension of inclusive capitalism that I have chosen to address—integrity in the financial system.
現在來談一談包容性資本主義的第二個方面——金融體系的穩健。
In this age of diminished trust, it is the financial sector that takes last place in opinion surveys. This might not be surprising in light of some of the behavior that triggered the global financial crisis. But it is nevertheless disturbing. As many have pointed out, the very word credit derives from the Latin word for trust.
在這個信任度下降的時代，金融部門在觀點調查中的得分最低。考慮到觸發了全球金融機構的一些行為，這也許并不令人奇怪。但這仍令人煩惱。正如許多人已經指出的，“信用”一詞恰恰來自拉丁文的“信任”。
We are all familiar with the factors behind the crisis—a financial sector that nearly collapsed because of excess. A sector that, like Icarus, in its hubris flew too close to the sun, and then fell back to earth—taking the global economy down with it.
我們都了解危機背后的一些因素——金融部門由于發展過度，幾乎坍塌。就像伊卡羅斯傲慢地飛向太陽，然后落回到地球——帶著全球經濟一起下落。
We can trace the problems to the evolution of the financial sector before the crisis. Financial actors were allowed to take excessive risks, leading to a situation whereby the profits on the upside went to the industry—and the losses on the downside were picked up by the public.
我們可以將問題追溯到危機之前金融部門的演變。我們讓金融部門冒了太多風險，導致了這樣一種狀況——經濟上行時期的利潤被金融行業納入腰包，而經濟下滑時期的損失由公眾來承擔。
Some of the greatest problems, still outstanding today, lay with the so-called too-big-to-fail firms. In the decade prior to the crisis, the balance sheets of the world’s largest banks increased by two to four-fold. With rising size came rising risk—in the form of lower capital, less stable funding, greater complexity, and more trading.
最嚴重的一些問題來自所謂的“太大而不能倒”的問題，其至今尚未解決。在危機之前的十年里，世界最大銀行的資產負債表擴張了兩到四倍。在規模擴大的同時，風險也在上升——體現在資本減少、融資穩定性下降、復雜度上升、交易量增大。
This kind of capitalism was more extractive than inclusive. The size and complexity of the megabanks meant that, in some ways, they could hold policymakers to ransom. The implicit subsidy they derived from being too-big-too-fail came from their ability to borrow more cheaply than smaller banks—magnifying risk and undercutting competition.
這種資本主義在更大程度上是選擇性的，而不是包容性的。大型銀行的規模和復雜性意味著，政策制定者可能會被它們“綁架”。這些銀行因“太大而不能倒”而獲得隱性補貼，這是因為它們能夠以比小銀行更低的成本借款，而這會加劇風險、損害競爭。
Completing the financial reform agenda
完成金融部門議程
Thankfully, the crisis has prompted a major course correction—with the understanding that the true role of the financial sector is to serve, not to rule, the economy. Its real job is to benefit people, especially by financing investment and thus helping with the creation of jobs and growth.
幸好，危機促成了重大的方向調整——這是其于這樣一種認識，即金融部門的職能是服務于實體經濟，而不是支配實體經濟。它的真正作用是為投資提供資金，從而促進創造就業和經濟增長，以此造福于人民。
As Winston Churchill once remarked, “I would rather see finance less proud and industry more content”.
正如溫斯頓·丘吉爾曾說過的，“我寧可看到金融位謙而產業位尊”。
The good news is that the international community has made progress on the reform agenda. This is especially true for banking regulation under the auspices of the Basel Committee, where we are moving forward with stronger capital and liquidity requirements. This should make the system safer, sounder, and more service oriented.
好消息是，國際社會在改革議程上已經取得一定進展。巴塞爾委員會領導下的銀行監管改革尤其如此，資本和流動性要求正在增強。這會使金融體系更加安全、更加穩健、更加以服務為導向。
The bad news is that progress is still too slow, and the finish line is still too far off. Some of this arises from the sheer complexity of the task at hand. Yet, we must acknowledge that it also stems from fierce industry pushback, and from the fatigue that is bound to set in at this point in a long race.
壞消息是，進展仍然太慢，我們距離終點線還是太遠。這在一定程度上是因為這項任務非常復雜。但我們必須承認這也是因為我們面臨巨大的行業阻力，并且在漫長的過程中已經產生疲勞情緒。
A big gap is that the too-big-to-fail problem has not yet been solved. A recent study by IMF staff shows that these banks are still major sources of systemic risk. Their implicit subsidy is still going strongly—amounting to about $70 billion in the US, and up to $300 billion in the Euro Area.
一個重要缺口是，“太大而不能倒”問題尚未得到解決。基金組織工作人員最近開展的一項研究顯示，這些銀行仍是系統性風險的重要來源。它們的隱性補貼依然很高——在美國約為 700億美元，在歐元區高達 3000億美元。
So clearly, ending too-big-to-fail must be a priority. That means tougher regulation and tighter supervision.
所以，解決“太大而不能倒”問題顯然是一個優先任務。這意味著需要實行更嚴格的監管。
Here, I believe that the new capital surcharges for systemic banks can work. We estimated that increasing the capital ratio on these banks by 2? percent, beyond the Basel III standard, can reduce the systemic risk of a trillion dollar bank by a quarter. This is a big deal.
在這方面，我認為，新的針對系統性銀行的資本附加要求能夠發揮作用。我們估計，在巴塞爾 III標準的基礎上，將對這些銀行的資本比率要求進一步提高 2.5個百分點，能夠使規模達到萬億美元的銀行的系統性風險下降四分之一。這種改善相當顯著。
Yet the problem will not go away without steps to reduce the potential for contagion. First on the agenda should be an agreement on cross-border resolution of megabanks—providing a framework to unwind them in an orderly way in case of failure. This is a gaping hole in the financial architecture right now, and it calls for countries to put the global good of financial stability ahead of their parochial concerns.
不過，如果不采取步驟降低發生波及效應的可能性，問題還是得不到解決。首先應就大型銀行的跨境破產處置達成一致——提供一個框架，在這些銀行經營失敗時，能夠有序地關閉它們。這個問題是目前金融架構中的一個重要漏洞，在這方面，各國應將全球金融穩定目標置于本國考慮因素之上。
And we should not give up just because it is hard. Let me quote John Fitzgerald Kennedy here, who famously said that “we choose to go to the moon not because it is easy, but because it is hard”.
我們不應僅僅因為難而放棄。我想引用約翰·肯尼迪說過的一句著名的話：“我們想登上月球，不是因為這很容易，而且因為這很難。”
We also need more vigor across the rest of the reform agenda—better rules for nonbanks, better monitoring of shadow banks, and better safety and transparency over derivatives, an area that is still today excessively obscure and complex. To reduce the scope for contagion, I would like to see much more progress on cross-border issues, for example, in the mutual recognition of rules for derivatives markets.
我們也需更有力地推進其他改革——改善針對非銀行機構的規則，對影子銀行進行更好的監控，提高衍生產品的安全性和透明度（這一領域目前仍然過于模糊和復雜）。同樣，為了降低產生波及效應的可能性，跨境問題需要取得更多進展，例如，共同確定衍生產品市場的規則。
Again, this is complex, and we need to be mindful of the risks of fragmenting the global financial system and hampering the flow of credit to finance investment. But complexity is not an excuse for complacency and delay.
同樣，這很復雜，我們需要考慮到分割全球金融體系以及阻礙投資信貸流動的風險。但不能因為這個問題復雜，就安于現狀和拖延不前。
